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This dissertation seeks to advance our understanding of the nature of
hallucinatory experience. It defines and contrasts the two major current theories about the
nature of perceptual experience: representationalism and naïve realism. I then argue that
most (if not all) current versions of these theories do not offer a satisfactory account of
hallucination. Finally, I propose and defend a schematic version of a Kaplanian theory for
perceptual experience that can arguably give a satisfactory account of the distinctive
nature of hallucination. I compare my proposal with similar candidates and argue that it
offers a more promising way of accounting for the relevant desiderata in a harmonious
way. In short, I propose that hallucinatory experiences are failed experiences of a special
sort. By having a hallucination, the subject fails to be in contact with worldly objects, and
this special kind of failure can be accounted for in terms of a failed reference to putative
objects. On my proposal, a hallucinatory state purports to represent a specific state-of-
the-world, but it fails to do so. This renders hallucinatory states incapable of being
(properly speaking) either veridical or falsidical. This peculiar aspect of hallucination, I
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This dissertation seeks to advance our understanding of what hallucinations are.
There is a class of mental states deserving of the label 'hallucination', which seems to be a
good candidate for a psychological kind, a kind which cuts the mind at its natural joints.
These mental states are experiences of a certain kind. In particular, they are experiences
with a sensory quality. William James (1890:528) has famously defined hallucination as
a "strictly sensational form of consciousness, as good and true a sensation as if there were
a real object there. The object happens to be not there, that is all". This definition captures
the essence of it, but a more precise description can certainly be elaborated.1
First of all, a hallucination is not a genuine contact with particular objects in the
world. In the hallucinatory occasion, the hallucinator fails to be in perceptual contact with
one or more of the objects that are phenomenally portrayed in the hallucinated scene.2
This is not to say that a hallucination cannot be in any way connected to external objects.
It may well be the case that a hallucination is triggered by an ordinary object in the
perceiver's environment. A subject, for example, may hear voices every time the vacuum
cleaner is switched on.3 The voices happen to be not there, but only in the subject's head.
Though the voices are clearly connected to the real vacuum cleaner and its annoying
noise, they are hallucinated. Being somehow connected to real things is not enough to
1 For a list of available definitions, see Aleman and Laroi (2008) and Blom (2010).
2 Properly speaking, a hallucination can be (and typically is) a hybrid perceptual state in which some
objects are genuinely perceived while others are hallucinated. For the sake of simplicity, I use the term
'hallucination' to refer to total hallucinations, or perceptual states that do not involve the subject being
perceptually related in the right way with anything in her environment. A classic example of total
hallucination is the experience had by a brain in a vat, but there are less fantastic, more mundane, real cases
of total hallucination.
3 I borrow this example from Aleman and Laroi (2008:15).
2make an experience non-hallucinatory. Subject and perceived objects must be connected
in the right way.
Moreover, a subject can hallucinate a scene with a certain object at a certain
location, and a real object may indeed be there, and look exactly like the one portrayed in
the hallucination. Macbeth might hallucinate a dagger at a certain location at which there
actually happens to be an exactly matching real dagger. The hallucinated dagger, so to
say, occludes the real one. This is a case of veridical hallucination. To complicate the
case, we can have the real object that is actually before the hallucinator trigger the
hallucinatory state. So the hallucination is not only veridical, but it is also caused by the
real object before the hallucinator. Suppose, for example, that when Macbeth sees a red
object, he hallucinates a dagger. He then sees a bloody dagger on the table, which causes
him to hallucinate a bloody dagger just where the real one is located, and just like the real
one. The possibility of hallucinations of this sort points to the fact that any satisfactory
characterization of hallucination must include an account of the relevant kind of relation
that must obtain between subject and perceived object to make the perceptual experience
non-hallucinatory. Saying that there is a real object there, that it actually causes the
perceptual experience, and that the experience portrays the scene just as it is, will not do.
Whatever hallucination is, it seems to involve some sort of failure of the relevant relation
between perceiver and perceived object.
In order to know what hallucinations are, we must also be able to demarcate it
from other phenomena. As it turns out, it is not always easy to discern where the
boundary lies between hallucination, illusion, and other phenomena. Details aside, in
illusion a certain object is actually perceived, but the object is not as it appears to be. In
3hallucination, no particular object is actually perceived.4 The relevant relation that fails to
obtain in a hallucinatory experience does obtain in the illusory case. When having an
illusion, the perceiver genuinely perceives a real object, but one or more properties of the
object are not veridically portrayed. If, for example, a green apple looks red to a subject,
due to some abnormal lighting, the subject is under an illusion. Though the subject
misperceives the color of the apple, it seems right to say that she still perceives a real
apple, but just gets its color wrong. Hallucinations, on the other hand, are not simply
misperceptions of properties of objects. In the hallucinatory occasion, there is no genuine
contact with the seeming object portrayed in the experience. The kind of disconnection
with the world is more radical in the hallucinatory case.
Hallucination must also be distinguished from non-sensational phenomena. As
remarked by William James, a hallucination is a "sensational form of consciousness".
Hallucinations are sensational and conscious by nature. There is no unconscious
hallucination, just as there is no unconscious pain. For things like pains and
hallucinations, being unconscious is an impossibility. Of course, a subject can be more or
less aware of a minor pain or a rapid hallucination. But that does not change the fact that
hallucinations and pains are, as such, conscious phenomena. Hallucination involves not
only any form of conscience, but a specific sort of sensational conscience. The kind of
sensation of a hallucinatory experience is just like the sensation one experiences in
genuine sensory perception. In James' words, it is "as good and true a sensation as if there
were a real object there". In this sense, hallucinations can be subjectively
4 This characterization of illusion is not quite accurate, as it fails to capture a sort of experience known as
veridical illusion. In a veridical illusion, similarly to a veridical hallucination, the world is portrayed in a
certain way, and things are as they appear to be. Still, the experience is illusory because it is defective in
some other respect. See Johnston (2006:272-3) for an example of veridical illusion. I set aside this case,
however, because for my purposes here the not-so-accurate characterization of illusion will suffice.
4indistinguishable from genuine veridical perceptions. They seem to have the very same
sensational texture of veridical sensory experiences.
The specific sensational nature of hallucination distinguishes it from other
phenomena, such as delusions. Delusion is a disorder in belief, not in perception. In many
cases, there is no sensational element whatsoever connected to it. In the Cotard delusion,
for instance, the subject falsely believes that she is dead.5 In another kind of delusion, the
Capgrass delusion, the subject believes that close friends and family members were
replaced by impostors. In both cases, there is no strictly sensational element being
affected. The subject, in the first case, falsely believes to be dead, but her perceptual
experiences keep unchanged. In the second case, the putative impostors are identical-
looking to their originals. The world, under the effect of Capgrass delusion, is
sensationally portrayed in the exact same way as it was before: nothing seems to go
wrong insofar as perception goes, but only when beliefs kick in. The intrinsic sensational
nature of hallucination does not admit of a mere explanation in terms of false beliefs.
Contrary to delusion, hallucination involves a sensational portrayal of the world that is, in
an important sense, defective.
Despite the familiarity of the experience, the precise meaning of hallucination is
remarkably hard to pin down. My aim here is not to offer a detailed definition of
hallucination. Rough lines will be enough to help us singling it out from other kinds of
phenomena. More importantly, the kind of clarification that I seek here has to do with a
specific confusion that arises when philosophers try to characterize the very nature or
metaphysical constitution of hallucination. Whatever hallucinations are, there is an
unquestionable set of features that at least a significant part of them seem to share. These
5 See Berrios and Luque (1995) for a comprehensive analysis of cases of Cotard delusion.
5features, as it will become clear later, may lead to various philosophical quandaries. The
very possibility of hallucination poses crucial questions that must be addressed by any
comprehensive theory of perceptual consciousness.
Hallucination has had a vital role in shaping theories in philosophy of perception.
A better grasp on the nature of hallucination is certainly an important step towards a
satisfactory theory of perceptual experience. The philosophical terrain we are about to
enter is full of pitfalls and obscurities. There is no hope of getting anything straight in this
field unless one advances with great caution. To avoid terminological confusion, I take
some space in this introduction to clarify how some key terms are going to be used here.
The term 'perception', as I use it here, refers to sensory perception: touch, taste,
smell, hearing, etc. In this sense, one cannot perceive that one will fail in the test, or that
a mathematical equation has no unique answer. Those are not the kind of things that one
can come to entertain through the senses, at least not in the same direct way as one can
perceive the scent of a flower, or the texture of a surface.
The relevant sense of perception here is also distinct from what might be called
unconscious perception. People with blindsight, for example, have large blind areas in
their visual fields, and yet they can make surprisingly accurate guesses concerning visual
stimuli in those areas.6 Even though they are not consciously aware of anything in their
blind areas, they are somehow attuned to what happens there. In a certain sense, it seems
right to say that they can perceive things that they are unconscious of. This, however, is
not the sense in which I use the term 'perception' here. In my usage, perception has a
distinctive subjective aspect. Sensory perception necessarily involves a subjective
6 See Weiskrantz (1986) for a detailed study of blindsight cases.
6portrayal that has a distinctive qualitative nature. In sensory perception, there is always
something it is like to be in that state.
In the sense in which I use the term 'experience', it is a perceptual episode in one
or more sense modality that occurs to a subject. In a less strict use of this term,
experience simpliciter can also refer to non-perceptual episodes, such as thinking,
feelings, imaginings, etc. Since I am concerned here with perceptual experience, my use
of 'experience' will refer exclusively to perceptual experience, except where otherwise
noted.7
The terms 'perception', 'experience', 'perceptual experience', and their cognates, as
they are used here, are non-success terms. Some philosophers use the term 'perception' to
denote only genuine perceptual episodes. In this latter sense, perception necessarily
involves the existence of the perceived object, as well as the obtaining of the appropriate
relation between perceiver and perceived object. My use of these terms, in contrast,
includes cases of misperception, such as hallucinatory experiences, in which the
perceptual relation fails to obtain. My favored usage, evidently, does not beg any
substantial philosophical question. Some philosophers, for instance, claim that
hallucination and genuine perception belong to radically different psychological kinds.
By sticking the same label to those cases, I do not assume any substantial metaphysical
theory. By using the terms the way I do, I only phrase some questions differently.
I take it to be intuitively evident that perceptual experiences have a certain
subjective aspect that constitutes part of the subject's conscious state. I call this the
7 Following most of the literature in philosophy of perception, I privilege visual experience. The subtleties
differentiating the various sensory modalities will be largely irrelevant to the general point I want to make
here. Maybe most people in philosophy of perception are wrong and instead of a paradigmatic case, vision
is something of a special case. The extent to which this may be so will not be discussed here in any detail.
If this is right and a significant part of the current literature is wrong, the scope of my investigation will be
restricted to visual experiences. Though it may eliminate the excitement of my investigation, I can still
maintain what is said here as a more modest claim exclusively about visual perception.
7phenomenal character of experience. An essential part of the present debate concerns the
precise nature of phenomenal character. Any account of perceptual experience must tell a
story about its phenomenal character, and this story must somehow accommodate
hallucinatory experiences. As it will become clear later, hallucination is not easily
included in a comprehensive account of the phenomenal character of perceptual
experience.8
The philosophical debate concerning the nature of perceptual experience in
general and of hallucinatory experience in particular is currently polarized between two
major views: representationalism and naïve realism. The precise kind of theories in
dispute here is itself a debating point in philosophy of perception. When we talk about
theories concerning the nature of something, it is not entirely clear what we have in
mind. In short, when I talk about the 'nature' of something, I mean to talk about its
metaphysical constitution, or what makes it what it is, and not something else. A
substantial part of this dissertation consists in clarifying what this philosophical debate is
all about. The precise claims defended by each view in dispute are made explicit, as well
as the explanatory tasks they are called on to accomplish. I characterize these views in a
way that makes the very contrast between them explicit and that is sensitive to the
relevant desiderata they address.
Since the downfall of the once dominant sense-data theory, representationalism
became gradually something close to a new orthodoxy. Representationalism comes in
many flavors. In Chapter 2, I give a more precise characterization of this view in light of
the putative explanatory roles of the notion of representational content. I also critically
8 My use of the term 'phenomenal character' is also neutral about any specific metaphysical theory about
the phenomenology of experience. Once again, philosophers vary in how they use this term, but my
terminological option begs no substantial point: it is just a matter of phrasing some question differently.
8assess the ways in which representationalists try to account for the nature of hallucination
in terms of perceptual content.
In short, a common thread running through most (if not all) representationalists is
the claim that perceptual experiences (veridical or not) fundamentally consist in the
subject representing her environment as being a certain way. According to this view,
perceptual experience, by its very nature, is a representational state of a certain kind.
Such states are said to have representational contents, which can be roughly understood
as the veridicality conditions that capture the way that things, according to the
experience, appear to be. The representational content serves several explanatory
functions. Among them, it is used to fix the phenomenology of perceptual experience, or
what it is like to undergo a certain experience. So understood, representationalism is a
theory both about the nature of perceptual experience and about its phenomenal
character.
Representationalism, as I use this term here, is hence both a thesis about the
metaphysical structure of perceptual experience and a thesis about the representational
basis of phenomenal character. Some philosophers distinguish representationalism from
intentionalism.9 They prefer to use the term 'intentionalism' to refer to a thesis about the
representational basis of phenomenal character, whereas the term 'representationalism' is
used to designate a broader thesis concerning the representational nature of experience. In
this usage, intentionalism presupposes representationalism, but not vice versa. In my
usage, however, representationalism encompasses the intentionalist thesis concerning the
representational basis of perceptual phenomenology. Representationalism is, hence, a
thesis about the metaphysical basis of perceptual experience, and it includes, among other
9 See, for example, Byrne (2001) and Wilson (2013).
9things, a claim about the ultimate psychological basis of the phenomenal character of
experience.
As usual in philosophy, no orthodoxy goes on too long without its detractors.
Naïve realism has arisen more recently as a strong opponent to the representationalist
orthodoxy. As I use this term here, naïve realism is also a view about the nature of
perceptual experience. In short, naïve realists claim that veridical perceptual experience
consists fundamentally in obtaining the perceptual relation between subject and the mind-
independent objects of experience. This view will be characterized in more detail and
criticized in Chapter 1. Though not directly a thesis about the nature of nonveridical
experiences, naïve realism constraints the range of possible accounts of such experiences.
Understanding the implications of naïve realism regarding the account of hallucinatory
experience is an essential part of the this dissertation.
A representationalist, at least qua representationalist, does not need to deny that
the subject of a veridical experience stands in a distinctive perceptual relation with mind-
independent worldly objects. What is denied is that the subject's experience
fundamentally consists in this fact. In other words, representationalists deny that the
ultimate nature, or metaphysical structure, of perceptual states consists in this fact.
Similarly, naïve realists, qua naïve realists, do not need to deny that the subject of a
perceptual experience represents her environment as being a certain way. What is denied
by the naïve realist is that perceptual experience fundamentally consists in this fact. The
sense in which these views contradict is a debating point. A substantial part of this
dissertation will be devoted to clarifying and untangling the positions in dispute.
My investigation here is focused on how naïve realists and representationalists
account for the nature of hallucinatory experience. As it will become clear, when
10
hallucination comes to the fore, they have a very hard time trying to satisfy all desiderata
they pose to themselves.
After critically assessing some of the main existing alternatives in the first two
chapters, I sketch, in Chapter 3, my own proposal. I present here only the skeleton of an
account that seems more promising than the former ones. In short, I propose a certain
version of a Kaplanian theory for perceptual experience. My proposal incorporates
relational elements, typically associated with naïve realism, into the representationalist
framework. Instead of overloading the notion of content with multiple explanatory roles,
I propose a division of the explanatory labor into distinct elements of the theory. The
distinction between hallucinatory experience and the other types of perceptual experience
is accounted for in terms of the absence of the appropriate perceptual relation between
subject and objects in the environment. The failure of this relation renders a perceptual
state incapable of picking out the putative particular object it is supposedly about.
Hallucinations, I claim, are perceptual states that fail to determine specific contents.
Properly speaking, hallucinations have no content. The world, so to say, does not
cooperate, and the experience does not represent any particular state of affairs.
Hallucination, I claim, fundamentally involves a failed reference to the world.
Admittedly, I only present a schematic version of a complete theory of
hallucination. A fully developed theory would involve an account of many issues that I
do not address here. I claim, however, that my schematic view points to a very promising
way of accounting for the relevant desiderata. I only point to a promising direction, but
the details of how to follow this route are largely left to the traveler.
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Chapter 1
Naïve Realism and Hallucination
This Chapter is divided into four sections. In the first one (1.1), I give a precise
definition of naïve realism and spell out its main desiderata. Naïve realism presents itself
as an alternative to the representationalist account of perceptual experience. The way I
conceive the naïve realist view tries to do justice to the sense in which it differs from its
competitors. In the second section (1.2), I summarize the main arguments presented by
naïve realists against the representationalist approach and respond to them. Some naïve
realists believe that representationalism faces insurmountable difficulties in its own
right.10 Given this negative argument, they claim that naïve realism is the only man left
standing. As I will argue here, these arguments are not compelling. In the third section
(1.3), I investigate how naïve realists can account for hallucinatory experience. It is well
known that the possibility of perceptual error presents a significant challenge for naïve
realism. Even if it is granted that naïve realists have offered us convincing arguments
against representationalism, they still owe us a positive account of hallucinatory
experience. I will argue they do not deliver. Lastly (1.4), I reject the possibility of
reconciling naïve realism and representationalism, at least if naïve realism is understood
as a claim about the metaphysical basis of perceptual phenomenology. I argue that naïve
realism is misguided from the start: the naïve intuition upon which it is based is simply a
misleading intuition.
10 Arguments of this kind were advanced, among others, by Travis (2004), Campbell (2002), Brewer
(2006), and more recently Conduct (2009), Wilson (2013), and Raleigh (2013).
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1.1. WHAT NAÏVE REALISM IS ALL ABOUT
Naïve realism is characterized in many different ways in the literature.11 But some
characterizations miss the crucial point in which it diverges from the representationalist
view (which it is supposed to stand against as a competitor) and do not do justice to its
deepest motivations. In what follows, I propose a characterization that captures the main
motivations behind naïve realism.
In its core, naïve realism is a theory about the nature of perceptual experience.
But what does it mean to be theory about the nature of something? As I use this term
here, a theory is about the nature of something if it aims to identify what kind of thing
that thing is, or it aims to reveal its metaphysical structure. In an important sense, the
kind of thing that something is explains the intrinsic attributes of that thing, or it provides
that by virtue of which that thing has certain interesting properties.
The question concerning the nature of perceptual experience can be understood as
the question about its psychological ground floor. Perceptual experiences are
psychological entities that have many interesting properties.12 Some of these properties
seem to be particularly important for the explanation of various phenomena. An account
of the nature of perceptual experience seems required, for instance, to explain its
phenomenological aspect, or what it is like for the perceiver to undergo a certain
experience. When we propose a theory of perceptual experience, part of what we are
trying to do is offering an account of what grounds the phenomenal character of
11 Philosophers also vary in how they label this view. Campbell (2002) calls it the "relational view",
Brewer (2004) calls it the "object view". Martin (1997), Smith (2002), Fish (2009), Kennedy (2009), and
many others, call it "naïve realism". I go with the majority here.
12 I am neutral here on the metaphysical question concerning the kind of entity that perceptual experiences
are: events, states, or what have you. I assume in what follows that they are some sort of mental state, but
nothing here bears on that.
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experiences. Perceptual experience also has an epistemological import, since it
supposedly plays some role in justifying our beliefs and knowledge of empirical facts. A
theory of perceptual experience should also explain what we can get out of having
sensory experiences, or how experiences put us in a position to know certain things about
our environment. Plausibly, perceptual experience also plays a cognitive role, as when it
makes singular demonstrative thoughts available to the subject. The behavior and
cognitive abilities of sentience creatures like us would be largely mysterious if no
account of perceptual experience is given. Moreover, an account of the nature of
perceptual experience is also required to place this entity in the order of nature as a
whole. This last requirement is part of the general project of a naturalized account of
mind and of consciousness in particular. The quest for the psychological ground floor of
perceptual experience is, in short, part of the theoretical effort of explaining how its many
key features can be explained in a non-mysterious way by the kind of thing that it is.
This talk of fundamental nature or metaphysical structure of perceptual
experience can be understood as a way of gesturing at the explanatory tasks of a
philosophical theory of perception. Among the many things that ask for an explanation,
the phenomenal character of perceptual experience has loomed the largest. But there are
other equally important desiderata. When a theory proposes an account of what
perceptual experience fundamentally consists in, it is trying to provide the ultimate
personal-level psychological explanation of the phenomenological, epistemological,
cognitive, or behavioral facts in need of explanation.
Given the explanatory demands that a philosophical account of perceptual
experience is typically expected to satisfy, I summarize the main desiderata of naïve
realism in four categories:
14
1) Metaphysical demand: naïve realism must reveal the nature or the
psychological ground floor of perceptual experience;
2) Phenomenological demand: naïve realism must fix (or explain) the
qualitative aspect of perceptual experience;
3) Epistemological demand: naïve realism must explain the justificatory role
of perceptual experience, or why conscious perceivers gain knowledge of
their environment by means of perceptual experiences;
4) Cognitive demand: naïve realism must explain how perceptual experience
can make new thoughts available (especially demonstrative thoughts about
perceived objects).
I propose now a characterization of naïve realism that is attentive to its multiple
explanatory demands and that, at the same time, does justice to the views of its main
proponents. The definition I present now attempts to capture what naïve realism is all
about:13
Naïve realism: Veridical perceptual experience consists fundamentally in
obtaining the perceptual relation between perceiving subject and the mind-
independent things that conform to the qualitative aspect of experience.
This characterization needs to be unpacked. First of all, it must be noted that
naïve realism is fundamentally a thesis about veridical perceptual experience. Cases of
perceptual error (illusion and hallucination) are not directly addressed by naïve realism.
Though not directly about nonveridical perceptual experiences, naïve realism does imply
that some accounts of perceptual error are not available. Naïve realism does not commit
itself to a particular account of nonveridical perceptual experience, but it does constraint
13 The definition I present here combines elements from Brewer (2004), Martin (1997), Fish (2009),
Kennedy (2009), Logue (2014), among others.
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the range of possible accounts. The implications of naïve realism regarding the account of
perceptual error will be discussed later. As for this moment, it suffices to say that naïve
realists owe us a story about nonveridical experience.
Another feature of naïve realism is that it consists in a thesis about the nature, or
fundamental constitution, of perceptual experience. When a naïve realist says that
veridical perceptual experience consists fundamentally in such-and-such, she holds a
claim about the very nature of veridical perceptual experience, or what it is all about.
Failing to satisfy the required conditions means failing to be a veridical perceptual
experience, and nothing can be said to be such a thing unless the required conditions are
met. Merely saying that in a veridical experience the subject perceives things in her
environment and some of their properties is hardly a controversial claim. To make naïve
realism an interesting theoretical claim, the fundamentality of this claim must be
emphasized: veridical experience fundamentally consists in obtaining a certain state of
affairs.
The definition presented here also emphasizes the fact that naïve realism
characterizes veridical perceptual experience in relational terms. The obtaining of a
certain perceptual relation defines the very nature of veridical perceptual experience. The
kind of relation at stake here is of the essence.
First of all, the perceptual relation is supposed to be direct. A relation is direct, in
the relevant sense here, only if it is not mediated by any item that may function as a
proxy or intermediary.14
14 The notion of a direct perceptual relation was famously defended by Austin (1962). It was originally
intended as a critique of the sense-data theory. In that context, the defense of direct perception was a clear
denial of mind-dependent intermediaries. However, it is far from clear whether or not the notion of direct
perception is at odds with the representationalist framework. In what follows, I refine this notion in order to
make it more interesting (or relevant) to the current debate between naïve realists and representationalists.
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More importantly, the relation is direct in the sense required here only if it cannot
be obtained in the absence of the perceived thing.15 The relata of this relation are the
perceiving subject, on the one side, and mind-independent things, on the other side.16
Since the second relatum is the worldly thing itself, and a relation cannot exist in the
absence of one of its relata, it follows from this view that only experiences perceptually
related to existing ordinary objects can meet the conditions.17
Last but not least, naïve realism defines the qualitative aspect of veridical
perceptual experience (or what it is like to the subject to undergo a certain experience) in
terms of the perceived things that stand in the perceptual relation to the subject. As
Martin (2004:64) famously put it, when a subject sees something, the external objects and
their properties "shape the contours of the subject's conscious experience".
This metaphor of shaping the contours should be interpreted here in a constitutive
sense, as opposed to a merely causal one. If, for example, the contours of a certain
landscape are altered by an earthquake, the earthquake itself does not constitute the
landscape, even though it may have caused some drastic changes (e.g. the mountains are
now lower, or the lake changed its location).18 The relevant sense here, however, is that
in which the hills are said to shape the contours of a landscape. The hills constitute the
contours, or they are the contours. This is the sense in which naïve realists claim that
15 The somewhat vague tern 'perceived thing' stands here for whatever is perceived: objects, properties,
relations, or what have you. I use the term 'thing' (and many times 'object') as a placeholder for whatever
we are directly in contact by means of perceptual experience.
16 What makes naïve realism realist is the fact that the veridical perceptual experience is defined in terms
of a relation to ordinary mind-independent things.
17 The term acquaintance is the most commonly used to name this relation. I prefer, however, to use the
less theoretically-loaded term perceptual relation. This relation can arguably be understood as a primitive
relation that cannot be reduced to any more basic relation. Being perceptually related with something, in
this sense, cannot be equated with perceptually representing something, or with any sort of causal-relation-
plus-something-else. Primitive or not, the required relation can only obtain if the actual things being
perceived are instantiated before the perceiver. Whether or not this relation should be understood in
primitive terms fall out of the scope of my dissertation.
18 This example is from Fish (2009:6).
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worldly things shape the contours of perceptual experiences. Campbell (2002:116) also
has this constitutive sense in mind when he claims that "the phenomenal character of
your experience, as you look around the room, is constituted by the actual layout of the
room itself".
The naivety of naïve realism comes precisely from this account of the qualitative
aspect of experience. The perceived objects, according to this view, contribute in a
constitutive way to the way in which objects and their properties are phenomenally
presented to us in a perceptual experience. This is often called the presentational aspect
of perceptual experience, or the naïve intuition: when undergoing a perceptual
experience, the perceived things are presented to us phenomenally.
Brewer (2006:167) claims that "perceptual experience presents us directly with
the objects in the world around us themselves". Perceptual presentation can be direct in at
least two different senses. Metaphysically, a presentation is direct if the objects perceived
necessarily constitute the perceptual experience. A subject S perceives an object o in a
metaphysically direct way if the fundamental psychological aspects of S perceiving o
cannot be fully exhausted by a psychological state whose nature does not necessarily
involve the relation with o. Perceptual presentation can also be said to be direct in a
phenomenological sense. By being directly presented with worldly objects in a perceptual
experience, these objects are also phenomenally manifest to us in a direct way. This is, in
a nutshell, the naïve intuition. As Brewer (2006) says, experience is presentational
because its qualitative aspects are fixed directly by the encounter with objects in the
world.19
19 The phenomenological directness of perceptual experience, interpreted in a naïve way (i.e., the objects
directly being manifest to us), is often used to support the naïve realist view. See, for example, Crane
(2006:139-41), Hellie (2007:266-9), Fish (2009:19-23), and Kennedy (2009:578-80).
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Pautz (2010:295) remarks that slogans to the effect that objects must be "directly
present in experience", or must "constitute essentially the experience", are imprecise and
misleading. I agree. That is why I insist to characterize the presentational nature of
perceptual experience advocated by naïve realists in a more precise way. As I use this
notion here, it comprises both a metaphysical claim about the constitution of perceptual
experience and a phenomenological claim about its qualitative aspect. In the latter sense,
naïve realism is in the business of providing the metaphysical basis of perceptual
phenomenology.
1.2. ANTI-REPRESENTATIONALISM
According to representationalists, perceptual experience fundamentally represents
the world as being a certain way. On this view. perceptual experiences have
representational content, and this content is used for multiple explanatory roles. Roughly
speaking, the representationalist theory consists in an attempt to explain the key features
of perceptual experience in terms of its representational content. Perceptual experience,
says the representationalist, is fundamentally a matter of a subject being in a certain
representational state. This state has accuracy conditions that capture the way things are
represented to be according to the experience. The representational content of a
perceptual experience is then used to fix the phenomenology of the experience, or what it
is like for the subject to undergo that experience.20 As I use this term here,
20 The relation between representational content and phenomenal character can be understood in different
ways. In its weak form, labeled weak representationalism, perceptual experiences with type-identical
contents necessarily have the same phenomenal character, and if two perceptual experiences have different
phenomenal characters, they necessarily fail to have type-identical contents. In this weak form, the
phenomenal character of an experience is metaphysically supervenient on its content. In its strong form,
called strong representationalism, the phenomenal character of a perceptual experience is equated with its
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representationalism includes a substantive theory about the phenomenal properties that
inhere our sensory states (such as the color of a patch, the pitch of a sound, a particular
smell or taste, a perceived texture, etc.).
There is widespread disagreement among representationalists as to how we should
understand the notion of content, or in which sense experiences have content.
Nonetheless, the representationalist thesis, in its more general sense, understood as a
starting point for investigations into the nature of perceptual experience, is widely shared
and hegemonic.
More recently, however, the very idea of experiences having content was
challenged by some naïve realists. Naïve realists in general deny that representational
content play a fundamental role in determining the nature of perceptual experience. But
some of them also reject the very idea that the world can be represented as being a certain
way by means of a sensory experience. In other words, some naïve realists deny that
perceptual experiences have representational content in any interesting sense.
I call this more extreme position that deny the very idea of perception as
involving some sort of representation of the world anti-representationalism. The anti-
representationalist stance consists in the claim that the notion of representation and
representational content should not be allowed to play any role in a philosophical account
of perceptual experience. As in the famous image from Wittgenstein (1953:§271), they
content. If two perceptual experiences have the same phenomenal character, they also have the same
content, and if they have identical contents, they also have the same phenomenal character. In its strong
version, representationalism consists in the claim that phenomenal character is identical to content: having
an experience with a certain qualitative character is identical to having an experience with a certain content.
It is worth noting that the strong thesis implies the weak one. So both weak and strong representationalists
are committed at least with the weak claim. For my purposes here, the weak claim is enough to qualify a
view as representationalist.
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claim that these notions are like wheels that may be turned, but that do not form part of
the mechanism.21
The crucial point of anti-representationalism is not necessarily to reject any use
whatsoever to the notion of representational content, but to claim that as it is understood
by representationalists, this notion is both incoherent and/or unnecessary. Anti-
representationalists claim that representationalists cannot deliver what they promise
because the crucial notion of representational content is deeply problematic and cannot
do the relevant job. If they are right, an alternative must be searched for. That is how
many naïve realists justify the new alternative they propose. Given the failure of
representationalism, naïve realism, they claim, is the only man left standing.
I investigate now some of the most influential arguments advanced by anti-
representationalists.22 The dialect of these arguments consists in rejecting the main
competitor in order to motivate their alternative view. All anti-representationalists I
consider here use the rejection of representationalism to motivate a version or another of
naïve realism. If they are right, or so they claim, we must accept naïve realism because
there is no other competitor in the game.
21 The same image is evoked by Travis (2004:86) and Wilson (2013:1).
22 As a matter of fact, the literature is incredibly vast and diverse. Arguments against representationalism
range from simple-minded appeals to common sense to highly sophisticated metaphysical arguments. Of
course, I do not intend to respond to all of them. I modestly select what I find the more convincing and
popular arguments used by a significant number of naïve realists to support their anti-representationalist
stance. I leave aside, for example, John McDowell's (1982, 1994, 2008) transcendental argument that naïve
realism is the only view that makes our connection with the external world non-problematic; and Martin's
(2002) argument that only naïve realism can account for sensory imagination; and Fish's (2009) claim that
representationalism cannot close the explanatory gap; and Johnston's (2006) claim that only naïve realism
can explain that fact that veridical sensory experience can give rise to more than "mere knowledge". As I
don't find these and many other arguments particularly persuasive, and given the fact that I don't have the
space to criticize all of them, what I present here is only my response to what I take to be a paradigmatic
class of arguments used to reject representationalism and support naïve realism.
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The anti-representationalist arguments are manifold.23 Campbell (2002), for
instance, claims that representational states cannot satisfactorily explain the existence of
demonstrative thoughts about perceived objects. Travis (2004), on his turn, claims that
perceptual states are not the kind of things that can be veridical or falsidical. Error, or
misperception, he claims, arise only in beliefs and judgments: perception itself is not
capable of error. Based on this idea, his argument against representationalism is twofold:
first he argues that there is no principled way of determining the representational content
of a given experience, and then he argues that even if some specific content could be
determined, it would play no relevant role, since we can explain everything in need of
explanation without resorting to the notion of content. A similar line of attack is adopted
by Brewer (2006), who argues that representationalism arises from the spurious extension
of a feature of the content of thought to the content of perception. Thoughts, he claims, in
opposition to perception, have general content. Content is general if the properties being
represented stand for indefinitely qualitatively distinct things that fall within the range
determined by some general property. Brewer argues that in perception, however,
constituents of the world themselves are presented to the subject, and such constituents
cannot be mere general categories.
I start with the argument presented by Campbell (2002).24 He claims that the
representationalist view cannot give a satisfactory account of what makes it possible for
us to have thoughts about singular external objects.25 If you are to know what my use of a
demonstrative expression such as 'that tomato' refers to, when I say that 'that tomato is
23 See Schellenberg (2014b) for a slightly different list of arguments and different answers to them.
24 McDowell (1986) advanced a similar argument, but I focus here on Campbell’s version.
25 Campbell (2002) contrasts the "Representational View" with what he calls the "Relational View", which
is nothing but a version of what I label 'naïve realism'. To avoid confusion, I stick here to my favored
terminology.
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bulgy', you must be able to perceptually single out the relevant object that I am talking
about. Perceptual singling out seems required for us to have knowledge of the reference
of demonstratives. Assuming that we can have knowledge of this kind, it follows that an
adequate account of perceptual experience must explain what grounds this kind of
knowledge.
According to Campbell (2002:45), conscious perceptual attention to an object
“must be thought of as more primitive than thought about an object”, for the first ability
grounds the second one. The representationalist view, he claims, treats perceptual
experience as just one way among many of being intentionally related to contents. If I
think about a certain tomato or if I have a visual experience of that tomato, for instance,
both states have the same content, and there is nothing about the perceptual relation,
understood in intentional (or representational) terms, that distinguishes the perceptual
relation from the intentional relation of thinking about the tomato. However, if
experience is to explain our capacity to think about particular objects, the kind of relation
between subject and perceived object must be more primitive or more direct than the
intentional relation between thoughts and their objects. For that reason, Campbell
believes that only the naïve realist view, in defending a truly direct relation with
perceived objects, can satisfactorily account for the grounding role of perception.
The kind of direct perceptual relation defended by Campbell can only take place
if the perceived object exists and it is properly related to the subject. In discussing the
difference between veridically perceiving a dagger and hallucinating a dagger, Campbell
(2002:117) says that “in the case in which there is a dagger, the object itself is a
constituent of your experience. The experience is quite different in the case of
hallucination, since there is no object to be a constituent of your experience”.
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Consider the following definition formulated by Valberg (1992:7): "By an 'object
of experience' we shall mean something present in experience: something which is right
there, available for us to pick out or focus on, and refer to demonstratively". Campbell
argues that only naïve realism can explain the fact that when enjoying an experience, the
subject is in contact with an object right there, which is directly available for
demonstrative reference. The object of experience is directly available, in this sense,
because it is not the case that it is available in virtue of the fact of something else being
available.26 The kind of priority of sensory reference, he argues, can only be explained if
experiences are allowed to make items directly available for reference. That, arguably,
distinguishes perceptual reference from any other kind of less direct reference to objects.
Johnston's (2006, 2007) case against representationalism seems to go along
similar lines. Johnston (2006:279) argued that when compared to hallucinatory
experiences (and illusions), veridical experiences have a distinctive mark: a veridical
sensory experience "presents the truthmakers for the propositions that we immediately
judge true on the basis of sensory perception". This specific function of sensory
experience cannot be confused with the mere portrayal of a scene, or the mere
presentation of propositions that might represent facts about the perceived scene.
According to Johnston, a purely representationalist account of sensory perception cannot
capture the "distinctive directness to items" of veridical perception. When a subject turns
her attention towards the particular object she is perceptually aware of, she, so to say,
have it isolated as a topic for further cognitive states such as thoughts or judgments.
Veridical experience, thus, provides new items for thoughts in a way that no other
experience can do.
26 The notion of being "directly" available, in this sense, is closely related to the notion of "non-dependent"
demonstrative reference, developed by Snowdon (1992).
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The main idea here is that sensory perception is a form of disclosure of reality,
and the presentational nature of veridical experience is essentially distinct from
representational states that do not necessarily involve the existence of the objects being
disclosed. The contrast becomes clear when we consider the distinctive power of
veridical experience of presenting new items that allow an immediate kind of knowledge
of our environment. What is so problematic about the representationalist approach,
according to Johnston (2007), is the fact that the aboutness relation holding between a
representational state and what it is about is merely contingent. However, the state of
veridically seeing something necessarily involves the presentation of what is been seen.
The connection between this state and what is presented is not an accidental feature of
that state, but "it enters into the essence of that state, partly defining what it is to be that
state" (Johnston, 2007:243).
However, as noted by McLaughlin (2010:244), the mere idea of perceived objects
being constituents of experience does not capture the essential difference between
representationalism and naïve realism. As it stands, it is still open for the
representationalist to maintain that in veridical perception the objects are constituents of
experience. Nothing blocks the representationalist from maintaining that, in veridical
perception, the subject bears a direct relation to the perceived object. This relation may
even be taken to be non-contingent. A representationalist can define veridical experience
in a way that necessarily involves the perceived object. The representationalist can say,
for example, that perceptual states have contents that specify the way the world must be
in order for the experience to be veridical, and this content can include the object of
experience. Nothing bars the representationalist, in principle, from positing object-
dependent contents. The relation of veridically seeing an object can be defined by the
representationalist as essentially containing the object as its relatum.
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McLaughlin (2010:244) stresses that Campbell leaves open “whether the visual
perceiving of the object is identical with the visual experience with the representational
content or is instead distinct from it”. Since the representationalist is free to include a
necessary relation to objects in the definition of veridical experience, Campbell and
Johnston do not offer a compelling reason against representationalism. Merely saying that
in veridical experience the object is demonstratively available to us by means of sensory
perception is not enough to put the representationalist in hot water. Campbell, as well as
Johnston, need a stronger claim to the effect that being phenomenally present in
experience cannot be accounted for in terms of being represented in experience. This
amounts to saying that the object of experience makes a non-contingent difference to the
phenomenal nature of the experience. But the specific role of perceived objects as
constituents of the phenomenal nature of experience is not made explicit by either of
them.
Campbell’s (2002:147) case against representationalism relies on the premise that
this view is “committed to saying that it is in virtue of its representational content that
experience can play its explanatory role”. The key explanatory role he (2002:114) has in
mind is that of “explaining our ability to think demonstratively about perceived objects”.
However, as emphatically stated by McLaughlin (2010:250), this premise is “simply
wrong”. The explanatory burden addressed by Campbell is transversal to the dispute
between representationalism and naïve realism. The representationalist can perfectly well
maintain that the fact that an experience is an experience of a certain object explains
certain matters, and the fact that the experience has a certain representational content
explains certain other matters. McLaughlin (2010:251) accuses Campbell of mistakenly
assuming that the representationalist view is committed to the idea that “whatever an
experience explains in virtue of being an experience of an object (or of a certain object),
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the experience explains in virtue of its representational content”. As a matter of fact,
being an experience of a certain object and being an experience with a certain
representational content can play different explanatory roles.
What makes my experience of a particular tomato, for instance, the experience
that it is goes much beyond the fact that the tomato itself is part of the representational
content. Other intentional attitudes, like thinking about the tomato, can arguably share the
same content. In this case, these two states (perceiving the tomato and thinking about the
tomato) cannot be distinguished merely by their contents: both can have the same object
in the content, namely the same tomato. The two states do not differ as well in whether or
not they are intentional, since both states are defined as intentional by
representationalists. Nonetheless, the perceptual and the cognitive states may differ in
various other ways.
One possibility is that the perceptual relation to the object differs from the
thinking relation. On this view, these relations incorporate different kinds of
intentionality, which may differ, among other things, in their higher-order functional
roles, or the conditions that must be satisfied to qualify as the appropriate relation. A
functional contrast, for example, is that the object of perception can be the input of a
thought, but the pure object of a thought cannot become the sensible object of a
perceptual experience. This asymmetry may be used to differentiate functionally different
kinds of intentional states, one being, in a certain sense, more “primitive” than the other.
Even if this explanation is not satisfactory, it cannot be simply assumed, as
Campbell did, that any intentional relation must be of a single kind, in every respect.
Moreover, the representationalist claims that the relation between subject and perceived
object is, in part, representational, and that part accounts for the phenomenal character of
experience. But nothing requires that the only admissible relation between subject and
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perceived object is representational.27 Besides representing certain things, experiences
can also, for example, be caused by worldly objects, and this causal connection can be
used to ground the capacity to refer demonstratively to objects. This is, as a matter of
fact, the standard explanation of demonstrative thought associated with the
representationalist view.28
It is surprising that Campbell does not argue against any alternative account open
to the representationalist. He (2002:116) wants to deny the view according to which “the
phenomenal character of your experience is constituted not by the way your surroundings
are, but by the contents of your representational states”, but his arguments do not touch
the phenomenological core of representationalism. Moreover, I share with McLaughlin
(2010) the opinion that Campbell does not motivate his naïve realist view against the
most classical challenge to this view: if phenomenal character is accounted for by a direct
relation with worldly objects and their properties, then what explains the phenomenal
character of illusions and hallucinations? He is silent on that matter, and he is not entitled
to be so. Campbell's anti-representationalist arguments, I conclude, are not compelling,
and he does a poor job advocating his alternative view.
Let's consider now the anti-representationalist arguments presented by Charles
Travis. He (2004:57) characterizes his target as the view that “a (given) perceptual
experience has a (given) representational content”. He is particularly concerned with the
27 According to a classical understanding of the representational relation, it consists in causal covariation
under optimal conditions (Tye, 1995:101). This means that the relation between subject and object is at
least partly causal. Pautz (2010:284) draws an important distinction between the "phenomenal question"
and the "success question", which concerns the "nature of successful perception". The account of
(veridically) perceiving something as having a relation to a certain content plus a certain causal relation
with the perceived object, though the standard view, is not obligatory for the representationalist.
28 This causal account is, in a certain sense, analogous to the causal theory of proper names: my capacity of
thinking about Aristotle is grounded in the causal chain that links my thoughts to Aristotle himself. By the
same token, my capacity of thinking about a particular tomato may be grounded in the tomato causing my
perceptual experience of it.
28
claim that perceptual experiences are the kind of things that can be true or false. Truth
and falsity, he insists, arise only in beliefs or judgments; perception itself is not capable
of error. He credits this view to Austin (1962), from whom he quotes the following
passage: “though the phrase ‘deceived by our senses’ is a common metaphor, it is a
metaphor […]. In fact, of course, our senses are dumb […], our senses do not tell us
anything, true or false” (Austin, 1962:11).
For the sake of exposition, I divide his main argument into two parts. According
to Travis, the attractiveness of Austin’s view comes in part from the impossibility of
determining the representational content of a given experience. This is the first part of his
argument. But this impossibility, he claims, should not be seen as a problem. After all,
“for what I perceive to be misleading, nothing needs to be represented as so” (Travis,
2004:64). He claims that the notion of representational content is not necessary to explain
misperception. This is the second part of his argument.
First things first. Travis assumes that the representationalist is committed to
explaining how the content of a given perceptual experience is determined. He also
assumes that this specification procedure consists in analyzing ordinary looks-reports.
According to Travis, by analyzing the use of the term 'looks' (and other terms that we
may use to speak of how things look), we may try to determine the content of particular
experiences. This procedure, in order to work, depends on the hypothesis that content is
“looks-indexed” (Travis, 2004:63). If content is “looks-indexed”, then it can possibly be
extracted from the way things are said to look (through some kind of linguistic analysis
of looks-reports). After investigating our looks-reports, however, Travis (2004) concludes
that they cannot index content. The existing reports either fail to isolate a strictly
phenomenal element (as when one says that 'this tomato looks expensive'), or they are a
matter of “factive meaning”, or of things indicating to the perceiver that the perceived
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scene is thus-and-so (as in the case of a ring on a tree trunk representing a year’s growth).
Travis (2004) then claims that in the only kind of looks-report that seems to be relevant,
representing collapses into indicating. According to Travis (2004:78), “what things look
like on this use of ‘looks’ is thus a matter of what things mean factively, or indicate”, and
this, he insists, is “precisely not a matter of things being represented as so”.29
Travis’ assumptions, that (1) the representationalist must provide a procedure for
determining specific contents of given experiences, that (2) this procedure must involve
the analysis of looks-reports, and that (3) this analysis depends on contents being looks-
indexed, are all of them controversial. In fact, I don’t feel inclined to accept any of them.
It is far from clear why the failure of a looks-index account of content should be
worrisome at all to representationalists. Pautz (2009:497) and Byrne (2009:444), for
instance, gladly grant that Travis is right here: content cannot be looks-indexed. This
claim, however, has hardly any impact on the substantial thesis that experiences have
content and that this content plays a fundamental role.30
For the sake of charity, I propose the following interpretation of Travis’ first
argument. The linguistic-analysis surface of his prose may actually point to a deeper issue
concerning the very nature of representation. Travis (2004:62) sees perception as a source
of information of the surroundings. He distinguishes two senses of representation: it can
be committed or uncommitted. Perception, he claims, is a kind of uncommitted
representation, in a sense akin to the sense in which sentences in English are not
committed to things “being some way rather than another” (Travis, 2004:61). Take, for
29 Byrne (2009) remarks that Travis (2004) ignores the most promising use of the term “looks”, that was
labeled by Jackson (1977) the “phenomenological use”. But adding more subtlety to the linguistic analysis
will hardly change the verdict that content is not looks-indexed. This will certainly not affect the point that
I want to make here.
30 Byrne (2009:444) remarks that the representationalist thesis "is not a claim about how we talk".
Perceptual experience is not a linguistic phenomenon. Whatever support there may be for
representationalism, he claims, it is not to be found in subtleties concerning how we use certain locutions.
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instance, the sentence 'Pigs swim'. An assertion of this sentence is committed to things
being thus and so, but the sentence itself cannot be said to be true or false, since it is not
committed to the world being any particular way. Indeed, the English sentence 'Pigs
swim' may be used for stating that pigs swim, but in itself the mere unasserted sentence is
not committed to things being any particular way. The distinction between committed
and uncommitted representations motivates Travis’ (2004:62) claim that perceptual
experiences have no face value: “with uncommitted representation, there is nothing either
to accept or reject; nothing purportedly so”.
According to Travis (2004), perceptual experience is a kind of “natural
representation”, and natural representation is simply not the kind of representation
implied in the notion of representational content. The “occurrence” or “instancing” of an
uncommitted representation does not mean anything by itself. It may indicate many
things, but the job of taking it as representing anything at all must be done by the
representer. Travis (2004:62) compares perception with the following case of natural
representation: the bald patches on a cat can be taken as indicating that it has mange. The
patches themselves don’t mean anything. Analogously, perceptual experiences do not
mean anything themselves. They are symptoms of the world, and they can be taken by a
representer as indications of various different things: that the cat has mange, or that it has
burns all over the body, or that it played with a razor, etc.
In the more charitable interpretation proposed here, the analysis of looks-reports
are simply used to suggest that the very notion of representational content (or the idea
that perceptual experiences are representational states) is misguided. When properly
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understood, the notion of representational content collapses into the idea that experiences
simply indicate how the world is.31
Let's look now at the second part of his argument. Travis (2004:64) defends
Austin’s idea that “rather than representing anything as so, our senses merely bring our
surroundings into view; afford us some sort of awareness of them”. In that respect,
“senses are dumb”: they are not the kind of things that can be in error. Error is a matter of
misjudging, or “failing to make out what I confront for what it is” (Travis, 2004:65). If I
see bald patches on a cat and misjudge that it has mange (when, in fact, the cat was born
that way), my senses do not misrepresent anything. It is me who failed to make out what I
see for what it is. That is an error of judgment, not an error of perception.
The main point here is that misperception can be accounted for without any
appeal to representational content. It is the very scene perceived that is misleading. The
misjudgment that things are thus-and-so cannot be simply equated with taking a
perceptual content at its face value. Misperceiving, according to Travis, consists in taking
certain misleading information as erroneously indicating something that is not the case.
Perception is informative only in the sense of bearing factive meaning (like the patches
on a cat, or the rings in a tree trunk). But factive meaning does not allow error. If the cat
with bald patches does not have mange, the patches do not misrepresent anything. The
patches are simply misleading. The difference between “factively meaning” and
“indicating” is spelled out by Travis (2004:66-7) in the following way: “if A factively
31 Byrne (2009:440) notices that “on one popular account, representation (and perceptual presentation in
particular) precisely is a matter of what things indicate (under certain conditions)”. Tree rings and cat
patches are used, ironically, to motivate the notion of representational content. In what follows, I prefer to
press a different point, but this comment by Byrne is suggestive of the fact that the view defended by
Travis does not touch upon the core of representationalism. As far as representationalism goes, different
accounts of what representing amounts to can fit the bill.
32
means B, then (if) A, B”; while “A, in indicating B, may be misleading just in virtue of
what it might have been expected to mean”.
Travis’ strategy, in a nutshell, is the following: there is no non-arbitrary way of
determining the content of a given experience. No problem, he says: it has no content.
The purportedly explanatory job of representational content (explaining misperception, or
perceptual error) cannot be done by this notion anyway. But this job can be done, he
claims, by the notion of indicating. Perceptual error, contrary to what representationalists
say, is a matter of misjudging misleading perceptual information (information that is not
itself true or false, that has no face value). The upshot is that representational content is
not a consistent notion, but we don’t need it anyway.
Travis’ argument, nonetheless, even in my more charitable interpretation, fails to
make a relevant point against representationalism. He may bring some insights
concerning an alternative account (a certain version of naïve realism), but his denial of
representationalism misses the target.32 Even if we ignore the assumption that the method
32 I prefer this argument against Travis than the one proposed by Byrne (2009). Byrne (2009) rejects
Travis’ (2004) position on the grounds that it cannot adequately account for illusions. Take the Müller-Lyer
diagram, for instance. Byrne (2009:445) claims that Travis is committed to saying that the lines look “as if
they are unequal”. The illusory experience, nonetheless, “does not imply that I have some tendency to
believe that” (Byrne, 2009:445). The power of indicating something is, according to Travis, an objective
fact concerning things in the world. Things just have an “objective look”. Travis (2004:68) says, for
instance, that the Müller-Lyer lines “do not just seem to have that look; that is actually the way they look.
(Witness the 'robustness' of the illusion)”. Byrne (2009:446) presses the point that, according to Travis’
account, the lines, properly speaking, do not look unequal: their “objective look” indicates that they are
unequal (or they just look as if they are unequal). But “looking as if” is an epistemological attitude that
involves judgment: the Müller-Lyer lines can look unequal even if they don’t look as if they are unequal.
This is the case if the subject does not believe that they are unequal; if, for instance, the subject is aware of
the illusory nature of the experience. Byrne (2009:447) concludes that Austin’s idea (that perception
“simply places our surroundings in view”) immediately puts the explanation of illusion as a challenge.
Byrne is certainly right that the defender of naïve realism has the burden of explaining the phenomenology
of illusion. But, as noted by Pautz (2009:496), there are disjunctive accounts of illusion on the market that
may fit the bill. Giving no account of something does not mean that no account can be given. Travis’
(2004) proto-version of naïve realism is certainly very schematic. It is, in fact, just a collection of insights.
The underdeveloped nature of his ideas, however, can hardly make Byrne’s criticism interesting. Byrne’s
point is too easily vindicated because his opponent is not in the business of developing a full-fledged
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for determining contents must be the analysis of appears-looks reports (which, we
granted, does not work), the mere requirement of having any such method seems
misplaced. I fail to see why the representationalist should be obliged to offer a general
procedure for determining specific contents for given perceptual experiences (or some
kind of detailed explanation of everything that is represented in particular perceptual
experiences).33
In what concerns the claim that there is a problem with the very notion of
representational content, it equally fails to touch upon the representationalist view as
such. Why is the representationalist in trouble if representational contents are understood
as uncommitted representations? The motto “perception itself is not capable of error” is
orthogonal to the very notion of content. Travis (2004) just assumes that contents must
explain perceptual error, but that is wrong. Content is not (directly) in the business of
explaining perceptual success, at least not necessarily. The idea that perceptual
experiences, in some sense, cannot be true or false, is perfectly compatible with
representationalism.34 Most part of the disagreement here, it seems to me, is merely
verbal. It depends on one’s favored use of locutions such as 'being true', or 'being in
error'. In a certain sense, perception is neither true nor false; in another sense, it is
trivially the case that one can go wrong in perception. If in one’s favored terminology
'being in error' is used only for judgments, fair enough. If the predicate 'being false'
account of illusion. Instead of the quick-and-easy criticism advanced by Byrne (2009), I prefer to
investigate how, and to what extent, Travis’ arguments actually concern the representationalist view.
33 Pautz (2010:287) claims that the representationalist is not committed to provide a “reductive
psychosemantics”, or some sort of procedure for determining content. This is a massively empirical
enquiry, and the defender of representationalism can be neutral about the details of such vastly empirical
enterprise.
34 Pautz (2009:498) makes the same point when he claims that the representationalist view is perfectly
compatible with error being a matter of false beliefs instead of false contents.
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cannot be attributed to experiences, that is fine too.35 And finally, even if some
substantive point lies behind these verbal disputes, the representationalist can give
various accounts of perceptual success. In conclusion, Travis criticizes a target that
cannot be equated with representationalism. Even if he is right, his arguments cannot
motivate the rejection of representationalism, and much less the defense of a new
alternative.
At last, I turn now to Bill Brewer's anti-representationalist arguments. Brewer
(2006:166) claims that the representationalist view is based upon the spurious extension
of two features of the contents of thoughts to the contents of perception. The first one (1)
is that contents can be true or false; the second (2) is that contents involve an ineliminable
generality. Brewer believes that both features are problematic when applied to perceptual
experience. Concerning the first feature, Brewer (2007, 2008, 2011) develops an
alternative framework in which the idea of content cannot be made to have any
interesting use. I leave this part aside. I focus here on his arguments against the second
feature, which he calls the generality problem.
According to Brewer (2006:173), perceptual content is general because the
properties it represents stand for indefinitely qualitatively distinct things, that fall within
the range determined by a general property. Michael Tye (1992:160), for example, said
that on a bright day on the beach in Santa Barbara he found himself "transfixed by the
intense blue of the Pacific Ocean". Take now Michael's experience of intense blue (or
blue27, say). His experience supposedly represents a certain shade of blue, but this
property is general, since it stands for qualitatively distinct hues: blue27,2, blue27,33, etc.
According to Brewer, the property represented in Michael's experience stands for hues
35 Whatever terminology one chooses, the “metaphors” mentioned by Austin (1962:11) can be properly
paraphrased. Sometimes it is hard to separate, in Travis (2004), the substantive claims about the nature of
perception from the mere verbal issues concerning the use of some locutions.
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within a certain range (between blue26,5 and blue27,5, say). Consequently, it is a general
property, and not the particular intense-blue which is actually instantiated by the Pacific
Ocean.
Brewer (2006:175) then argues that the representationalist view is circular:
"perceptual experience is to be characterized by its representational content, which is in
turn to be identified by a certain procedure which takes as its starting point a worldly
situation in which that very content is supposed to be determined as true". His circularity
argument assumes that the "procedure" for determining the range covered by a certain
general property is some kind of "generalization from a paradigm instance of its actual
truth". The problem, he claims, is that in order to know whether or not the paradigm case
is true, one must know the truth-conditions of the paradigm case. Given this circularity,
there is no way of determining the accuracy-conditions that define the perceptual content.
However, as noted before, the representationalist is not committed to providing a
"procedure" for determining the specific contents of perceptual experiences. Which
sensible properties enter in the content depends largely on empirical matters concerning
our sensory apparatus, discriminatory abilities, attention, and so on. Given all empirical
data, one may hypothesize that certain properties are relevant to determining the
perceptual content of a certain experience. The circularity pointed out by Brewer ignores
the fact that the accuracy conditions of a certain representational state do not come for
free, as if no empirical investigation were needed. By saying that the representational
content captures the accuracy conditions of experiences, the representationalist is not
saying that these conditions must be transparent to the perceiver. What is directly
manifest to the subject is a certain rich phenomenal experience: shapes, colors, textures,
smells, sounds, etc. What accounts for the richness of a given experience is a highly
complicated and technical question. The supposed circularity only arises if the content is
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supposed to explain the phenomenal character, and the phenomenal character is supposed
to fix the content in a way that is transparent to the perceiver. But things do not work that
way.
Brewer's (2006:174) arguments against the generality of content also appeal to the
"fundamental intuition" that in perception constituents of the physical world are
themselves presented to the subject.36 This intuition, that I call the naïve intuition,
highlights the presentational character of experience. Brewer has in mind the following
intuitive thinking: if, in perceptual experiences, we are directly presented with worldly
objects, then why aren't these objects phenomenally manifest to us, in a direct way? Why
isn't the phenomenal character explained, directly, by the encounter with objects in the
world? According to Brewer, the underlying reason why the representationalist cannot do
full justice to this intuition is the very conception of content. Perceptual content, in
important respects, is very much like the content of thoughts. Because of this similarity,
the notion of content cannot "account for the fundamental difference between perception
and thought: perception is an experiential presentation of the physical world around us,
whereas thought is not" (Brewer, 2011:56).37
The naïve intuition is taken by Brewer as a datum: any theory of perceptual
experience is committed to accommodate this intuition. Brewer's account of illusion is
illustrative of this attitude. If the world is directly presented to us in veridical experience,
36 Brewer (2006:174) claims that the general way in which things are represented “trades direct openness to
the elements of physical reality themselves, for some intellectual act of classification or categorization”. A
lot here seems to depend on a substantial metaphysical account of properties. In what follows, I circumvent
this highly complicated issue. The points I want to make do not hinge on this controversial issue.
37 There are, certainly, other remarkable differences between perception and thought. Many emphasize, for
instance, that perceptual experiences themselves do not necessarily involve concepts, whereas thoughts do.
If, for example, I look at a duck and it looks duck-like to me, this does not require my possession of the
concept DUCK, whereas thinking that it looks duck-like does. This distinction will be further explored in
what follows. For the moment, I want to highlight that Brewer is simply bringing our attention to a putative
difference between perception and thought, which is a difference that he takes to be deeply important.
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what happens in perceptual error? In a similar vein to Travis, Brewer (2006:168) claims
that the phenomenology of illusions is explained by the fact that perceived objects "have
the power to mislead us". The phenomenal character of illusion, which is an obvious
challenge for naïve realists, is explained in terms of the subject's response to the world.
An explanation of illusion along these lines is intended to save the intuition that mind-
independent things are presented to us in experience, though, maybe, in misleading ways.
Brewer's (2006:172) account of the phenomenal character of perceptual
experience has two levels: first, there is "the mind-independent direct object itself",
understood as constitutive of the phenomenal character, and secondly, there is the "way in
which the object is perceptually taken". The "way the object is taken" includes a given
point of view, a particular sense modality, and certain circumstances of perception (such
as lighting conditions, for example). All these elements that determine the perceptual
condition amount together to a third relatum of perceptual experience: a subject S
experiences object o in way W. In Brewer's own terms:
A mind-independent physical object, o, looks F to a subject, S, in virtue of the
fact that S is consciously visually acquainted with o from a point of view and in
circumstances of perception relative to which o has visually relevant similarities
with paradigm exemplars of F, where visually relevant similarities are similarities
to various kinds to which the physical processes enabling visual perception
respond similarly, as a result of both their evolutionary design and their
development over the course of our lives. (Brewer, 2011:118).
From various points of view, and in various circumstances of perception, physical
objects have visually relevant similarities with paradigms of various kinds of such
things. These may intelligibly lead us to take them as instances of such kinds […].
Illusions are cases in which the direct object of experience has such similarities
with paradigms of a kind which it is not in fact an instance. (Brewer, 2007:91).
Some of the ideas contained in these passages need to be unpacked. Consider
Brewer’s (2011, p. 120) own illustration. Subject S sees a duck. Relative to a given
viewpoint and circumstance of perception, the duck has visually relevant similarities with
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paradigm ducks, and thus it looks “ducklike”. The “relevant similarities” are de facto
similarities between physical objects, and the relation of “being visually similar with
some paradigm exemplars of a kind F” should not be confused with the application of a
concept. The kind F, that determines a range of paradigm exemplars, is not, strictly
speaking, a concept. A kind F is some sort of gestalt property (“being ducklike”, for
instance), and it is used to ground the application of properly associated concepts by
concept-users (the concept DUCK, for instance). In this sense, something “being similar
to a paradigm exemplar of a certain kind” does not involve the application of concepts (at
least not necessarily). Given that qualification, perceptual experiences of sentience
creatures that are not concept-users (such as infants and animals) pose no particular
problem to his theory.
If, for instance, subject S is in Twin-Earth and sees a twin-duck, or if, in the actual
world, S sees duck2 (a perfect replica of the first duck), Brewer’s theory is committed to
saying that S has different experiences in each case (since the objects are different, and
the perceived objects constitute the phenomenal character). Assumed that viewpoint and
perceptual circumstance are kept constant, Brewer claims that the subjective
indistinguishability of these experiences is accounted for in terms of the objects having
the same visually relevant properties (and thus, by consequence, the same relevant
similarities with paradigm exemplars of the same kind F). In all these cases (i.e. duck,
twin-duck, duck2), whatever object is perceived, it looks ducklike. Looking ducklike
accounts, thus, for the subjective indistinguishability of all these different experiences.
The “relevant similarities” are determined by the objective capacity of mind-independent
objects to affect our sensory systems in certain ways. A fully developed explanation of
what relevantly affects our perceptual system may include evolutionary design, cognitive
capacities, or whatever is found to be empirically relevant to account for our encounter
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with objects in the world. What makes some similarities relevant is, according to Brewer
(2011:102), a “largely empirical” question: a question that involves some properties of
physical objects (such as light reflectance), the operations of our sensory system, some
evolutionarily developed abilities, cognitive skills, and so on.
Brewer does not restrict himself to formulating an alternative view: he also claims
that representationalists fail to account satisfactorily for illusion. Consider the classical
case of the Müller-Lyer illusion. Brewer claims that the representationalist describes the
case roughly in the following way: a subject entertains a perceptual experience that
consists in being related with a certain representational content. The content (that fixes
the phenomenology of the experience) represents two lines of unequal length. Brewer
(2006:169) then asks: “how exactly would the world have to be for the purported
perceptual representation to be veridical?” The question here should not be confused with
the requirement of a general procedure for determining representational contents. The
point pressed here is that the representationalist faces a dilemma: either the content is not
determinate (which conflicts with the thesis that perceptual content is maximally
determinate) or the content is impossible. Since none of the horns is any promising,
Brewer concludes that the representationalist is in trouble.
Consider the second horn of the dilemma. According to Brewer (2006), in the
Müller-Lyer experiment, the endpoints of the lines are seen in their exact right place,
though the lines are represented as having unequal lengths. This is an impossible
combination, of course. Given the impossible (contradictory) combination of represented
elements, there is no way the world could be to make this content true. But if an illusion
has an impossible content, then one could know by reflection that it is falsidical. This
would eliminate the illusory character of the experience. The impossible content could
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not be representing the world, since there is no way of changing the world and making
the content veridical.
However, the account suggested by Brewer is not the only one available to the
representationalist. One possibility, offered by Pautz (2009:498), is to deny that the
representational content is falsidical, and claim that the lines look unequal only because
the perceiver is “disposed to believe falsely that they are different in length”. This reply,
argues Brewer (2011:65), is “quite implausible”: “the illusory look remains even for
perceivers with no such inclination because they are fully aware of the illusory nature of
the diagram”. Brewer’s reply, or so I argue, does not settle the matter. The
representationalist could appeal to a mere disposition to believe, which does not amount
to actually believing anything. In this case, knowledge of the illusory nature of the
diagram would function as a defeater of the inclination to believe that the lines are in fact
unequal in length, but the inclination itself could still remain.
The important point here is not how good this particular alternative offered by
Pautz is, but how Brewer’s argument is not compelling. It leaves the representationalist
with many options. Consider, for instance, the following alternative. The representational
content may be regarded as relative to what is consciously attended to. Attending to the
endpoints of the lines is one experience, with a certain representational content; attending
to both lines at once is another experience, with another content. None of the experiences
in isolation have an impossible content. Brewer (2011:69) acknowledges this alternative,
but insists that “since the whole combination is not possible, the content view is indeed
committed to impossible overall representational contents”. But now I fail to see the
problem. Impossible combinations of different experiences are ordinary phenomena.
When we have seemingly contradictory experiences, we just take a second look and
check if we have got something wrong. In the Müller-Lyer case, if a perceiver, in fact,
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consciously attends to the endpoints of the lines, then attends to both lines at once, and
finally compares both experiences, then she may well be puzzled (assuming that her
memory is working fine, etc.). Maybe she will think that there is an illusion going on, that
one of her experiences (or both of them) misrepresents the diagram. What I fail to see is
why the Müller-Lyer diagram must keep its illusory power of inclining the perceiver to a
false belief no matter how she looks at it, or how hard she works on comparing its various
looks. From a certain perspective, in certain conditions, and being attended in certain
ways, the illusion is robust. And that is all that needs to be accounted for.
Brewer (2011) also formulates another argument. The representationalist view, he
argues, lacks the adequate resources to account for the boundaries distinguishing illusions
from hallucinations. I call this the illusion-limits argument. After a certain point, it is
unlikely that an experience is illusory, instead of hallucinatory. Depending on the degree
of mismatching, an experience can lose the right to be illusory. In an illusion, an object o
illusorily looks F, while in a hallucination no object is presented, so nothing looks any
way. In the first case, according to Brewer, the object itself has an “objective look”, or de
facto similarities with paradigms, and, under certain conditions, it can be illusorily
perceived. Still, asks Brewer (2011:73), can the Müller-Lyer lines look like a perfect
circle, or can a rabbit some feet away look like the Eiffel Tower? According to Brewer,
(2011:73), “perceptual presentation is in general incompatible with extreme error”. If a
particular object o is, in fact, being presented, it is not the case that any error whatsoever
can occur. After a certain point, the very presentation of that object is implausible. It
becomes implausible that the phenomenal character is really due to the object presenting
itself in the experience. Contrary to hallucination (which is not a case of objects being
presented), illusions have limits. And the representationalist, he claims, cannot explain
these limits.
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Consider the following reply. The limits, may say the representationalist, are
“merely contingent upon the nature of the environment and the workings of subjects’
perceptual systems” (Brewer, 2011:74). Though Brewer agrees that the limits are, in
great part, a contingent empirical matter, there is a sense in which, given a fixed situation
(viewpoint and circumstance of perception), some phenomenal characters are just not
compatible with the genuine presentation of certain particular objects. In fairly ordinary
perceptual conditions, a rabbit cannot look like the Eiffel Tower. This simply cannot be a
case of the subject being perceptually acquainted with a rabbit. The very idea of “objects
being presented in experience”, or “subjects being perceptually acquainted with objects”,
cannot be reasonably applicable to such cases. The main idea here, says Brewer
(2011:74), is that “there are limits beyond which an object fails to be genuinely presented
in perception regardless of its causal involvement in the production of a representation
with the relevant false content”. That there are such limits, insists Brewer, is a datum, and
the representationalist view lacks the adequate resources to account for that.
Though thought-provoking, the illusion-limits argument is another case of
misunderstanding of the explanatory role of content. Content does not have to account for
what makes an experience an experience of a certain object. As far as content goes, there
are no limits to how extreme an illusion can be. However, the representationalist is free to
adopt various accounts of what makes an experience an illusion. She can pick, for
instance, the view that the various powers of objects to produce certain phenomenal
experiences, given certain experiential conditions, explain the bounds of illusion. This is,
of course, a massively empirical question, and representationalism is perfectly compatible
with any such empirical explanation. The only difference between the accounts of the
representationalist and the naïve realist, it seems to me, is that the former locates the
constraints in contingent causal facts concerning the relation between perceiver and
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world, whereas the latter takes the contingent facts (e.g relevant similarities, perceptual
conditions) to constitute the experience itself. Both give massively empirical explanations
of the illusion-limits, and nothing bars any of the theories from adopting the best
empirical explanation available. The representationalist is free to give any account of
“being suitably connected to an object”, and that account can perfectly explain the
relevant datum. Pautz (2010:287) reminds us that, in order to be an experience of an
object, causation is surely not enough: a “suitable degree of match between the object and
the experiential content” is also necessary. The explanation given by the
representationalist to this matching relation is at least as complicated and involves as
much contingent empirical facts as the ones available for the naïve realist.
The arguments considered here, presented by Campbell, Travis, and Brewer, are
certainly not all possible arguments against representationalism. But they are
representative of a certain strategy that has very poor prospects. If you want to vindicate a
view in philosophy of perception, you better be clear about the relevant desiderata and
show how your view does a better job satisfying them. Given the complexity and the
theoretical resources available to the main theories in the market, it is very unlikely that a
straightforward refutation of a competing theory is any promising. As I argued here, such
attempts tend to mischaracterize the target and ignore the alternatives available to the
opponent. Naïve realism may well be the best candidate, but it is not the only man left
standing. Naïve realists must show that they do a better job meeting the relevant
desiderata. And that, I claim in what follows, they do not deliver.
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1.3. NAÏVE REALIST ACCOUNTS OF HALLUCINATION
As characterized above, naïve realism is a theory about veridical perceptual
experience. The naïve realist still owe us a story about nonveridical experiences. I will
leave aside illusory experience in what follows and focus on the hallucinatory case.
Hallucination, I believe, poses a much deeper challenge for naïve realists.
When hallucinating, a subject undergoes a conscious experience, despite the fact
that there is no perceptual contact with any worldly item. Given that naïve realism
defends that perceptual experience necessarily involves a perceptual relation with mind-
independent objects, hallucinatory experience obviously does not qualify. The crucial
question is this: how can a naïve realist account for the nature of hallucinatory
experience?
I take some time now to compare the naïve realist approach with the sense-data
theory. According to the sense-data theorist, in having a perceptual experience, the
subject is directly aware of mind-dependent non-physical objects. Those are called sense
data.38 The relation between subject and mind-independent physical objects is, in an
important sense, indirect. The subject's direct awareness of sense data permits an indirect
relation between subject and the physical objects in the world.
The sense-data theory is mainly motivated by the fact that when undergoing a
perceptual experience, the subject is directly aware of something. The term sense datum
38 The term 'sense data' does not have a single use in the literature. G.E. Moore (1953), for instance, used
this term to refer to immediate objects of perception, understood as light patterns in the retina (or, in more
contemporary terms, one could refer to electric patterns in the primary visual cortex). More recently,
Bermúdez (2000) defined sense data as the surfaces of visually perceived physical objects. My use of this
term, however, follows the more widespread contemporary usage, which refers to mind-dependent non-
physical objects. The loci classici of this usage are Russell (1912), Ayer (1956), and Price (1932). More
recently, the sense-data theory was advocated by Jackson (1977), O’Shaughnessy (1980), Robinson (1994),
and García-Carpintero (2001). The way I use this term is now fairly established in the literature.
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simply names this item that one is aware of in perception. The passage below illustrates
the rationale behind the sense-data theory:
When I see a tomato there is much that I can doubt. I can doubt whether it is a
tomato that I am seeing, and not a cleverly painted piece of wax. I can doubt
whether there is a material thing there at all… One thing however I cannot doubt:
that there exists a red patch of a round and somewhat bulgy shape, standing out
from a background of other color-patches, and having a certain visual depth, and
that this whole field of color is presented to my consciousness… That something
is red and round then and there I cannot doubt… that it now exists, and that I am
conscious of it – by me at least who am conscious of it this cannot be doubted.
(Price, 1932:3).
The fact that perceptual experience presents us with some sort of item for
demonstration, or some sort of object of perception, led the sense-data theorist to develop
an item-awareness account of perceptual experience. On this view, in any perceptual
experience, there is always something, an item, that we are aware of.39
Simply denying that there is such an item will not do. A story must be told to
explain the character of the experience as it is from the perspective of the subject. In the
case of a hallucinatory experience, we want to say that there is no item one is aware of.
But then what accounts for the sensorial character of that experience? Smith (2002)
summarizes the worry as follows:
To say simply that our subject is not aware is surely to underdescribe this
situation dramatically… We need to be able to account for the perceptual
attention that may well be present in hallucination. A hallucinating subject may,
for example, be mentally focusing on one element in a hallucinated scene, and
then another, describing in minute detail what he is aware of… The sensory
features of the situation need to be accounted for. How can this be done if such
subjects are denied an object of awareness? (Smith, 2002:224).
Sense-data theorists have answered to this problem by offering a mind-dependent
item that is available for the subject independently of how the external world turns out to
39 See Pautz (2007) for a more detailed account of this feature of sense-data theory.
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be. Based on similar considerations, Johnston (2004) insisted that we need an act-object
analysis of hallucination, since hallucinations "serve up distinctive items for
demonstration". In this sense, an account of hallucinatory experience seems required to
offer some sort of item, or a relatum, to which the subject is related to.
I am certainly not interested here in rehabilitating the sense-data theory. I believe
there are compelling reasons to reject this view.40 I am only interested in comparing naïve
realism and sense-data theory. Interestingly, both theories share the same way of
approaching the nature of perception. Both sense-data theorists and naïve realists
characterize perceptual experience in fundamentally relational terms. The main difference
between them concerns the nature of the relata: the sense-data theorist claims that the
subject is related to mind-dependent objects, whereas the naïve realist says that the
subject is related to mind-independent objects. The main advantage of the sense-data
theory over the naïve realist view is the fact that both veridical and nonveridical
experiences admit of a unified account in the sense-data theory. The qualitative aspect of
hallucinatory experience and veridical experience is fixed by the sense data they are
related to. They can be related to the very same sense data, and that explains the fact that
they can be subjectively indistinguishable to the perceiver. The sense-data theory thus
provides a unified theory of the nature of perceptual experience: veridical and non-
veridical cases are equally relational, and they are related to the same things.41
40 The once hegemonic sense-data theory fell into disgrace and it is now widely regarded as emblematic of
a huge mistake in philosophy of perception. It was attacked from all flanks. There are epistemological
worries (skeptical consequences; the veil of perception), phenomenological worries (we don't see sense
data; perceptual experience seems to be transparent), and metaphysical worries (the discredit of indirect
realism; ontological profligacy), just to name a few. Sellars (1956), Wittgenstein (1953), and Austin (1962)
are among its most influential detractors. The main idea behind the fall of sense-data theory is that our
perceptual experiences show us how things are in the world, not simply something about ourselves.
Perception gives us information about the external environment, and this information grounds beliefs and
knowledge of how our surroundings are. Sense-data theory, in short, sits badly with our realist intuitions.
41 Not surprisingly, the argument from hallucination is a crucial motivation for the sense-data theory. The
force of this argument can be properly appreciated if we ask ourselves why so many philosophers for so
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Naïve realists, on the other hand, cannot offer a unified account. They are
committed to telling a different story about hallucinatory experience. Since the naïve
realist account of veridical perceptual experience cannot be naturally extended to
hallucinatory experience, the obvious way off this problem is to treat these cases
separately.42 The kind of relational account of veridical experience defended by the naïve
realist requires a relatum that is not there in the hallucinatory case. To address this
problem, the naïve realist must adopt some sort of disjunctivist account of perceptual
experience.43 We can also say that naïve realism comes at the cost of adopting
disjunctivism, since there is no independent reason for going disjunctivist.44
Disjunctivism has been characterized in many different ways.45 But not any
version of it touches the debate at stake here. Naïve realism and representationalism, as I
characterize these views, are theories about the nature of perceptual experience. The kind
of disjunctivism that is relevant to this debate must carve nature at its joints. In the
relevant sense, what is being accounted for disjunctively is the very nature of perceptual
long felt compelled to adopt a view that introduced weird entities such as sense data to account for our
everyday experiences. When a naïve realist says that the external world itself is made manifest in our
perceptual experiences, and affirms that our relation to external objects is direct and naïve, the argument
from hallucination is thus left unanswered and regains its original force: what, after all, accounts for the
nature of hallucinatory experience? If experiences are essentially relational, what is the relatum of a
hallucination?
42 Kalderon and Travis (2009) trace the historical origins of the connection between naïve realism and
disjunctivism about perceptual experience. They claim that even though Austin was not explicit about that,
he was in fact committed to a disjunctivist view. Only after Hinton (1973) this connection became fully
explicit.
43 Though widely accepted, the claim that naïve realism implies some sort of disjunctivism is denied by
Conduct (2012a). However, his proposal of a non-disjunctivist naïve realism does not survive a closer
scrutiny. I will not, though, discuss his non-orthodox view in any detail here. See Montage (2012) for a
criticism of this view, and Conduct (2012b) for a reply.
44 There has been a lot of resistance to disjunctivism about perceptual experience. See, for example,
Johnston (2004), Siegel (2004, 2008), Burge (2005), Hawthorne and Kovakovich (2006), Byrne and Logue
(2008b), Lowe (2008), Smith (2008), and Sturgeon (2008). It seems fair to say that adopting a view with so
many enemies counts as a theoretical cost: you would be better off without such a burden.
45 Martin (2006), for instance, defines disjunctivism in terms of "fundamental kinds" of experience; Byrne
and Logue (2008b) define in terms of different "mental states". See Hawthorne & Kovakovich (2006) and
Pautz (2010) for analyses of the various sorts of disjunctivism.
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states. The precise kind of disjunctivism that naïve realists have to resort to in order to
account for hallucinatory experience can be spelled out as follows:
Disjunctivism: Perceptual experience either consists fundamentally in
obtaining the perceptual relation between subject and perceived things that
conform the qualitative aspect of experience, or it fundamentally consists
in something else.
The disjuncts separate fundamentally distinct psychological kinds.46 Byrne and
Logue (2009a:ix) claim that a disjunctivist view says that "experiences in the good case
and the hallucinatory bad [case] share no mental core, that is, there is no (experiential)
mental kind that characterizes both cases". By separating fundamental mental kinds, the
disjuncts capture different ground-floor psychological facts, or facts in virtue of which
perceptual experiences have the intrinsic features they have. Phenomenal character seems
to be one of these features. The qualitative aspect of a perceptual experience is not an
accidental or contingent aspect of that mental state. Having a certain phenomenal
character is a property that experiences have in virtue of being what they are, not in virtue
of something else independent of their very nature. On that matter, I follow Mike Martin
(2006): the disjunctivist approach concerns the fundamental nature of perceptual
experience, and that nature includes the phenomenal character as a fundamental part.
Only in this distinctive sense the disjunctivist approach can serve to the naïve realist.
As characterized above, disjunctivism does not incorporate any substantive
account of the second disjunct. So it is neutral about the precise nature of hallucinatory
experience.47 The only thing that the naïve realist claims when she appeals to
46 This "fundamentality" qualification is rarely made explicit. See, for example, Burge (2005:25), Lowe
(2008:99) and Smith (2008:82). At last insofar as disjunctivism is called to rescue naïve realism, this
qualification is of the essence. See Logue (2013:113) for a defense of this claim.
47 I leave it open whether illusion should be grouped together with veridical experience or not.
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disjunctivism is that hallucination is radically different from veridical experience. But
that can't be the whole story. Naïve realists still have to offer us a substantive account of
the nature of hallucinatory experience. So far, they have only said what hallucination is
not. But we are interested here in a story about what hallucination is. When pressed with
this question, naïve realists have adopted three different lines of response. Some give a
negative account of the nature of hallucinatory experience. They claim that the only
fundamental feature of hallucination is that it is not something else. I call it the negative
disjunctivist account. Some others offer a positive account of hallucination, in which it is
defined in terms that are independent of veridical experience. I call it the positive
disjunctivist account.48 A last group tries to eliminate the need of giving any answer to
this question whatsoever. Hallucination, they claim, is not a genuine experience and it has
no phenomenal character in its own. Hallucination, as such, is not a perceptual state of
any kind. I call it the eliminativist disjunctivist account.
I will argue against each one of these alternatives. My argument against naïve
realism proceeds through a rejection of disjunctivism (as it is understood here) as a viable
account of the nature of hallucinatory experience. The argument assumes the form of a
weak redutio. Since naïve realism is committed to adopting some sort of disjunctivist
account of perception, and given that no disjunctivist account is any good on that matter,
then naïve realism must be rejected, or at least it is in serious trouble. The redutio is weak
because the alternatives considered here do not exhaust the logical space of possibilities.
The fact that there are only three disjunctivist views available to the naïve realist is itself
questionable. Though logically weak, the argument can still be persuasive enough. If it
can be shown that the disjunctivist accounts now available to the naïve realist
48 This terminology (negative/positive disjunctivism) is borrowed from Byrne and Logue (2008b:69). It has
become quite widespread recently.
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systematically fail to give a satisfactory account of hallucination, then we have at least a
good motivation to look for alternatives.49 We have reasons to be at least suspicious
about the prospects of naïve realists coming up with a satisfactory story about
hallucinatory experience.
1.3.1. Negative disjunctivism
Most defenders of naïve realism adopt some version or other of negative
disjunctivism.50 Martin (2004) has famously advocated that a hallucination consists
fundamentally in an experience that is subjectively indistinguishable from a veridical
experience from the perceptive of the perceiver. A hallucination is, therefore, something
that fundamentally looks like something that it is not, and its nature consists uniquely in
being a kind of impostor.51 As well remarked by Dancy (1995:436), negative
disjunctivism characterizes hallucination "solely by saying that it is like what it is not".
Negative disjunctivism defines hallucination in terms of subjective
indiscriminability, which is in turn characterized in terms of knowability. An experience
is subjectively indiscriminable from a veridical experience of a certain kind if and only if
it is not possible for the subject to know by introspection alone that her experience is not
49 Though not exhaustive, the alternatives considered here are certainly the most influential ones. Even if
there is some other alternative that I fail to address, I still have a point against the vast majority of naïve
realists.
50 This strategy was developed more prominently by Martin (2004) and Brewer (2011), whose views I
consider more directly here. Most naïve realists say little or nothing about hallucination, and when they do
they tend to defer to Martin's proposal. That is why I take this view to be the most popular among naïve
realists.
51 In the same vein as Martin, Child (1994:144) characterizes this view as follows: "the idea of
hallucination is derivative from that of seeing: a hallucination is simply a state of affairs in which the
subject is not seeing anything, but which is for her just like a case of vision".
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of that kind.52 On this view, phenomenal sameness and subjective indiscriminability are
distinct but closely related. If two experiences are phenomenally identical, it follows that
a subject with well-functioning discriminatory abilities will not be able to tell the
difference between them. But the converse doe not hold. Two experiences can be
subjectively indiscriminable to a subject even if they are not phenomenally identical. This
is so, for example, if the phenomenal difference is too slight and therefore inaccessible to
the subject, even if her introspective abilities are functioning properly.
The first question that arises concerns the conditions that must be satisfied in
order for a state to count as hallucinatory. Siegel (2008:210-4) pointed out that there are
obvious counterexamples to the definition above. Consider the case of cognitively
unsophisticated hallucinators. A toad, for example, may not be able to know anything at
all by introspection alone, since introspection involves higher-order representations that
cognitively simple creatures like toads may not be capable of. In this case, a toad trivially
satisfies the condition above: it is never possible for the toad to know by introspection
alone that its experience is not a veridical one. As a consequence, toads (and rocks and
tables) would be trivially hallucinating all sorts of things all the time. This is obviously
absurd.
Martin (2004:75, 2006:379-96) responded to this objection by cashing out
subjective indiscriminability in terms of impersonal knowledge. The idea is to replace the
particular subject with an ideal introspector. The improved formulation of the conditions
is the following: an experience is subjectively indistinguishable from a veridical
experience of a certain kind if and only if it is not possible for an ideal introspector to
know by introspection alone that the experience is not of that kind.
52 As I use the notion of 'introspection' here, it denotes the distinctive way in which the subject comes to
know about her own mental states, whatever that ability exactly consists in.
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Nonetheless, the "impersonal" version brings other difficulties with it. Brewer
(2011:111) compared the idealized notion of "being indistinguishable by introspection"
with the mathematical notion of "being unknowable". This comparison, however, is
problematic. Pautz (2010:275) pointed out that there is an important difference between
these cases. In the mathematical context, "being unknowable" is intuitively grasped
within the idealized mathematical framework. In the context of perceptual experience,
however, we have no basic (pretheoretical) intuition to appeal to. In the context of
perceptual experience, the impersonal condition ("being indistinguishable by
introspection") is not an epistemic condition at all, but it is an entirely primitive notion.
As a primitive notion, it is not defining hallucination in terms of something else that we
have an independent grasp on. Hallucinations, on this view, become some sort of brute
facts that resist any deeper explanation.
There is also another reason why this idealized condition seems problematic.
Being subjectively indistinguishable is accounted for in terms of what an ideal
distinguisher can distinguish. This seems circular. This would only be informative if the
kind of ability of the ideal distinguisher were defined in independent terms. This is
supposedly done by the notion of knowledge by introspection. But this notion, as pointed
out above, is unclear and cannot be explained in independent epistemic terms. As a
primitive notion, it only renames the notion that is supposedly being defined. The
property of being subjectively indistinguishable is defined in terms of the property of
being unknowable by introspection, but the explananda is as primitive and non-intuitive
as the explanandum. That is why the definition seems circular: whatever you want to
satisfy the first condition you can make it satisfy the second one, for there is no
independent procedure that can be used to test if something satisfies only the second
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condition. The right side of the bicondicional does not explain anything: it is itself in
need of explanation.53
Even if the negative epistemic criterion can be made unproblematic, it seems
insufficient to come to grips with the nature of hallucination. Smith (2008) points out that
there are a lot of non-hallucinatory experiences that meet the negative criterion (i.e. they
are subjectively indiscriminable from veridical experiences). The reason why the
negative epistemic condition does not satisfactorily demarcate the class of states that
deserve the label 'hallucination' is because it is inadequate to pick out sensorial states, and
hence inadequate to distinguish hallucinations from non-sensorial states.
Consider, for example, the experience of a very rapid flash of light.54 The subject
of such an experience can well wonder: did I just see a flash? The situation here admits of
three explanations. Maybe the subject did see a flash, but she is not sure because it was
barely detectable. The experience was, so to way, at the very threshold of her
discriminatory abilities. Another possibility is that the subject did not see anything, but
was simply 'under the impression' that she did. A third possibility is that the subject
briefly hallucinated a flash of light.
The main difference between the second and the third cases is that in the third
case the subject had a sensory experience, whereas in the second one she had no sensory
experience at all, however brief. According to Smith (2008:185), "there are here three
psychological states that need to be distinguished from each other: having a momentary
53 Responding to Siegel's (2008) criticism concerning the hallucinations of cognitively unsophisticated
creatures, Martin (2006:396) says that a simple creature do not need any capacity to introspect: we can
"attribute experience to the dog through attributing a specific take on the world, without thereby supposing
that the dog is self-aware". His negative epistemic condition says that the dog has a hallucinatory
experience iff an ideal introspector having the same experience would be unable to tell it apart from a
veridical experience. The pressing question is what distinguishes this (epistemic) condition from the
property of being subjectively indiscriminable from some matching veridical experience.
54 The example is from Smith (2008:184). This everyday case can also be found in psychological
experiments using a tachistoscope, which is a device that flashes images on a screen very briefly.
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perception, having a momentary hallucination, and having neither, but merely 'thinking'
that one has, or may have, just perceived something". The problem of a negative
epistemic criterion is that it is incapable of distinguishing hallucinatory experience from
mere 'thinking'. Merely thinking that you have a sensorial experience does not amount to
effectively having one. And hallucination, contrary to mere thinking, is intrinsically
sensorial.55
Negative disjunctivists, I conclude, have not yet offered a plausible negative
criterion that is capable of demarcating hallucinatory experiences in a non-circular way.
But this is not the only problem with this view. I offer two more arguments against
negative disjunctivism.
Martin (2002) defends the thesis that perceptual phenomenology extends beyond
what is discriminable to the subject. According to him, the "phenomenal nature" of a
perceptual experience outstrips what is subjectively distinguishable, or the "phenomenal
character". In his terminology, even though veridical experience and hallucination may
share the same "phenomenal character", they differ in "phenomenal nature". He accuses
the representationalist of believing in the myth of a common nature. Two different things,
with different natures, can surely be subjectively indistinguishable. The property of being
subjectively indistinguishable from something else does not pick out a ground-floor
psychological type. The only thing that unifies the class of states that are subjectively
indistinguishable from veridical experiences is the very property of being subjectively
indistinguishable.
55 An appeal to the distinction between a particular and an ideal discriminator will not help. Martin
(2006:378) invoked that distinction in order to respond to this criticism, but as argued by Smith (2008:187),
"there is no possible situation in which they could be discriminated". The introduction of an ideal
discriminator also pushes us back to the problem of the circularity of the epistemic criterion: what exactly
makes a situation ideally discriminable? If the ideal discriminator is also an ideal perceiver, she can hardly
be said to have the same kind of experiences that we have. If it is granted that our experiences are imperfect
and coarse-grained, then not even an ideal introspector would be able to tell the relevant cases apart.
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Martin's account, however, does not explain why hallucinations look so similar to
veridical perceptions. The negative account that he advocates can (at most) tell which
states count as indistinguishable, but the fact that those states are indistinguishable is
simply a brute fact of the world. What seems to me problematic about his view is that the
phenomenal nature of hallucination is simply left aside, as if no positive account of it
could possibly be given. Unless an account of the metaphysical ground of hallucination is
given, the fact that hallucinations have the sensorial phenomenology (possibly
indistinguishable from veridical experience) that they have is simply left unexplained.
Finally, I argue that the negative disjunctivist account is also incompatible with
the grounding intuition.56 As I use this term here, the grounding intuition is a
pretheoretical intuition concerning the fact that in hallucinating, a subject can, in
principle, acquire the capacity to have new beliefs involving phenomenal properties (such
as colors, odors, pitches, etc.). Intuitively, if a perceiver (who also has the capacity to
have beliefs) undergoes a hallucinatory experience, this perceiver can possibly acquire
the additional capacity of having novel beliefs involving the hallucinated properties.57
The force of this intuition is well illustrated by Johnston (2004).58 In the course of
investigating the nature of hallucinatory experience, Johnston defends, among other
things, the thesis that hallucinations can secure original reference to qualities, and, by so
56 The term 'grounding intuition', its definition, and the structure of the argument presented here is in great
part borrowed from Pautz (2010).
57 Contrary to Pautz (2010:266), I adopt a weaker version of the grounding intuition. Pautz needs a stronger
version (i.e., necessarily, if the individual who has the capacity to have beliefs has a hallucinatory
experience, then she thereby has the additional capacity to have novel general beliefs) because he is also
arguing against nonrelational (qualia) accounts of hallucination. My argument here has a narrower scope.
The weaker claim that hallucination can (possibly) endow individuals with the capacity to have beliefs that
they could not have before is enough for my present purposes.
58 Pautz (2009, 2011) credits the grounding intuition to Johnston (2004). But, according to Pautz (2011:20),
Johnston’s version has an epistemological character (i.e., it concerns the justification of beliefs about the
world). This strikes me as wrong. Johnston (2004) is also concerned with the res that makes de re beliefs
involving phenomenal properties possible. This point is not merely epistemological, but concerns the very
possibility of having certain beliefs.
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doing, hallucinations can ground de re knowledge of qualities. According to Johnston
(2004:130), “Frank Jackson’s Mary could come to know what red is like by hallucinating
a red thing or by having a red afterimage”. The idea here is that, intuitively, Mary can, by
means of a hallucination, come to grasp new properties that can ground beliefs of the
following kind: “this shade of red is darker than that one”. Phenomenal qualities, he
argues, are directly presented to the hallucinator, and this explains why hallucination can
ground de re knowledge of qualities. If some kind of de re knowledge can find its ground
on hallucination, there must be a res to which hallucination is related to.
Johnston (2004:141) presents an interesting experiment that supports the
grounding intuition. After being exposed to a bright monochromatic unique green light in
a dark room for a certain time, the room is illuminated and the subject afterimages a
small red patch, which is then superimposed on a small red background, causing the
subject to have a supersaturated red afterimage.59 The supersaturated red is more
saturated than any visible red in normal circumstances. This is a color that can never be
(veridically) seen, but only afterimaged. This experiment supports the thesis that novel
qualities can be experienced by means of hallucinatory experiences.
The reason why the grounding intuition poses a problem to the negative
disjunctivist account is plain to see. According to the grounding intuition, the hallucinator
can be perceptually introduced to novel properties, or properties that can endow her with
a newly acquired capacity to have beliefs involving this property. How can a mental state
that is defined in purely negative terms account for the fact that hallucinations can bring
59 Johnston takes this experiment from Hurvich (1982:187).
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new things to the mind?60 The grounding intuition calls for a positive account of the
nature of hallucinatory experience.
The argument from grounding intuition has the following structure: (premise 1)
undergoing a hallucinatory experience can endow the subject with novel cognitive
capacities; (premise 2) a merely negative condition cannot account for the possibility of a
hallucination endowing the subject with novel cognitive capacities; (conclusion) the
nature of hallucination cannot be capture by a purely negative condition.
The second premise consists in the claim that a mere negative condition cannot
possibly account for the positive attributes of hallucination. Hallucination, I grant it,
cannot make new particular objects available for thoughts, for it is not related to the
relevant re. Interestingly, the naïve realist is happy to use the grounding intuition when it
comes to objects, but they adopt an unjustified double standard when it comes to
properties. The fact that veridical perception can ground knowledge of singular
demonstratives, for example, is the main argument used by Campbell (2002) in support
of naïve realism. If the grounding role of veridical perception should be accounted for in
60 Martin claims that the explanatory power of a certain hallucination is derived from the veridical
experience it is indistinguishable from. Each hallucination corresponds to a causally matching veridical
experience. The power of triggering the same beliefs, he claims, is explained by the fact that veridical and
hallucinatory experiences are causally matching. Martin (2004:68) gives the following example: that James
is in a state subjectively indistinguishable from the veridical experience of a big fat hairy spider wouldn’t
explain his shrieking if his veridically perceiving such a spider couldn’t explain this shrieking either. It
must be noted, however, that a common proximal cause cannot fix externally-determined contents.
Moreover, Martin's account only applies to causally matching hallucinations. It may well be the case that a
hallucination and its corresponding indistinguishable veridical experience have different proximal neural
correlates. The so-called imagery/memory conception of hallucination, for instance, claims that at least
some hallucinations are realized by completely different neural processes, more akin to memory or imagery
than to veridical perception (see Macpherson and Platchias, 2013). Some drug-induced visual
hallucinations, for instance, seem to be correlated with activities in the parietal and frontal lobe, usually
associated with visual memory. Bentall and Varese (2013) also observed that auditory hallucinations of
squizofrenics are not clearly correlated with the usual neural patterns of veridical auditory experiences (see
also Cleghorn et al., 1992, and Szechtman et al., 1998). Martin's view simply rules out non-causally-
matching hallucinations a priori, but empirical evidence suggests otherwise. Making bold claims like that
from the armchair is certainly not recommendable.
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terms of the fundamental nature of perception, then, by the same token, the grounding
role of hallucination should also be accounted for in terms of the substantial nature of
hallucination. But that is exactly what the negative disjunctivist denies: hallucination has
no interesting substantial nature.
Brewer (2011:112) challenges this premise. He claims that negative conditions
are often perfectly explanatory, as, for example, when an accident is explained by a
driver failing to spot a cyclist. Though negatively defined, he insists that “hallucinatory
conditions are not blank”. Brewer interprets the negative disjunctivist strategy as a mere
theoretical characterization of a class of thick things: namely, hallucinations. Having a
hallucination, in this thick sense, is being in some condition or other with a substantial
nature. The negative characterization is a mere theoretical delineation of a class of things
that cannot be given a unified definition, since they don’t fall under any substantive
general class. The negative definition is the only one available when we try to capture
what, by its nature, is a class of diverse things. Concerning the grounding role of
hallucination, Brewer (2011:112) replies with a the following question: “If it is perfectly
clear how, had the subject’s condition been one of actually seeing an F instead, this
would have explained her capacity for beliefs whose content contains F, then why would
a condition indistinguishable from this not have served equally well?"
The cyclist example given by Brewer, or so I argue, is infelicitous. If we are after
a material explanation of a certain event (say, an accident), the lack of attention of the
driver cannot enter in the picture. In this kind of explanation, the relevant explananda is,
say, the car moving in a certain direction, or the arms of the driver doing such-and-such
movements. The kind of explanation that is pressed by the grounding intuition involves
the capacity to have novel de re beliefs. The lack of something cannot explain that. The
rhetorical question that closes the last paragraph also misses the point. The grounding
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intuition asks for a constitutive explanation of how on earth a subject can have certain
beliefs. If two states can play the same grounding role because they are phenomenally
indistinguishable, then hallucinations should also be able to ground de re thoughts about
objects, but this is admittedly not the case. The grounding capacity of a mental state
cannot be fully explained by what is like to be in that state. Having certain grounding
capacities also require a distinctive metaphysical constitution. Some states can only
ground some other states if they are appropriately related to the relevant res. This seems
to be the case with the grounding capacity of hallucination.
The first premise of the argument from grounding intuition simply states the
intuition.61 Brewer also challenges this. He (2011:113) claims that having beliefs
involves certain cognitive abilities and the use of concepts. Suppose that subject S
believes that object o is red. This can only happen if the concept RED is at S’s disposal.
The term 'concept' here is used in a broad sense: it may either be a thick concept (which
implies that the subject is a concept-user and can competently use the concept in
thoughts), or a thin concept (which only involves some specific cognitive ability, such as
tracking certain objects or properties, or grasping a certain gestalt property). Either way,
Brewer argues that hallucinations fail to provide the required material to ground beliefs.
In a hallucination, there is no tracking of an existing object or instantiated property to
ground concept-possession. As a consequence, hallucinations cannot possibly provide
concepts like RED for thoughts. Indeed, if properties like 'being red' are to be understood
as some sort of res, then hallucinations cannot plausibly track or be properly related to
61 A naïve realist might reply that this premise begs the question. But I agree with Pautz (2010:278) that
this premise is based on a deeply entrenched intuition, and simply rejecting it cannot be done without a
"serious cost". Moreover, the naïve realist is happy to start her whole philosophical theorizing motivated by
an intuition: the naïve intuition. The naïve realist takes the naïve intuition as a datum that must be
accommodated: by the same token, the grounding intuition has all the rights to be taken as a datum. It is as
good an intuition as it gets.
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those things. Hallucination, argues Brewer, cannot provide the necessary material to
ground beliefs: it is not cognitively robust enough for that.
Brewer’s requirement that perceptual experience must be cognitively robust
enough to ground belief is interestingly related to the case of agnosia. The visually
agnosic can identify some features of the object, but she fails to identify visual kinds. If
an agnosic looks at a duck, she undergoes a certain phenomenal experience, but she lacks
the capacity to have beliefs involving gestalt properties such as 'being ducklike', or 'being
roundish'.
Maybe like the agnosic's experience, the experience of a hallucinator has a certain
phenomenal character, but it lacks the capacity to ground beliefs. Pautz (2009:39) argues,
however, that the agnosic case counts against Brewer. Whatever impoverished experience
the agnosic has (say, the duck looks like "a lot of grayish dots"), it still endows the
subject with the capacity to have de re beliefs involving these impoverished experienced
properties. The agnosic's experience can ground beliefs such as "these dots are darker
than those ones". Even though the agnosic does not seem to acquire gestalt concepts, she
comes to grasp new de re elements for reference. The upshot is that the grounding role of
perception does not seem to depend on the grasp of gestalt properties . Brewer, it seems
to me, tends to equate cognitively loaded processes with ground-floor experience, but the
strictly sensorial element is thinner than Brewer’s coarse cognitive apparatus.
Brewer offers a last argument to the effect that hallucinations are not cognitively
robust enough to ground beliefs: the tracking requirement.62 In order to have a belief that
includes a certain phenomenal property, the believer should plausibly have tracked actual
instances of that property. Grasping a phenomenal property seems to involve attentional
62 Once again I borrow the terminology from Pautz (2008:46).
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tracking, which requires that the property keeps unchanged across variations in viewing
conditions. If, for example, a perceiver sees a round object, and tracks it, she can thereby
acquire the capacity to have beliefs involving the property of being roundish. Given the
absence of any trackable particular in the hallucinatory occasion, Brewer (2011:112)
concludes that, contrary to the grounding intuition, hallucinatory experience cannot offer
items for demonstrative thoughts.63
However, even if we grant, for the sake of argument, that tracking a property is
necessary for making that property available for thoughts, it seems reasonable to suppose
that the relevant sort of tracking can also take place in hallucination. Suppose, for
example, that Macbeth hallucinates what seems to him to be a bloody dagger. The
hallucinated dagger can plausibly be tracked by Macbeth. From Macbeth's perspective,
the dagger keeps its phenomenal properties (e.g. being bloody-red, being dagger-shaped)
unchanged across variations in viewing conditions and perceptual circumstances. Why
couldn't Macbeth's hallucination ground beliefs involving the property of being bloody-
red? If hallucination can be subjectively indistinguishable from veridical perception, then
it seems to follow that it can also offer trackable properties. What cannot be tracked by
Macbeth is a real dagger, for there is no such thing there to be tracked. But the grounding
role of hallucination concerns properties, not objects.64
63 Pautz (2008:47) argues against the tracking requirement by appealing to intuition: the grounding
intuition is stronger than this heavily-theoretically-loaded requirement. I find his argument unconvincing.
Empirical evidence plus a bit of theorizing can, in principle, defeat an intuition that is pretheoretically
entrenched.
64 It might be objected that we have a good grasp of the idea of tracking physical objects, but it is entirely
mysterious what the tracking conditions for hallucinatory objects would be like. However, it seems to me
that we have a fairly good grasp of the notion of tracking in such cases. Take, for example, empirical
evidence about animals’ hallucinations. Nielsen et al. (1983) studied the behavioral effects of the
administration of amphetamine to monkeys and concluded that they had hallucinatory experiences based,
among other things, on observed behaviors such as “attack or sudden threat reactions directed at invisible
objects”, or “visual tracking of invisible objects, sometimes involving coordinated patterns of ‘eating
behavior’”. The observed behaviors can be considered hallucinatory because no eliciting stimuli could be
determined for their occurrence. If the administration of a hallucinogenic drug leads a monkey to act as if it
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Negative disjunctivism, I conclude, does not seem promising. The negative
condition is problematic, the fact that hallucinations look the way they do is simply left
unexplained, and the grounding role of hallucination is not satisfactorily addressed. If
naïve realists rely on this view to account for hallucination, they are in hot water.
1.3.2. Positive disjunctivism
The second alternative available to the naïve realist is to adopt some sort of
positive disjunctivist account of hallucination. In a positive account, contrary to the
negative one, hallucination is characterized independently of veridical experience. While
veridical experience, according to the naïve realist, consists fundamentally in perceiving
mind-independent objects, hallucination, in a positive disjunctivist account, consists in
something else radically different that has its own distinctive nature, which is defined in
terms that make no reference to veridical experience. A positive disjunctivist can, for
example, hold the naïve realist account of veridical experience and defend that
hallucination, on the other hand, consists fundamentally in the subject being acquainted
with mind-dependent entities (i.e., sense data), or define hallucination in nonrelational
terms (i.e., qualia), or give a representationalist account of hallucination (e.g. a
hallucinatory experience consists in representing one's environment as being a certain
way). No matter how hallucination is defined, what makes its account positive is the fact
that its fundamental nature is not defined simply by saying what it is not, but in
independent and substantive terms. In a positive disjunctivist account, perceptual
is visually tracking invisible objects, this seems to be quite a good reason to suppose that the monkey is
tracking hallucinatory objects.
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experience is not only treated disjunctively, but each disjunct has its own nature that is
defined in positive terms.
Martin (2004:52-68) presents an argument, namely the screening-off argument,
that poses a serious challenge to the positive disjunctivist account. The details concerning
how the positive disjunctivist fill out the hallucinatory disjunct are irrelevant to this
argument. If the argument is right, no filling will do the job.
The general structure of the screening-off argument is the following: (premise 1)
veridical and hallucinatory cases have a specific experiential commonality; (premise 2)
this commonality must be fundamental, thus undermining disjunctivism; (conclusion)
positive disjunctivism is self-undermining.
The first premise consists in the uncontroversial claim that hallucination and
veridical perception can be subjectively indistinguishable from the subject's perspective.
From this follows that hallucinations and veridical perceptions can share experiential
properties, or properties concerning what-it-is-like to be in a certain state. The very
exercise of imagining what it would be like to hallucinate a red tomato, say, consists in
imagining having an experience with the same phenomenal character as a veridical
experience of a red tomato. As remarked by William James (1890:528), a hallucination is
"... as good and true a sensation as if there were a real object there".
The second premise requires some arguing. Given that veridical and hallucinatory
cases have a certain experiential commonality, in which sense is this commonality
fundamental? Plausibly, veridical and hallucinatory experiences have various
phenomenal, doxastic, and behavioral commonalities. Suppose, for example, that I
hallucinate what seems to me to be a red tomato. My hallucination looks a certain way to
me. Based on that look, I may form beliefs such as 'this shade of red is darker than that
one'. I may also be fooled by my hallucination and act accordingly, trying, for instance, to
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grasp the hallucinated tomato. All these things can also happen in veridical experiences. I
can plausibly have a veridical experience that looks the very same way to me as my
hallucination as of a red tomato. Based on that veridical experience, I may also form
beliefs about different shades of red, or stretch out my hand to grasp the tomato. All those
things are obvious commonalities. But the claim that a certain commonality is
fundamental is much less obvious.
A fundamental element of a mental state concerns its psychological ground floor,
or that in virtue of which that mental state has its intrinsic properties and is the kind of
state that it is. According to the screening-off argument, if we admit specific experiential
commonalities across veridical and hallucinatory cases, and these commonalities are
accounted for by some distinctive metaphysical basis in the hallucinatory case, then it
follows that the metaphysical basis of hallucinatory phenomenology will, so to say,
screen off the metaphysical basis of veridical experience from playing the role that naïve
realists want it to play. Naïve realists claim that the obtaining of a certain relation
between subject and mind-independent objects is the ultimate psychological ground of
veridical experience. Veridical experiences, on this view, have the specific phenomenal
character they do because they are the kind of psychological entities that they are. Having
a certain phenomenal character is, for the naïve realist, a fundamental property of a given
(veridical) perceptual state. But now something else, with a radically different
fundamental constitution, seems to share this same fundamental feature. The problem,
goes the argument, is that whatever accounts for this feature in the hallucinatory case, this
thing can just as well be extended to account for the same feature in the veridical case.
There is no non-arbitrary way of preventing the explanation of hallucinatory
phenomenology from being applied to account for veridical phenomenology. As pointed
out by Conduct (2010:207), "the onus is on the disjunctivist to explain why, even though
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in hallucination a subject is in a certain state in virtue of which the world appears to be a
certain way, no such state obtains in the [veridical] perceptual case".
Even if we assume that veridical and hallucinatory experiences have a
fundamental commonality, it could still be argued that the perceptual relation, which is
unique of veridical experience, can play some fundamental explanatory role. This unique
property of veridical perception could, for instance, be used to ground the capacity of
making de re beliefs about particular objects available.65 The screening-off argument is
perfectly fine with that. As far as the argument goes, what is being denied to the positive
disjunctivist is the possibility of using some unique fundamental property of veridical
experience to account for its qualitative or phenomenological aspects. And this
consequence, according to Martin (2004:64), is a "severe limitation on the disjunctivist’s
commitment to naïve realism", for the positive disjunctivist is now committed to saying
that "the naïve realist aspects of perception could not themselves shape the contours of
the subject’s conscious experience". If naïve realism is supposed to be (as I suppose here)
a theory about the metaphysical basis of perceptual phenomenology, then this
consequence is just not admissible for a naïve realist.
Logue (2013) is not convinced by the screening-off argument. She claims that it
simply assumes that if the phenomenal, doxastic, and behavioral features of experience
are best explained in term of X, then experience fundamentally consists in being X. In this
case, X would be required to be the ultimate psychological fact in virtue of which
experience has these features. However, she (2013:127) argues, "just because Y obtains in
virtue of X, it doesn't follow that Y obtains ultimately in virtue of X (i.e. that Y
fundamentally consists in X). For Y might obtain in virtue of X, which in turn obtains in
65 See Byrne and Logue (2008b:83-7) and Hellie (2013) for a discussion of this point.
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virtue of Z". If, for example, hallucinatory experience fundamentally consists in a certain
representational state, it does not follow from that that veridical experience must
fundamentally consist in the same kind of thing, even if both kinds of experience involve
the instantiation of the same representational properties. The reason why this is a non-
sequitor is because it is still open to the positive disjunctivist to hold that, in the veridical
case, the instantiation of the representational property obtains in virtue of a further (more
fundamental, or ultimately fundamental) psychological fact.
If, for example, I hallucinate what seems to me to be a tomato, the phenomenal
character of my hallucination may be explained by the fact that my experience
fundamentally consists in representing the world as having a (putative) tomato before me.
On the other hand, if I veridically see a tomato, even if my experience also represents the
world as being the same way (e.g.., as having a certain tomato before me), there might be
a further psychological fact that is more fundamental in the veridical case: viz., the fact
that I am seeing a real tomato. In this case, even though the shared experiential feature is
accounted for in the hallucinatory case by a fundamental property of that state, and the
veridical experience also instantiates the same property, it is still open to the positive
disjunctivist to claim that the veridical experience possesses the shared property (e.g. the
relevant representational property) in a non-fundamental way. The representational
property, in this case, is only fundamental for hallucination, but for the veridical case the
fundamental psychological fact consists in the obtaining of the appropriate perceptual
relation to the tomato.
Martin (2004:61) finds it disquieting that one thing can be fundamentally X while
another thing can be non-fundamentally also X. If X captures the fundamental nature of
something, it must pertain to the ground floor of psychology, so that nothing can be X
without being fundamentally so. Logue (2013) claims, however, that this is a fully
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unjustified metaphysical presupposition that should carry no dialectical force. Unless a
compelling argument for this metaphysical principle is produced, she argues, the worry is
simply not genuine. According to her (2013:129), this metaphysical assumption seems to
spring from nothing more than "a deeply rooted aesthetic preference for symmetry in our
metaphysics".
Though I must agree with Logue that a fully developed metaphysical justification
seems to be lacking, I argue here that some suggestive considerations may serve at least
as a first-pass justification. This first-pass justification, I claim, can at least pass the
burden of proof back to Logue.
Take Logue's own example. Consider a positive disjunctivist account that
combines a naïve realist account of veridical perception with a representationalist account
of hallucination. In the veridical case, the subject perceptually represents such-and-such
in virtue of veridically perceiving some objects and their properties. In this case, the
obtaining of the right kind of relation to worldly objects constitutes the ultimate
psychological fact in virtue of which the experience has the intrinsic phenomenal,
doxastic, and behavioral features that it does. In the hallucinatory case, on the other hand,
the hallucinator represents such-and-such, and there is no further psychological fact in
virtue of which the representational state obtains.
What reason is there, however, for saying that there is a further psychological fact
in the veridical case? The only reason, as far as I can see, to add this ad hoc amendment
is to rescue positive disjunctivism from the screening-off argument. Logue (2013:130)
claims that the reason for introducing a further psychological fact is "whatever reason we
have for thinking naïve realism is true". Fair enough. But when she does that, she only
shows (if anything) that naïve realism plus positive disjunctivism is a metaphysically
possible view. However, in its interesting sense, naïve realism also wants to be a good
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metaphysical explanation of the phenomenology of experience. If a property that is
possessed by veridical experience in a non-fundamental way is capable of fundamentally
grounding the same phenomenal features of some other kind of state, then the supposedly
fundamental constitution of veridical experience seems to be explanatorily idle when it
comes to explaining phenomenology. If the same qualitative properties can be ultimately
grounded in some element that is also present in veridical perception, then it is simply
mysterious why it does not do the same grounding job in the veridical case. This move
might well be metaphysically possible, but it seems unlovely.
Even if Logue is right, and there is a region in the metaphysically possible space
that positive disjunctivism can occupy, this bit of space doesn't seem to be a very
hospitable place for naïve realism to be settled. The screening-off argument, as I conceive
it, aims to eliminate explanatorily idle elements from philosophical explanations of
certain phenomena. The argument is not (necessarily) saying that the target theories are
metaphysically impossible, but only that they fail to offer a reasonable explanation of the
relevant phenomena. The pressing question is not whether or not it is metaphysically
possible that the ultimate psychological ground of veridical cases differ from the ground
of hallucinatory cases, but which explanatory roles the ground of veridical cases should
be allowed to play.
Logue seems to be partly aware of this uncomfortable situation, and that is why
she admits that her suggestion may not count as a good account of perceptual
phenomenology. But then she (2013:116) tries a desperate maneuver: it may well be the
case that no one theory of perceptual experience can deliver everything we want from it.
Explaining phenomenal sameness is only one desideratum, but there are other desiderata
on the table. If no theory can accommodate all desiderata, then we must figure out which
desiderata are more important and leave the others aside. Following this suggestion,
69
naïve realism should reduce its scope and abandon the ambition of explaining the
ultimate nature of perceptual phenomenology.66
First of all, I am baffled by the insinuation that phenomenal sameness is not
among the most important desiderata. But I will not press this point here. It suffices to
say that arguments pro et contra a certain view in philosophy of perception form a huge
inference to the best explanation. Leaving out of your theory the explanation of
something as important as phenomenal sameness counts at least as a first-pass reason
against your view. If it could be convincingly argued that no one theory can
accommodate all desiderata, then this strategy could get some traction. But insofar as this
argument is missing, we should keep looking for a view with more explanatory power.
I conclude that the prospects of positive disjunctivism coming to the rescue of
naïve realism are dim. The screening-off argument presents a serious challenge that is not
satisfactorily met by positive disjunctivists. If the naïve realist relies on a positive
disjunctivist account of hallucination, then she is again in hot water.
66 Logue (2013:116) suggests that phenomenal commonality may be such that it admits of no
psychological explanation. In this case, the fact that two states are phenomenally alike is simply a brute fact
of nature. There is simply no underlying psychological commonality that explains phenomenal
commonality. Thau (2004:249), for instance, defended that phenomenal sameness is a matter of
neurological, as opposed to psychological, similarities. The consequences of adopting this view open a
whole new set of questions that fall out of the scope of my dissertation. A neurological explanation of
sensory phenomenology seems to imply a reductive account of perceptual consciousness. On this view, an
experience has the phenomenal character it does ultimately in virtue of some neurological fact. Logue
(2013:116) claims that the lack of a psychological explanation should not count against positive
disjunctivism. Why on earth, she asks, do we need any such explanation? There are brute facts in nature, so
why can't phenomenal sameness be one of them? I find this maneuver deeply problematic. Isn't it the very
point of elaborating a philosophical theory of perceptual experience to explain things like phenomenal
sameness? The dialectical point in which we find ourselves when we oppose naïve realism and
representationalism does not admit such wonderings. If perceptual phenomenology is nothing but a brute
fact, the motivations for being either naïve realist or representationalist seems to be totally undermined.
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1.3.3. Eliminativist disjunctivism
There is a last disjunctivist account available for naïve realists: eliminativist
disjunctivism. The eliminativist denies that veridical and hallucinatory experiences can
actually share the same phenomenal character. This denial is motivated by the following
reasoning: if the phenomenal character of veridical experience is accounted for in
relational terms (i.e., the naïve realist view), and if the perceived object constitutes the
experience as a necessary relatum, then veridical experience and hallucination cannot be
phenomenally identical. Since the perceived object is supposed to shape the contours of
the experience, or fix its phenomenology, making therefore a constitutive difference to its
phenomenal character, then experiences that lack the appropriate relation with the same
objects cannot be phenomenally identical.
Fish (2008, 2009) has prominently defended this sort of eliminativism.67 He
claims that, properly speaking, hallucinations have no phenomenal character. By
eliminating the qualitative aspect of hallucinations, the whole difficulty faced by negative
and positive disjunctivism simply disappears: there is no putative factum in need of
explanation. There is no phenomenal sameness to be accounted for. There is, so to say,
no genuine phenomenology when it comes to hallucinatory experience. Instead of
actually undergoing an experience that phenomenally portrays the world as being a
certain way, the hallucinator simply believes/thinks/judges mistakenly that she is
undergoing a genuine sensorial perception, or an experience with a genuine phenomenal
character.
67 The label 'eliminativist disjunctivism' is not from Fish, even though he has often qualified his view as
eliminativist. Soteriou (2005) defends a view along the same lines, but I focus here exclusively on Fish's
version.
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Though not a genuine sensorial experience, a hallucination can obviously be
indistinguishable from a veridical experience from the subject's perspective. This
indistinguishability, according to Fish (2008:146), can be accounted for in terms of
discriminatory context (i.e. "the subject's discriminatory capacities and the observation
conditions under which the discrimination is attempted"). This notion of discrimination is
borrowed from Williamson (1990), who defines this term as a purely epistemic notion. In
short, the idea is that two experiences are subjectively indistinguishable if and only if the
subject cannot know by introspection alone that they are not identical. In this sense, the
fact that two experiences are subjectively indistinguishable for a given subject is a
contingent fact and a topic for empirical investigation. Different experiences can be
subjectively indistinguishable for different subjects under different conditions.
Even though it is a largely empirical question, Fish sketches a possible answer
that might deliver the relevant explanation: maybe hallucinations are generated by a
deficit in the meta-cognitive skill of "reality discrimination".68 Reality discrimination is
characterized as "the ability we have of telling mental episodes that are internally
generated apart from real veridical experiences" (Fish, 2008:157). Though, properly
speaking, hallucination has no phenomenal character, due to some meta-cognitive deficit,
the hallucinator mistakenly believes that she has a sensory experience with a specific
phenomenal character. But the hallucinator is simply wrong.69
Though hallucination has no phenomenal character, there is something it is like to
hallucinate, of course. But the explanation of “something-it-is-like claims”, according to
Fish (2008:160), is that when a perceiver hallucinates, she falsely believes that she has a
68 Fish (2008) borrows this notion of "reality discrimination" from Slade and Bentall (1990:125).
69 Hilbert (2004:188) summarized the core claim of the eliminativist view in the following way: "the
immediate objects of hallucination are just as we take them to be".
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perceptual experience. Since having a perceptual experience implies believing that “there
is something it is like to see something”, then the phenomenal impression is a
consequence of this false belief. Fish (2008:160) explicitly inverts the “standard order of
explanation”. In the hallucinatory case, it is not the phenomenal experience that generates
the perceptual belief, but the other way around. On this view, hallucination is a byproduct
of false beliefs of a certain kind.
This inversion of the order of explanation does not come for free. Fish (2009:98)
claims that "we can explain everything we need to explain (in other words, everything a
hallucinating subject thinks, says, and does) by appeal to the beliefs that a hallucinating
subject forms". However, as pointed out by Logue (2010:32), "the beliefs the hallucinator
forms cannot explain one crucial thing: why the hallucinator has those beliefs in the first
place". We are supposed here to give a plausible account of why a certain perceptual
state has the cognitive consequences that it does. Fish's inversion simply begs the
relevant question: hallucinations are equated with cognitive states, but the reason why
those cognitive states arise in the first place is simply mysterious.
The experience of numerically distinct but identical-looking objects poses another
problem to the eliminativist. Since, on this view, perceptual phenomenology is shaped in
a unique way by the perceived object, then it follows that numerically distinct objects, no
matter how similar they are, result in phenomenally distinct experiences. On the face of
it, this is an extremely counter-intuitive consequence. When objects have very similar
looks, such as Austin's lemon and the cleverly disguised bar of soap that looks exactly
like the lemon, the perceiver simply fails to tell the difference, but as a matter of fact,
according the Fish, there is a difference there to be told. Experiences of such objects are
subjectively indistinguishable, on this view, because the perceiver can't tell the
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difference. This again inverts the intuitive order of explanation: the perceiver fails to tell
the difference because the objects look alike.
The eliminativist is committed to the odd view that cognitive states, such as
beliefs and judgments, can generate in the subject an experience that, from her
perspective, has the same rich sensorial texture as sensory experiences. The subject of a
hallucination, for example, simply fails to tell (by introspection) that she is not actually in
a sensorial state at all. Introspectively, beliefs and sensory experiences can be
subjectively indistinguishable. The fact that a subject can miss some fine-grained
difference between distinct looking experiences is a mundane and uncontroversial fact.
The problem with the eliminativist account, however, is that the introspective powers of a
hallucinator must be as bad as to systematically deceive her into believing that she has an
experience with phenomenal character when, in fact, she is in a state that lacks
phenomenal character altogether. This kind of introspective error is much more than a
mere extension of the former, mundane, one. It is highly implausible that introspection
can be that bad, and systematically so.70
The hallucinations of cognitively unsophisticated creatures poses one more
challenge to this view. According to Fish (2008), cognitively simple hallucinators do not
have real experiences. The allegedly hallucinatory experiences of such creatures are
nothing more than behavioral reactions to certain cognitive or perceptual disorders. In
this case, hallucination is not only non-phenomenal, but it is also a non-cognitive
phenomenon. The hallucination of a toad, for example, is akin to some sort of reflex
action. The only thing in common between the unconscious state that characterizes the
toad's hallucination and a veridical experience of the toad is the fact that both things lead
70 Schwitzgebel (2008:253), who is very critical about the powers of introspection, admits that this sort of
systematic introspective error is not plausible.
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to the same externally observed behavior. Once again, the intuitive order of explanation
is inverted: unsophisticated creatures do not behave the way they do because they have
the experiences they have, but we assign to them certain experiences because they behave
the way they do.
This behaviorally-based, or "effect-based", conception of animal's hallucination
seems deeply unsatisfactory.71 Siegel (2008:8) points out that this view "does not ensure
that hallucinations have any felt reality from the point of view of the hallucinator". For
unsophisticated creatures, there is nothing it is like to be in a hallucination.72 A lethargic
cat (assuming that cats are unsophisticated) that hallucinates a butterfly but remains quiet
is, in this view, a theoretical impossibility.73 As far as I can see, Fish offers no
independent reason to depriving animals from having genuine hallucinatory experiences.
His account of such cases looks like a desperate move to save his theoretical
commitments.
In conclusion, the eliminativist account of hallucination fares no better than the
other ones. Being eliminativist about the phenomenal nature of hallucination is a very
bold move that brings on all sorts of counter-intuitive consequences. This view is not just
odd, but it is also incapable of satisfying various explanatory demands. Given the
71 Logue (2010:30) offers the following argument against Fish's account of hallucination: "compare a dog's
hallucination as of a black cat against a green wall in broad daylight with a dog's hallucination as of a white
cat against a green wall in broad daylight". Assuming that dogs are cognitively unsophisticated creatures,
Fish's account cannot distinguish these different experiences. It is unlikely that the color of the cat will
make any difference to the way the dog will behave towards it (or to how it will be disposed to behave). In
both cases, the dog will plausibly chase the hallucinatory cat. The example is interesting, but I am not so
sure that the relevant difference cannot be accounted for in dispositional terms. Moreover, Fish could just
deny that the cat looks any way to the dog.
72 Along similar lines, Johnston (2004:124) insists that "being susceptible to visual hallucination is a
liability which comes with having a visual system, i.e., comes with being able to see, and does not require
the operation of the ability to think or believe or reflectively grasp the fact that you are seeing, any more
than seeing requires this".
73 This example is from Siegel (2008).
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prospects of the disjunctivist accounts available to naïve realism, I conclude that
hallucination still poses a serious challenge for this view.
1.4. THE NAÏVE INTUITION
I framed the debate about the nature of perceptual experience in terms of a dispute
between two opposing views: representationalism, on the one side, and naïve realism, on
the other. I dedicated most of this chapter to highlighting some problems with the naïve
realist view. Given the polarization of the debate, the criticism of one side aims at making
the other alternative more appealing. As part of a huge inference to the best explanation,
the arguments presented here aim to cast doubt on the explanatory virtues of naïve
realism.
The strategy adopted here presupposes that the views in dispute in fact contradict.
This, however, is not entirely clear. Some philosophers have argued that we can reconcile
these views in a unified hybrid view.74 The attempts of reconciling naïve realism and
representationalism, however, change substantial aspects of these views. Understood in
its full glory, as a claim about the metaphysical structure of perceptual experience, and
given that desiderata it aims to satisfy, naïve realism shall not be combined with anything
else, but it shall be abandoned.
Logue (2014), for instance, claims that naïve realism is compatible with the claim
that experiences have content. This claim can be interpreted in many ways, and Logue
distinguishes three different senses in which experiences have content. I am particularly
interested in what she calls the "Spicy Content View", which corresponds to what I
74 See, for example, Logue (2013, 2014), Siegel (2010), and Schellenberg (2010, 2011).
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conceive as the representationalist view. According to Logue (2014:225), "the Spicy
Content View consists in the claim that perceptual experience fundamentally consists in
the subject perceptually representing her environment as being a certain way". Contra
what is commonly accepted, she claims that this view is compatible with naïve realism.
Her strategy consists in weakening the explanatory scope of naïve realism. She
(2014:240) argues that "a philosophical theory of perceptual experience has several
explanatory tasks", thus "it's in principle possible to divide the labor across Naïve
Realism and the Spicy Content View". The idea, in short, is to explain the
epistemological role of perception in naïve realist terms, and the phenomenology of
perception in representational terms. The upshot of this strategy, as she claims
(2014:240), "is that Naïve Realism and the Spicy Content View need not be in
competition with each other".
Logue's reconciliation project can only get off the ground if we grant that naïve
realism can be weakened in the way that she proposes. But I am not willing to grant her
that. Naïve realists claim that veridical experience consists fundamentally in obtaining a
certain relation between subject and worldly objects that conform the qualitative aspect
of experience. The phenomenal nature of perceptual experience is part of what is being
accounted for by the ultimate psychological constitution of veridical perceptual states.
Logue's maneuver ends up abandoning the very naïveté of naïve realism. A theory that is
not in the business of explaining the phenomenology of veridical experience in terms of
its ultimate metaphysical constitution can hardly be called naïve realist. If some property,
possessed by veridical experience in a non-fundamental way, is allowed to ultimately
explain the phenomenal character of experiences, then the basic psychological nature of
veridical experience seems to become explanatorily redundant with respect to its
phenomenology. If the qualitative aspect is explained by a non-fundamental property,
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naïve realism, understood as a claim about the fundamental link between perceptual
relation and phenomenology, cannot be maintained. Only by making naïve realism non-
naïve Logue is capable of reconciling it with the representationalist view. At least as I use
the term 'naïve realism', Logue does not combine this view with anything else, but she
simply abandons it.
Susanna Schellenberg (2010) also argues that the views according to which
perceptual experience is fundamentally relational do not need to be taken to be in conflict
with views according to which perceptual experience is fundamentally representational.
She detects two main desiderata of any philosophical account of perceptual experience: it
should account for the particular object of an experience making a difference to
individuating the experience, and it should explain the possibility of experiences of
different objects (or of no objects at all) being subjectively indistinguishable. The first
desideratum is easily satisfied by a relational account of experience, whereas the second
one is easily satisfied by a representational account.
According to relationalism, "perceptual experience is fundamentally a matter of
standing in an awareness or an acquaintance relation to objects" (Schellenberg, 2010:19).
This is very closely related to the view I called naïve realism. Representationalism, on its
turn, consists in the claim that "perceptual experience is fundamentally a matter of
representing objects".75 Given the fundamentality of both claims, they seem to contradict.
However, Schellenberg argues that the conflict is only apparent: a satisfactory account of
perceptual experience should be, at the same time, fundamentally relational and
representational.
75 Schellenberg (2010:20) defines representationalism in a way that is neutral about the specific
"relationship between the content and the phenomenology of experience". My use of this term is more
committal on that matter. But since her use is more permissive than mine, it includes the views I call
representationalist and many others. I am interested here in how my more restricted class of views can be
combined with fundamentally relational views.
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The reason why these views seem to contradict is straightforward. They both want
to explain the phenomenology of sensory experience in terms of its basic metaphysical
structure, and they advocate different accounts of its basic psychological nature.
Schellenberg can combine relationalism and representationalism because she rejects what
she calls the "austere" version of both views. By so doing, she rejects the naïve account
of phenomenology that is advocated by austere relationalists. But naïve realism, in its full
glory, does include the naïve phenomenal thesis. This thesis is a claim about why, when
an object appears some way to the subject, the subject is appeared to in a certain way.
According to this thesis, this is so because there is a perceived object that constitutes the
way that the subject is appeared to, or the phenomenology of that appearance. In Martin's
words, the perceived objects "shape the contours" of the experience. By connecting this
claim with the view that Schellenberg calls "austere relationalism" and by rejecting this
view, Schellenberg is not combining what I call 'naïve realism' with anything else. She is
also rejecting this view and proposing an altogether non-naïve view in its place.76
The attempts of combining naïve realism and representationalism only retain the
relational claim of naïve realism, but they cannot retain the metaphysical and
phenomenological claims that come along. Naïve realism, or so I argue, has to be
abandoned, and not combined with something else. It is misguided from the start: the
naïve intuition upon which it is based is simply a misleading intuition.
The naïve intuition consists in a certain pre-theoretical understanding of the
qualitative nature of our perceptual experiences. Brewer (2006:167), for example, claims
that we must acknowledge the following intuition: "perceptual experience presents us
directly with the objects in the world around us themselves". The intuition concerns the
76 Schellenberg's proposal will be discussed later in Chapter 3.
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phenomenology of such direct presentation of the world. If we are directly presented with
worldly objects in perceptual experiences, why aren't the objects phenomenally manifest
to us in a direct way? Why, wonders the naïve realist, isn't the phenomenal character of
our experiences explained, directly, by our encounter with objects in the world? Brewer
(2011:56) claims that only the naïve realist can do full justice to the intuitive fact that
"perception is an experiential presentation of the physical world around us".
I want to emphasize the phenomenological reading of this intuition. In its
interesting sense, the naïve intuition concerns the nature of phenomenal character.
Following Pautz (2010:295), I believe that slogans to the effect that objects are "directly
presented in experience", or that objects "constitute essentially experience", are imprecise
and cut no icy. In order to avoid loose talk and come to grips with the deepest motivation
for naïve realism, we should interpret the naïve intuition as concerning the nature of the
phenomenological aspect of experience.
I have argued in this Chapter that naïve realists have a very hard time trying to
account for the nature of hallucinatory experience. One may well wonder why some
philosophers still insist to pay this price and defend naïve realism. As far as I can see,
their deepest motivation (if not the only one left) is the putative factum of the naïve
intuition. The reason why I insisted to define the naïve realist view as essentially
incorporating the naïve intuition is because this intuition seems to play a crucial role in
motivating this view from the very start. As far as I can see, the naïve intuition is the
deepest reason why naïve realists are so reluctant to accept any approximation with
representationalism. The centrality of this intuition makes naïve realism incompatible
80
with representationalism. In its deepest sense, the naïve intuition implies an account of
phenomenal character that is entirely at odds with the representationalist view.77
Given the centrality of the naïve intuition and the fact that it cannot be
accommodated by the representationalist, the pressing question is the following: can we
simply reject the naïve intuition?
First of all, we must admit that there is a prima facie plausibility in the naïve
intuition. In this sense, it qualifies as a genuine intuition. As remarked by Pautz
(2010:286), it is "built into our very concept of seeing". In a certain sense, we intuitively
think that the objects of our experiences constitute the experience's phenomenology. But
the intuitive pull of this thought seems to rely on a much less intuitive idea. As far as the
intuition goes, no precise meaning is given to the sense in which objects constitute the
phenomenology. Maybe naïve realism originates from a certain tendency, well illustrated
by Austin (1962) and Travis (2004), of giving more importance to the way we ordinarily
talk of perception than it deserves. Maybe this intuition is simply built in the way we talk
of seeing, but no substantial metaphysical thesis is implied by those locutions.
I agree with Pautz (2010:296) that the naïve intuition is itself unclear and cannot
be consulted in order to adjudicate theoretical disputes. The whole idea that the
phenomenal character of a certain experience is the way it is "by-virtue-of" the
presentation of certain objects is entirely obscure. The "by-virtue-of" relation is not
spelled out in any precise way. And if it is accounted for in precise terms, the specific
account will not come out naturally from the intuition. As it stands, the intuition serves as
no guide for any specific interpretation of this relation. As argued by Pautz, the precise
definition of the "by-virtue-of" relation will be a theoretically-loaded claim that could
77 Pautz (2010:291) offers some good reasons why the naïve intuition cannot be made consistent with the
representationalist view.
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hardly be said to follow from the original pretheoretical intuition itself. The reason why
this relation is not clearly spelled out, I think, is simply because the naïve intuition, in and
by itself, is nothing more than a vague intuition. It is a vague intuition based on the way
we ordinarily talk of perception. As far as this intuition goes, any account whatsoever of
the constitutive role of objects can be given. The theorist is completely free to do her job:
the intuition does not settle the matter in any relevant way. In particular, the intuition
does not directly support any specific claim about the phenomenal nature of perceptual
experience.
If the naïve realist faces all the difficulties discussed here mainly because of her
allegiance to the naïve intuition, and given the vague nature of this intuition, I conclude
that we have good reasons to reject the naïve intuition as it is usually interpreted by naïve
realists. In an important sense, naïve realism is an immense theoretical effort to save the
naïve intuition, and the payoff of this effort seems to be meager.
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Chapter 2
The Content of Hallucination
In the previous Chapter, I argued that naïve realism fails to do justice to the nature
of hallucination. Now I want to investigate whether representationalist accounts fare any
better. This Chapter is structured as follows: (2.1) I first define representationalism and
summarize the standard explanatory roles attributed to representational content; (2.2)
Then I defend the view that perceptual experiences (at least veridical ones) have singular
content; (2.3) The singular content view typically leads to content-disjunctivism about
perceptual experience. I consider and reject the most natural account, according to which
perceptual experiences have either singular or existential contents; (2.4) I then consider
the view that hallucination has gappy content and reject that too; (2.5) The failure of
content-disjunctivist views have motivated alternative accounts. I consider and criticize
one of them: the set-theoretic account of content; (2.6) Finally, I wrap up the discussion
and propose a revision of the standard role played by the notion of content. I will argue
that the this notion has been loaded with irreconcilable explanatory demands. This will
pave the way for my own proposal, which I sketch in Chapter 3.
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2.1. REPRESENTATIONALISM AND THE PUTATIVE ROLES OF CONTENT
According to the most popular view among philosophers of mind, perceptual
experiences, by their very nature, represent the world as being a certain way.78 More
importantly, they fundamentally consist in the subject representing her environment as
being a certain way. On this view, a perceptual experience is a representational state of a
certain kind. Such state is (at least partly) individuated in terms of its content, which is
roughly understood as the veridicality conditions that capture the way things appear to be
according to the experience.
Paradigm cases of representation include maps, photographs, and language.
Similar to maps, photos, and utterances, mental states such as beliefs and thoughts also
seem to have an intentional nature (i.e., they are about some state of affairs, which may
or may not obtain). States like beliefs depend for their accuracy on a match between the
mental state and the way the world is.79 While this account is plausible enough for beliefs
and other propositional attitudes, its extension to perceptual experience is less obvious
because of its phenomenal or qualitative aspects.
Representationalism, in short, consists in extending the intentional account to
perceptual experience. Just like maps, photos, utterances, thoughts, and beliefs,
perceptual experiences are also essentially about some state of affairs that may or may
not obtain. The underlying idea that intentionality is the "mark of the mental", usually
credited to Brentano (1874), certainly runs deep into the representationalist theory. In
very rough terms, representationalists account for perceptual experience in terms of an
78 This theory originated with Anscombe (1965) and Hintikka (1969), but it gained its current shape in the
works of Harman (1990), Tye (1995, 2000), Dretske (1995), Lycan (1996), Shoemaker (1994), Chalmers
(1996), Crane (2001), Byrne (2001), Pautz (2009), Siegel (2010a), among many others.
79 Sellars (1956) and Fodor (1975) have classically stated that the state of affairs (which may or may not
obtain) that an intentional state is about constitutes its representational content.
84
intentional state that is directed towards some object and/or property which that state is
about.
The notion of 'representation', and of 'representational content', can be understood
in various ways. Representationalists vary a lot in how these notions are understood.80
Independently of how each representationalist fills in the details, they all agree that being
a perceptual experience consists in being a representational state of a certain kind. They
also agree that a representational state is partly defined by its content. More importantly,
they account for the phenomenal character of perceptual experience in terms of its
representational content.81
Merely saying that every perceptual experience has some sort of content
associated with it and that this content captures the way things perceptually appear to the
subject is not enough.82 Representationalists are not only committed to saying that
80 A popular representationalist view was developed by Michael Tye. According to Tye (1995:101), "for
each state S of object x, within the relevant set of alternative states of x, we may define what the state
represents as follows: S represents that P = df If optimal conditions obtain, S is tokened in x if and only if P
and because P." Classical examples of such relation includes rings in tree trunks and thermometers. The
idea here is to explain the aboutness of perceptual experience in terms of a specific notion of
representation, which finds its origins in Stampe (1977) and Stalnaker (1984). Assuming that a certain
perceptual system is functioning properly, an that it reliably tracks distal features of the environment, and
assuming that the resulting perceptual states covary under optimal conditions with these features, it seems
plausible to suppose that these perceptual states represent those features, i.e. they are about these features
(shapes, colors, etc.). As stated by Tye (1995:105), "if optimal or ideal perceptual conditions obtain,
sensory states of the sort found in perception track the presence of certain external features; they thereby
represent those features". Similar notions of representation were developed by Dretske (1988, 1995) and
Fodor (1990). Though very influential and popular, views of this kind are not mandatory to
representationalists. I cite them here just to illustrate some possible representationalist accounts.
81 As previously stated here, this relation between representational content and phenomenal character can
assume a weak (i.e., perceptual experiences with identical contents necessarily have the same phenomenal
character, and if two perceptual experiences have different phenomenal characters, they necessarily fail to
have identical contents) or a strong (i.e., the phenomenal character of a perceptual experience is identical
with its content: if two perceptual experiences have the same phenomenal character, they also have the
same content, and if they have identical contents, they also have the same phenomenal character) form.
The second form implies the first one, but not vice versa. I assume here that representationalists are
committed at least with the weak version.
82 Pautz (2009), Siegel (2010), Schellenberg (2011), and Logue (2014) have noted that a loose (or weak)
interpretation of the claim that perceptual experiences have perceptual content makes this claim trivial or at
least uninteresting insofar as it can be accepted by both representationalists and naïve realists. The way I
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experiences have contents in a loose sense, but they are also committed to the stronger
claim that the subject representing her environment as being a certain way, which is
captured by the notion of perceptual content, consists in the ultimate nature of perceptual
experience. The fundamentality of this claim is of the essence. To say that perceptual
experience fundamentally consists in X is to say that it is ultimately in virtue of X that it
has its intrinsic psychological features. Features like the phenomenal character of
perceptual states, or their cognitive and epistemological roles, seem to be ultimately
grounded in whatever counts as the fundamental nature of these states.
Representationalism, in this strong sense, is a claim about the psychological ground floor
of perceptual states.
All that said, I propose the following characterization of representationalism:
Representationalism: perceptual experience is fundamentally a matter of
a subject being in a certain representational state defined in terms of its
representational content, which captures the way things are represented to
be according to the experience, and this content fixes the phenomenal
character of the experience.
Assuming that perceptual experiences have content, the obvious question that
arises is what precisely is explained in terms of contents. Representationalists deploy the
notion of content for various explanatory purposes. I now summarize the main putative
roles that this notion has been called on to play. In the next sections, different accounts of
perceptual content are assessed as to how well they accomplish these various tasks.
Firstly, the content of a perceptual experience captures its accuracy conditions.
Perceptual experiences, according to representationalism, are states that represent the
define these views tries to uncover their deepest commitments and the reasons why they resist a rough-and-
ready reconciliation.
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world as being a certain way. The way the world is represented to be is explained in
terms of the conditions that must be satisfied in order to make that state an accurate
representation of the world. The content is nothing but these conditions. If this constraint
is not met, it is hard to make sense of the notion of representational content altogether.
Secondly, representationalism explains the phenomenology of perceptual
experiences in representational terms. Contents are supposed to fix (or explain) the
phenomenal character of experiences.
Thirdly, a theory about perception should explain perceptual error. Perceptual
experiences are typically classified by philosophers in three types: veridical perception,
illusion, and hallucination. Illusions and hallucinations are grouped together as
nonveridical experiences, or as cases in which perception goes wrong. Since, according
to representationalism, experiences are representational states with accuracy conditions,
perceptual error is naturally explained as a case of inaccurate representation. Just like a
belief or any other intentional state, a perception can misrepresent the world. When this
happens, its content fails to match the world. According to this view, veridical experience
is an accurate representation in which the perceived objects are as they appear to be. If,
for instance, I perceive a red tomato before me, and there is in fact a red tomato there, I
have a veridical experience. In an illusion, the perceived objects lack at least one of the
properties they are perceived to have. For example, if a green tomato looks red to me, due
to some unusual lighting conditions, I experience an illusion. Finally, in a hallucination at
least one of the objects that seem to be perceived is not in fact perceived. Though there is
no genuine contact with what seems to be a particular object on the hallucinatory
occasion, hallucinations still involve a conscious portrayal of the world as being some
way. I do, for instance, have the visual experience as of a red tomato before me, even
though there is nothing there to be seen. This also seems to qualify as an inaccurate
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representation: once again, my conscious portrayal of the world fails to match the reality.
According to this standard explanation, giving the accuracy conditions of perceptual
experience also amounts to accounting for perceptual error. Since contents capture the
accuracy conditions of experiences, they also account for the different types of perceptual
error.
The fourth task concerns the following intuition: in a veridical experience, we
seem to be directly in contact with ordinary objects, and as we see these objects, they
look some way to us.83 I call it the direct realist intuition.84 If I see a tomato, for example,
I see it directly. As Tye (2009:77) puts it, "there is no tomato-like sense impression that
stands as an intermediary between the tomato and me". By seeing the tomato, I do not
experience something else, some sort of tomato-picture, over and above the tomato itself
and its properties. This intuition seems to carry serious metaphysical and epistemological
consequences. If our perceptual contact with the world is not direct in the sense of us
being directly aware of external mind-independent objects and their properties, an
intermediate layer of mind-dependent objects of a mysterious metaphysical nature seems
to stand between perceivers and perceived things.85 Moreover, perceptual experiences
play an epistemological role: it seems that our knowledge of contingent facts derives
from perception. If perception is not direct in the sense required by this intuition, its
epistemological powers seem to be at risk. Intermediaries introduce the infamous veil of
83 This intuition has had a significant impact on theories in philosophy of perception. It has classically
motivated disjunctivist accounts of perceptual experience, as in Hinton (1973), Snowdon (1990) and Martin
(2002).
84 This is often called the 'naïve intuition', but I prefer to save this term for the distinctive intuition
associated with the naïve realist view, which I already discussed in Chapter 1. As I use the term 'naïve
intuition', it refers to the intuition that, as we veridically perceive the world, external objects "shape the
contours of the subject's conscious experience" (Martin, 2004:64). The naïve intuition has a precise
phenomenological sense that I want to avoid here.
85 The sense-data theory did precisely that, and for well-known reasons this view is accused, among other
things, of being metaphysically unsustainable.
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perception. In short, the intuition is realist because we seem to be in contact with
ordinary things in the world, and it is direct because nothing mediates this relation. It
seems to follow from this intuition that the content of perceptual experience includes the
worldly entities we are perceptually in contact with. According to Tye (2014b.:2), "on
pain of losing direct contact with the object, that suggests that the object itself figures in
the content of the experience, assuming that experience is representational at all".
Finally, perceptual experiences play a cognitive role: they make new contents
available for thought. In perceiving, the subject can, in principle, acquire the capacity to
have new thoughts involving what is perceptually presented (e.g. colors, shapes,
particular objects). My having a perceptual experience of this tomato seems to make this
object available for de re thoughts. I can, for instance, think of this tomato that it looks
red. The same seems true for de re thoughts about qualities. My experience of a certain
shade of red seems to ground my capacity to have de re thoughts to the effect that this
shade of red looks more similar to that shade of orange then to that shade of blue. Given
the representationalist framework, it seems natural to suppose that which things an
experience makes available for thought should have something to do with the content of
the experience. The fact that my experience represents this tomato and this shade of red
explains why I can, thereby, have the capacity to have de re thoughts about these things.
2.2. PERCEPTUAL EXPERIENCE AND SINGULAR CONTENT
Even if it is granted that perceptual experience is fundamentally a representational
state of some sort, and that its content fixes its phenomenology, it is still left open what
sort of thing the content is. The debate here is often phrased in terms of the classical
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dispute between Russellianism and Fregeanism.86 Albeit I am inclined to favor the
Russellian view, I prefer to be neutral on that dispute here.87 Instead of starting with this
massive philosophical quarrel, I prefer to investigate how well certain features of content
fare when they are deployed to explain the putative roles of this notion. In an important
sense, my discussion here is transversal to the Russellianism/Fregeanism debate.88
Whatever sort of thing content is, it has some features that may do better or worse in
accounting for the relevant desiderata.
I want to start with the following question: does perceptual experience have
singular content?89 Let's first consider a radical position that claims that experience has
no singular content at all. Perceptual experience, according to this view, has only
86 Roughly speaking, Russellian contents are structured complexes the constituents of which are worldly
entities (such as objects and properties), whereas Fregean contents are structured complexes the
constituents of which are modes of presentation of referents (which are worldly entities, such as objects and
properties). See Speaks (2009:545) for a more precise definition.
87 Here are some of the reasons for my inclination. According to the direct realist intuition, by seeing this
tomato, I do not experience something else, some sort of tomato-picture, over and above the tomato itself
and its properties. On that matter, Fregean modes of presentation look awfully like mental intermediaries.
Fregeanism also seems at odds with the intuitive view that the phenomenology of perceptual experience
seems to be, at least in part, the phenomenology of being aware of objects and their properties. When I see
a red and bulgy tomato, it is the redness and bulginess of this specific tomato that makes it the case that
when I am visually aware of this object and its properties my visual experience has the phenomenal
character it does. This point is pressed by Masrour (forth.): "if contents consist in Fregean modes of
presentation then it is unclear why being aware of contents would have the phenomenology of being aware
of objects and their properties". Furthermore, the very notion of modes of presentation, as applied to
perceptual experience, is in need of refinement. It seems to introduce a new class of items (senses) to which
no criteria of individuation is offered. Speaks (2009:546) argues that in trying to provide constraints on
when two experiences have identical or different senses, Fregeans face a dilemma: they either have to deny
the transparency of experience (i.e. the thesis that by introspecting a perceptual experience we do not
become aware of features of the experience itself), or they end up making the notion of sense unintelligible.
Tye (2014a) agrees with Speaks (2009) on that matter, and adds that Fregean contents also sits badly with
the view that perceptual content is nonconceptual.
88 Even though I phrase the discussion in somewhat Russellian terms, I believe that a Fregean can translate
my prose into her favored terminology without loss.
89 Another, more Russellian, way of phasing this question is to ask whether or not particular objects are
components of the content of perceptual experience. For present purposes, you can phrase the question as
you please.
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existentially quantified items, that represent the world as having some object or other that
has certain properties (e.g. size, shape, color). I call it the purely existential thesis.
This view faces obvious counterexamples. Suppose I have the visual experience
of a red circle. If no particularity is allowed in the content, my experience simply
represents the world as having an object x such that it is red & circular. Let's now
suppose that there is no such object in front of me. As far as the content of my experience
goes, any red & circular object anywhere in the world at any time will make my
experience veridical. This is clearly nonsense.90
In order to avoid obvious counterexamples, some kind of singularity, such as
particular places and times, must be allowed in the content. This leads to the impure
existential thesis.91 According to this view, when I have the visual experience of a red
circle in front of me, I represent the world as having an object x such that it is red &
circular & it is at some spatio-temporal location l.92 This view may look attractive
because it seems to get the phenomenology of experience right. Particular objects seem to
have no impact on phenomenology. Intuitively, experiences of two identical-looking but
numerically distinct objects can have the very same phenomenology. Even a
hallucination, in which no particular object is actually perceived, can have the same
phenomenology of a veridical perception. The phenomenological sameness of these
experiences is explained by the existential thesis in a very straightforward way: they
simply share the same content.
90 Schroeder & Caplan (2007:596) and Tye (2009:555) point to the absurd consequences of this view.
91 McGinn (1982), Millar (1991), and Davis (1992) defend views of this type. Davis (1992:26), for
instance, says that "we can take perceptual content to be existentially quantified content. A visual
experience may present the world as containing an object of a certain size and shape, in a certain direction,
at a certain distance from the subject".
92 This is obviously an oversimplification. Maybe the subject of the experience, or the viewpoint from
which the scene is perceived, also have to be included in the content. I leave these complications aside
since they won't affect my argument here.
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However, even in its impure version, the existential thesis fails to get the accuracy
conditions right. To illustrate this failure, Tye (2009:544) adapted a famous example
from Grice (1961), in which a perceiver looks straight ahead and, unbeknownst to her,
there is a mirror placed in front, inclined somehow so as to reflect a white cube that is out
of her visual field. Let's suppose that behind the mirror there is a red cube. Also
unbeknownst to the perceiver, some special lighting conditions make the reflected white
cube look red to her. This scenario leads the existential thesis to the wrong verdict that
the experience is accurate. The representational content is that there is an object x such
that it is cubical & red & it is at location l. In fact, that is the case: there is a red and
cubical object there. But, obviously, the red cube is not seen, and the cube that is actually
seen lacks the property of being red & being at the perceived location. This is a case of
illusion, and the existential thesis lacks the appropriate resources to explain that.93
The existential thesis also sits badly with the direct realist intuition. Intuitively, if
I see an object, it looks some way to me. According to the existential thesis, no particular
object looks any way to me. Understood in existential terms, experiences represent
general properties that can be satisfied by an indefinite number of objects. If my
experience of this tomato looking red & bulgy does not include this particular tomato in
the content, it seems to miss something that is needed to individuate my experience as an
experience of this particular tomato, and not of any other identical-looking thing. The
very idea of a perceptual state being a genuine encounter with the world seems to be lost.
The world is inhabited by particular objects that instantiate various properties; it is not a
93 In order to avoid this problem, Searle (1983) introduced the causal relation with the perceived object in
the content. But since the object itself does not enter in the content, this reply cannot avoid possibly deviant
causal chains. Given the failure of capturing a particular item through descriptions, the accuracy conditions
of experience will never be fully captured in purely existential terms.
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bunch of uninstantiated properties floating around. If that is what we perceptually
represent, we seem to be too far removed from reality.
The cognitive capacity of perceptual experience of possibly making new
particular contents available for thought is also left unexplained by the existential thesis.
My experience of Tim allows me to have de re thoughts about him. My experience of
Tom makes it possible for me to have de re thoughts about Tom. Assuming that Tim and
Tom are different people, whether it is Tim or Tom that I am visually aware of explains
which thoughts I can possibly have. The fact that Tim and Tom are identical-looking
twins cannot make it the case that both experiences have the same cognitive powers.
In conclusion, the existential thesis does very poorly in explaining the relevant
desiderata. In order to properly address them, singular content is required. However, the
claim that perceptual experience has singular content brings an obvious problem.
Singular content works well for veridical and illusory experiences. If I see a tomato, the
tomato itself enters into the content of my experience, period. But what about
hallucinations? According to the direct realist intuition, in having a perceptual
experience, I am directly in contact with ordinary objects and their properties. But
hallucination involves no contact with ordinary objects.94 If particular objects are
supposed to be components of the content, what can possibly be the content of a
hallucinatory experience? Introducing objects of some special sort to fill out the contents
of hallucinations is a metaphysically unlovely move. The most natural move at this point
94 As a matter of fact, hallucination can be pure or impure. Impure hallucinations mix genuine and
hallucinatory elements. For example, if I hallucinate a pink elephant in my room, the pink elephant may not
exist, but the curtain behind it and the sofa to the left may be real objects that I am genuinely perceiving.
Most empirical cases of hallucination seem to be impure. In pure hallucinations, on the other hand, the
subject is not perceiving any ordinary object: i.e. the whole scene is hallucinated. For the sake of simplicity,
I assume that hallucinations are pure, and therefore they involve no perception of any particular object.
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is to adopt some sort of content-disjunctivism: veridical experiences have singular
content, but hallucinations have some other kind of content.95
2.3. VERIDICAL PERCEPTION IS SINGULAR, BUT HALLUCINATION IS EXISTENTIAL
Since hallucination involves no perception of particular objects, it seems plausible
to hold that they have an existential content. Combined with the thesis that veridical
perception has singular content, this leads to the content-disjunctivist view that perceptual
content is either singular or existential.
According to this view, when I hallucinate a red circle in front of me, my
hallucination represents the world as having an object x such that it is red & circular & it
is at some spatio-temporal location l. The content is falsidical because no object satisfies
the condition. As for the phenomenal character of hallucination, it is fixed by its
existential content. My hallucination looks the way it does because it portrays the world
as having a cubical & red object before me. This seems enough to explain the red &
cubical character of my experience. As I said before, a purely existential content seems to
get phenomenology right.
The existential account of hallucination also seems to acknowledge its cognitive
powers. By hallucinating a red circle, I can thereby acquire the capacity to have de re
thoughts about a certain shade of red and a certain circular shape. I can, for instance,
think of this shade of red that it is darker than any other shade I have ever seen. Johnston
95 I assume here that hallucinations have some sort of content. One can obviously hold a disjunctivist view
according to which veridical (and illusory) experiences have singular content, but hallucinations have no
content at all. I set aside this possibility. Since content, according the representationalist view I am
considering here, is used to reveal the very nature of perceptual experience, a view that denies any content
for hallucination seems to qualify as a form of metaphysical disjunctivism, which was already rejected in
Chapter 1.
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(2004:129) stresses that hallucinations "serve up distinctive items for demonstration", and
by having a hallucination the subject "can learn certain novel things". My hallucination of
a red circle can make new knowledge available. I can come to know, for instance, what
red things look like, or how similar this shade of red is to that shade of orange. Moreover,
hallucinations cannot make singular contents about objects available for thought, since
they are unable to ground de re thoughts about particular objects. The existential account
of hallucination nicely captures that distinction. The existential content includes
properties that account for the fact that hallucinations can make available de re thoughts
about qualities. And the lack of singular content accounts for the hallucination's
impotence to ground de re thoughts about particular objects.
However, the existential account of hallucination gives the wrong verdict in cases
of accidentally veridical hallucinations. My hallucination of a red cube in front of me
represents the world as having an object x such that it is red & cubical & it is in front of
me. If, by a fluke, there is in fact an object there that is red & cubical, the verdict is
simply that my experience is veridical. But to treat an accidentally veridical hallucination
as a veridical perception simpliciter seems to get something wrong. Veridical
hallucinations are 'veridical' in some weaker or derivative sense, not in the full sense in
which a genuinely veridical perception is veridical. If the accuracy conditions are
supposed to capture the different types of perceptual error, the existential account simply
delivers the wrong answer. Accidental accuracy cannot turn a hallucinatory experience
into a veridical perception. If a hallucination can be simply a veridical depiction of the
world, the fact that it is some form of misperception becomes obscure.
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Moreover, when hallucinating, the subject may act as if there is a particular object
being perceived.96 That is also the way in which the experience is reported. If I
hallucinate a spider on the wall, I may avoid getting close to it. I may try to kill it. If
asked what I am seeing, I may point to the wall and say that I am seeing that spider. From
the subject's perspective, the hallucination seems singular. It has, so to say, a singular
character. After hallucinating a spider, I may think of that spider that it is bigger than any
other spider I have ever seen. In an important sense, I am not thinking of some
indeterminate big spider. I want to refer to that particular spider. Hallucinations seem to
present us with singular items for demonstration, just as veridical perception does.97 In a
hallucination, there seems to be something, an item, that the hallucinator can attend to. I
can, for instance, look at the layout of my room and fail to notice the hallucinated spider
on the wall. In the periphery of my visual field, it may look just like a big black blur. But
I may turn my attention to the spider and see it in its full glory. Attending to the
hallucinated spider seems to enable me to have singular thoughts about it. I can, for
instance, ask "What is that?" with respect to the thing that is presented to me in my visual
experience.98
96 As a matter of fact, in most existing hallucinations this doesn't happen. See Sachs (2012) for various
examples. The content of most hallucinations tend to go against our background beliefs. It is unlikely that
gigantic spiders, distorted people, pink elephants, or Lilliputians are actually around. Most of the time,
hallucinators are not fooled by their experiences, so they don't act as if those things were real. However,
there are cases of real hallucinatory behavior, when people do get fooled. As far as hallucination goes,
things can look pretty real. Even if the hallucinator does not believe in what she sees, the hallucination
itself can still look perfectly real. In principle, hallucination can mimic genuine perception in every detail,
and it seems to be projected into the external world, just like veridical perception.
97 According to Pautz (2007), this feature of hallucinatory experience was a key motivation for the sense-
data theory. It is instructive to realize how difficult it is to avoid hypostatizing some object of a special sort
for hallucinatory experience.
98 The singularity of hallucinatory experience seems also to be connected with other phenomena. If I
hallucinate a spider in the morning and once again in the afternoon, I may well wonder whether it is the
same spider I am visually experiencing all over the day. Hallucinated items can thus appear in identity
questions. A purely existential content does not include any object in particular, so this wondering about
the identity of two identical-looking hallucinated spiders seems ungrounded. Moreover, in the so-called de
re hallucination, the subject seems to hallucinate an existing particular object. For example, I can plausibly
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The existential account does not have the appropriate resources to explain
accidentally veridical hallucinations and the singular character of hallucination.99 Simply
denying the apparent singularity of hallucination will not do. A story most be told to
explain the character of the experience from the perspective of the hallucinator, as well as
the cognitive capacity of hallucination of making singular thoughts available.
2.4. VERIDICAL PERCEPTION IS SINGULAR, BUT HALLUCINATION IS GAPPY
Given the shortcomings of the existential account, Michael Tye (2009) defended
an alternative content-disjunctivist view, according to which veridical perception has
singular content, but hallucination has a gappy content.100 I call it the gappy theory of
hallucination.
In order to acknowledge the direct realist intuition, the gappy theory includes
particular objects in the content of veridical experience. Since no such objects are
available in hallucination, Tye proposed that the content of a hallucination is very much
like the content of a veridical perception, the only difference being that, instead of a
particular object, there is a gap, or an empty slot, in the content.101 For instance, if I
hallucinate my mom entering in the room, or Barack Obama dancing the cancan. The fact that hallucination
can plausibly have de re content also suggests the singular character of hallucinatory experience.
99 Jackson (2012:200) suggested that instead of a content-disjunctivist view that distinguishes experiences
with singular content from experiences with existential content, one could defend some sort of dual content
view, in which veridical perceptions (and illusions) have a layer of existential content on top of their
singular content, while hallucinations have only the existential content. This proposal, however, is of no
help here. Since hallucinations still have only existential content, their singular character is still left
unexplained. The problem here is not that the account is disjunctivist, but what the hallucinatory content is
taken to be.
100 Shortly after defending this view, sometime in 2010, Tye abandoned it and adopted the set-theoretic
notion of content. He (2014a) recently summarized how his views on perceptual content have changed
through time. The theory he currently endorses will be addressed in the next section.
101 For a defense of different notions of gappy content, see Burge (1991), Bach (1997), Loar (2003) and
Schellenberg (2010).
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veridically perceive a red tomato, the content of my experience includes the property of
being red and the tomato itself. But if I hallucinate a red tomato, the content of my
hallucination includes the property of being red and an empty slot, < >, or a gap. Even
though their contents are different, veridical perception and hallucination share a
common structure, that Tye (2009:546) called "content schema".
Besides sharing the same content-structure, veridical perception and hallucination
can also share the same "non-object-involving properties". This allegedly accounts for
their phenomenal character. Hallucinating a red cube and having a veridical perception of
a red cube can look exactly alike. This is explained by the fact that both experiences
represent the same "cluster of properties" (namely, being red & cubical). According to
Tye (2009:562), "the solution is to look at the properties represented to find phenomenal
character, and not to the representing of those properties". The "representing" here stands
for the perceptual experience as a whole, which has a certain content, while the
"represented" stands for certain things (namely, the cluster of properties) that are
represented by the experience.
However, explaining the phenomenal character in terms of "cluster of properties"
looks a lot like the existential thesis, and it was argued that this view is unable to explain
why a hallucination looks singular from the subject's perspective. By having a
hallucination, the subject does not experience a bunch of properties floating around, but
things that look very much like particular objects. As Tye (2009:553) himself noticed,
hallucinations have a "deceptive nature". In a hallucination, the subject can be completely
deceived so as to take the hallucinated item for a real one and act accordingly. A vivid
hallucination as of a hungry lion approaching is a perfectly good explanation for the
subject's reaction of running away. A hallucinated thing is not experienced as a bunch of
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qualities, but as a real thing out there. People don't usually run away from a bunch of
qualities, but they do run away from what seems to be a ferocious animal.
According to Tye (2009:553), "the supposition that there is gappy content in
hallucinatory cases preserves as much similarity as can be preserved between those cases
and the veridical ones". Gappy contents are more similar to singular ones than existential
contents are because, besides sharing the same non-object-involving properties, they also
share the same content schema. That, supposedly, explains the striking similarity between
veridical experience and hallucination.
A gappy content seems better equipped to explain not only the hallucinatory
behavior, but also the singular character of hallucination. If I hallucinate a spider and then
think of that spider that it looks big, the singular content of my thought seems to be
properly captured by a gap. I am not thinking about some indeterminate big thing, but
about this spider over there. The spider, it turns out, does not exist. But my experience of
it as being a particular thing cannot be denied. To surreptitiously alter the content of what
I think to be thinking about seems to beg the relevant question. Instead of explaining the
relevant phenomenon, an account of this type simply redescribes the facts. In this case,
the very emergence or existence of the phenomenon is not explained. The gappy content,
on the other hand, describes the situation in a way that seems to capture its very nature.
When a subject hallucinates a spider and then has thoughts about that spider, there seems
to be some sort of emptiness or absence in her thoughts. If no object was perceived, no
particular spider will ever make these thoughts true or false. In an important sense, those
thoughts are about something that does not exist. They fail to refer, which differs from
referring falsely to something. The fact that both veridical perception and hallucination
can give rise to thoughts of singular nature plausibly has something to do with their
contents. There is likely something in common on both cases that explain their cognitive
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and behavioral commonalities. The common thing, according to the gappy theory, is the
content schema. Whether the schema is filled by an object or it has a gap instead does not
change the fact that perceptual experiences, be they veridical or not, have the same
structure. Objects and gaps are, to some extent, functionally alike: they play the same role
in explaining cognitive attitudes and behaviors.
Despite all its virtues, the gappy theory faces some serious difficulties. Let's first
consider its account of the accuracy conditions of perceptual experience. In a veridical
experience, a particular object is represented as having some properties, and the object in
fact has those properties. The experience is, therefore, accurate. In a hallucination, no
particular object is represented, so the content has a gap instead of a real object. Gappy
contents can be considered immediately inaccurate, no matter which properties are
represented.102 However, suppose again that I hallucinate a red tomato in front of me and,
by a fluke, there is in fact a red tomato there. According to the gappy theory, the content
of my hallucination includes the property of being red and a gap. The theory gives the
unequivocal verdict that the experience is inaccurate. However, there is a sense in which,
in veridical hallucination, the world is like it is represented to be. The putative 'veridical'
aspect of that experience is left unexplained.
In response to this problem, Tye (2009) claimed that despite the fact that
hallucinations are unequivocally inaccurate, they can still dispose the subject to form true
beliefs. In his (2009:557) own words, “cases of veridical hallucination are veridical, then,
only to the following extent: the visual experiences they involve dispose their subjects to
form true beliefs”. Consequently, what is veridical in veridical hallucination is not its
perceptual content, but the content of cognitive states triggered by the hallucination.
102 As a matter of fact, gappy contents can be considered falsidical or neither true nor false. For the sake of
simplicity, I assume here that they are falsidical, but that does not touch on the point I want to make.
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According to Tye (2009:558), "the relevant contents, thus, are potential cognitive
contents and not actual visual contents of my experience".
The proposed account of veridical hallucination is not convincing. First of all, the
relation between perceptual experience and belief is turned upside down. Intuitively, the
truth of perceptual beliefs are somehow based on the accuracy of perceptual experiences.
The fact that I veridically see a cup on the table, for example, somehow explains my true
belief that there is a cup on the table. Yet, the account above inverts this relation: the fact
that I truly believe that there is a cup on the table explains the "veridicality" of my
hallucinatory experience as of a cup on the table. According to this view, the
"veridicality" of my experience is a by-product of the truth of my belief. The reason why
it seems hard to make sense of this view is because my experience seems to ground my
belief, in the sense that I believe what I do because I have the experience that I have. But
this grounding relation is asymmetric.
The pressing question here is how an inaccurate perceptual experience, that
supposedly misrepresents the world, can ground true perceptual beliefs about the
world.103 There is an obvious sense in which this can happen. Suppose, for example, that
I visually experience a red and circular gemstone. I can, based on this experience, form
different beliefs: for instance, the belief that there is a red gemstone, and the belief that
there is a circular gemstone. Now suppose that the perceived stone is actually blue and
circular. The experience is, therefore, inaccurate. However, my belief that there is a
circular gemstone is still true and it is based on my inaccurate experience. The
explanation of this case is straightforward: beliefs represent less than experiences do.
However, in the case of a veridical hallucination, it seems that any perceptual belief that
103 I assume here that the perceptual experience grounds alone, without the intervention of any other
experience or cognitive state, the resulting beliefs.
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is solely based on that experience will be true. Now that is quite surprising: an inaccurate
representation of the world can, assumed that the belief-formation processes are working
properly, ground only true perceptual beliefs about the world. The fact that the triggered
beliefs are true cannot provide the desired explanation, on pain of circularity. In the
relevant sense, the beliefs are true because the hallucination is veridical, and not vice
versa.104
Moreover, as stressed by Jackson (2012:202), the disposition to form true beliefs
is an accidental property of perceptual experience. It seems perfectly plausible that the
very same experience can come unaccompanied by the disposition to form a true belief.
My hallucination as of a red cube has some essential properties, such as representing the
property of being red & cubical, but these properties cannot be captured by appealing to
some contingently possessed property, such as the property of being likely to dispose the
subject to believe so and so. If a hallucinator lacks the accidental property of being likely
to be disposed to have certain beliefs because of her hallucination, it does not follow from
that that her experience itself cannot portray the world to be a way it actually is. Having a
veridical hallucination has essentially to do with what is represented by the experience
and how the world actually is, not with accidental cognitive properties of the subject of
the hallucination.
104 It could be replied that since hallucinations have gaps in their content, they can also ground false
singular beliefs. If that is the case, veridical hallucinations give rise to both true and false beliefs. But now
the account seems trivial. Any hallucination can trigger true and false beliefs. My hallucination of a pink
elephant may dispose me to believe that there is something pink in front of me. Even though there is no
elephant there, there may be a pink sofa. My belief that there is something pink is true, and it is based
solely on my hallucination. Still, we don't want to call it a case of veridical hallucination. One could then
add the following condition: a hallucination is veridical if it can only dispose the subject to form true non-
singular beliefs. Now the inversion problem strikes again. The cognitive power of making this whole class
of true perceptual beliefs available is not explained. The explanation of this peculiar power cannot be the
fact that the subject is disposed to form true beliefs: this simply inverts the explanans/explanandum
relation.
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The gappy theory also faces another, even deeper, problem. It is not clear that we
can make sense of a gappy content at all.105 The content of a perceptual experience is
supposed to give conditions that capture how the world has to be like in order to make the
experience accurate or not. But a gappy content seems to offer no such conditions. As
stressed by Jackson (2012:201), it is "obscure what the constraint might be" when there is
no object to fill the gap. A gap can hardly be understood as what saturates an open
proposition.106 A gappy content seems to be the absence of content altogether, not a
content with absence of referent. If we insist that gaps can play a substantive role in
filling the content, it seems that gaps become objects of a special sort, that are somehow
capable of filling empty slots in the content. But, intuitively, gaps are the empty slots
themselves, or the very absence of anything, and not some sort of fillers of empty slots.
Jackson (2012:201), therefore, concludes that a substantive notion of gap seems
implausible.
Michael Tye (2012) himself abandoned the gappy theory later for similar
reasons.107 The pressing question is how we can even make sense of gaps. The role
played by gaps in the content schema is functionally identical to that of particular objects.
Among other things, objects are inserted in the content to account for the direct realist
intuition. So, just as objects look some way to us in a veridical experience, gaps
supposedly look some way to us as we hallucinate. On the face of it, it is unlikely that
any notion of gap will make sense of it. On the other hand, if gaps are excused from
105 Braun (2005) argues that this is a problem for gappy contents in general, not only as applied to
perceptual experience.
106 Burge (2007:75), for example, regards the view "according to which there is a 'hole' in the
representational aspects of the proposition, where the hole corresponds to the object (which completes the
proposition)" as "rather silly".
107 See also Tye (2014b) and Sainsbury & Tye (2012: Chapter 8).
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acknowledging the direct realist intuition, this seems to introduce an unlovely double
standard.
Sainsbury and Tye (2012) consider and reject many possible alternatives. I only
mention a few of them here to illustrate the kind of difficulties that they systematically
fail to overcome. One such alternative is to think of contents as complex structures with
parts, analogous to ordered pairs. If, for instance, I veridically perceive a red tomato, the
content of my experience is an ordered pair containing two members: <the tomato,
redness>. If I hallucinate a red tomato, the content is still an ordered pair, now having a
gap instead of a tomato: << >, redness>. The obvious problem is that in order to have an
ordered-pair, we need two items to form a pair. In the gappy case, however, we only have
one member. The gappy part is not a special kind of thing, but the absence of anything.
Therefore, the very idea of having an ordered-pair becomes obscure.108
Another option is to find some sort of gap filler. Maybe a gap is filled by the
empty set. Now there is something filling the gap, and this thing plays the role of the
object of the perceptual experience. According to this view, when I hallucinate, I do not
fail to refer to an object, instead I refer to a special sort of object, namely, the empty set.
Not surprisingly, the experience is inaccurate, since the empty set is falsely represented to
have phenomenal properties such as, for instance, being red & cubical. Obviously, sets
have no colors or shapes. But can we really make sense of the empty set looking some
way to the perceiver? This is hard to swallow.
Maybe some other gap filler looks less bizarre. Maybe, for instance, there are
such things as absences, which are analogous to holes.109 Again, the pressing question is
108 Sainsbury & Tye (2012:159) acknowledge that order pairs can also be defined set-theoretically, so that
the members of the pair do not constitute it. But having sets instead of gaps do not seem to fare much
better, as it is argued in what follows.
109 Casati & Varzi (1994) have argued for the existence of holes. The idea here is to extend the ontology of
holes for that of absences.
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how absences can look any specific way to the subject. Another option is to take a spatio-
temporal location as the gap filler. Once again, how can a location look red? Locations
have no colors, and it hardly makes any sense to say that. If it is claimed that a location
has a certain color insofar as it is occupied by some object that instantiates that color, we
are then back to the existential thesis. The reason why these attempts are hopeless is
clear: they "confuse the truth that in hallucination one does experience something - for
example, a ripe tomato - with the falsehood that there exists some thing one experiences"
(Sainsbury & Tye, 2012:152).
All other candidate views fail for analogous reasons: they either fill the gap with
some funny entity, and the outcome is quite bizarre, or they just leave the gap open,
which leads to the mysterious pair of a single item. One way or the other, the prospects of
the gappy theory seem murky.
2.5. THE SET-THEORETIC VIEW OF CONTENT
The difficulties faced by the content-disjunctivist accounts of perceptual
experience, especially after the gappy theory fell into disgrace, moved Tye to adopt a
radically different theory: the Set-Theoretic View, or STV for short. This is an extremely
austere view of perceptual content that requires the revision of important assumptions
that were so far taken for granted. The very explanatory role and nature of content has to
be radically redefined. I first characterize this view and then evaluate how well it
accounts for the relevant desiderata.
According to Sainsbury & Tye (2012), the rich and fine-grained nature of
perceptual experience has misled many into thinking that perceptual content must be
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equally rich. Our perceptual representation of the world has a fine-grained texture, which
is more akin to maps or pictures than to linguistic sentences. It is thus tempting to infer
form this that perceptual content must mirror the richness of perceptual representation.
However, they (2012:157) claim, this is a mistake: "it falsely assumes that a property of
the vehicle of representation (the experience) must be a property of its content".
According to STV, experiences are complex structures, which have various
representational parts standing for the things represented. If, for instance, I veridically
perceive a red tomato, a part of my experience represents the tomato, and another part
represents the property of being red. The picture-like richness of my experience is then
captured by its representational parts, which are integrated into a complex structure. All
that said, we can still hold that the content of my experience is very simple, that it has no
parts corresponding to the represented items. As they suggest, the content of my
experience is simply the set of worlds at which my experience is accurate. As they
(2012:158) put it, "the content of a visual experience is unstructured in the sense that it
has no component parts".110
The reason it was insisted that perceptual experiences should have the objects
they are about as components of their content was the need to accommodate the direct
realist intuition. However, this is not the only available explanation. STV accommodates
this intuition by having the perceived object as represented by part of the experience.
Even though the object itself is not a part of the content, it is still represented by the
experience, and the accuracy conditions of the experience still depend crucially on the
object. According to STV, my experience of a red tomato is accurate if and only if the
actual world is a member of the set of possible worlds at which the tomato is red. The
110 As reminded by Sainsbury and Tye (2012:159), "set membership should not be confused with the part-
whole relation. The former is irreflexive, asymmetric and transitive; the later is reflexive, asymmetric and
transitive".
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content of my experience is the set of worlds at which that particular tomato has the
property of being red. Though the content does not have a tomato in it, it is "specified by
reference" to the particular tomato that I perceive. The accuracy conditions of my
experience necessarily depend on it being the case that that tomato is there and has the
property of being red. Worlds at which some other identical-looking tomato is red do not
make my experience accurate. Changing the tomato necessarily changes the accuracy
conditions of my experience. This is enough to cash out the direct realist intuition.
And if I hallucinate a red tomato? According to STV, the content of this
experience is the set of possible worlds at which the tomato has the property of being red.
But there is no perceived tomato. Since my experience does not pick out any actual
object, it follows that there is no world at which this (putative) tomato is anything at
all.111 Since my experience does not represent any actual tomato, there is no world at
which this (putative) tomato can possibly exist and have any property whatsoever.
Therefore, the set of possible worlds at which the hallucinated tomato is red is the empty
set. Obviously, the actual world is not a member of the empty set. Therefore,
hallucinatory experiences are necessarily inaccurate.
Perceptual content was supposed to fix the phenomenal character of perceptual
experience. This, surely, cannot be done by the austere notion of content as sets of
worlds. According to this view, any two hallucinations have the same content: namely,
the empty set. Nonetheless, if I first hallucinate a pink elephant and later a purple giraffe,
these hallucinations have very distinct phenomenal characters. Moreover, my
hallucination as of a red tomato and my veridical perception of a red tomato can look
exactly alike, even though the content of my hallucination is the empty set, and the
111 In order to make sense of empty singular terms (e.g. this hallucinated tomato), we must assume a free
logic account of singular terms. See Sainsbury (2005) for an interesting use of free logic to account for
emptiness in thoughts.
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content of my veridical perception is a set of worlds including the actual world. Hence,
instead of using the content to fix the phenomenology of experience, STV explains
phenomenal character in terms of the properties represented by the experience. According
to Tye (2014a), "necessarily, visual experiences that predicatively represent the same
property complex have the same phenomenal character". My experience of a red and
bulgy tomato, for instance, represents the property-complex <being red & bulgy> and, if
it is not hallucinatory, it also represents a particular tomato. Veridical and hallucinatory
experiences can share the very same property-complex, which supposedly explains why
they can have the same phenomenology.
STV undoubtedly has many merits. But let's take a closer look at how it addresses
some of the issues we have been discussing. Consider first the case of accidentally
veridical hallucination. As the other views presented here, STV also accounts for
accuracy conditions in terms of content. But concerning this task, STV does not do much
better than its predecessors. Understood as having the empty set as its content, a
hallucination is unequivocally inaccurate. The gappy theory also delivered the same
verdict, and that seemed to be the wrong answer, since hallucinations can be accidentally
veridical. When advocating the gappy theory, Tye (2009) claimed that hallucinations are
veridical only to the extent to which they dispose the hallucinator to form true beliefs. As
argued before, this will not do. Jackson (2012) convincingly criticized this account, and
Tye (2012:223) himself recognized later that this proposal fails to "come to grips with
what is intuitively the intrinsic accuracy of the experience itself". But now STV faces the
same difficulty.
Quite surprisingly, though, Tye claims that STV handles veridical hallucinations
in a straightforward way. In order to show that, he (2012:223) gives the following
example: suppose I hallucinate Barack Obama in front of me. According to Tye
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(2012:223), my experience is accurate "just in case the actual world belongs to the set of
worlds at which Obama is before me". Now suppose that, by a fluke, Obama is actually
there. This, supposedly, makes the content veridical. But since the experience is not
caused by Obama in the right way ("no light from Obama reaches my eyes"), it does not
count as a veridical perception of Obama. This allegedly accounts for the hallucinatory
nature of the experience.
I find this example quite puzzling. First of all, it is not clear whether or not my
experience represents Obama. Since it is a hallucination, the most plausible answer is
that it does not represent any particular object. If that is the case, the content of my
experience, as any other hallucination, is the empty set, and not "the set of worlds at
which Obama is before me". The content of a perceptual experience is supposedly
"specified by reference" to the particular objects represented by the experience. Since
Obama is, plausibly, not represented by my experience, how can he now be used to
specify the accuracy conditions of that experience? In an important sense, hallucination is
not about anything: no thing can make it veridical.
What makes Tye's (2012) example so perplexing is the fact that it is a case of de
re hallucination. When giving the accuracy conditions of that experience, he simply
specified its content by reference to the res the experience is supposedly about. But the
very fact that hallucinatory experience can be about an existing particular is far from
clear.
In order to explain cases of allegedly de re hallucinations, Johnston (2004:129)
distinguishes between primary and secondary objects of hallucination. Since
hallucinations can secure original reference to qualities (e.g. a certain shade of red) and
can ground de re thoughts about them, it seems plausible that properties (or property-
complexes) can be the primary objects of hallucination. Whatever we are related to when
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having a hallucination, it seems to include properties like being red & cubical. However,
hallucinations cannot secure original reference to particular objects. No genuine de re
thought about Obama, for instance, can be grounded in a hallucination. In an important
sense, a particular object, like Barack Obama, cannot be the primary object of a
hallucination, but only a secondary or derivative one. Johnston (2004:132) claims that in
cases of de re hallucination, the primary object “strikes the subject” as being about a
certain particular thing. But particularity here is derivative, being based on the “subject’s
existing repertoire of singular reference”. As a matter of fact, secondary objects of
hallucination are just a “façon de parler” (Johnston, 2004:143). The only genuine objects
of hallucination are the primary ones, which, strictly speaking, are not objects, but
clusters of properties.
Because I had a certain hallucination, I may come to believe that Barack Obama
is before me. But as suggested by Johnston, Barack Obama only figures in the content (or
is used to fix the content) of my perceptual belief. My hallucination itself only represents
a cluster of properties that strikes me as being Barack Obama. If Obama is there, my
belief is true. But no particular object can make my hallucinatory experience veridical,
since my experience is not about any particular object. Suppose, for instance, that the
concept BARACK OBAMA is not in my "repertoire of singular reference". Or just
suppose that the man I hallucinate in front of me does not strike me as being Barack
Obama. In this case, it seems obvious that Obama cannot make my experience veridical,
no matter how Obama-like the man in my hallucination looks.
Furthermore, when I hallucinate a red cube and there is, by a fluke, a red cube
there, this seems to be as good a case of veridical hallucination as there can be, despite
the fact that the cube I hallucinate does not strike me as being any particular cube I have
ever seen or thought about before. The fact that there is no particular cube in my
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repertoire of singular reference cannot plausibly make it impossible for me to have a
veridical hallucination as of a red cube in front of me.
Veridical hallucination, or so I claim here, is simply left unexplained by STV.
When Tye (2012) gives the example of a de re hallucination, he only complicates the
matter. His example does not show how STV can actually handle cases of veridical
hallucination. The Barack Obama example insinuates the same failed proposal formerly
advanced to save the gappy theory. My hallucination of an Obama-like cluster of
properties seems to dispose me to believe that Obama is there. The veridicality of my
hallucination is, once again, explained by the contingent property of being likely to
dispose me to believe such-and-such. This, it was admitted, will not do.
Hallucinatory behavior also poses a problem for STV. When defending the gappy
theory against the existential account, Tye (2009:553) alerted us to the "deceptive nature
of hallucination". When hallucinating a spider, for example, the subject may act as if
there is a real spider out there. Tye (2009:553) argued then that a gappy content does a
better job than an existential one in accounting for this phenomenon. Curiously, STV
seems not to be any better on that account than the existential thesis. If I hallucinate a
black spider, the content of my hallucination is the empty set. This certainly doesn't
explain much. But my experience, understood as the vehicle of representation, has some
representational parts. Since there is no particular spider to be represented by my
hallucination, the only thing left is a property-complex. This, supposedly, includes the
property of being black & arranged spiderwise. However, as stressed before, from the
perspective of the hallucinator, there seems to be a real spider there, and not just a bunch
of properties floating around.
More importantly, STV seems unable to explain the singular character of
hallucination. According to STV, contents are simply sets of worlds. The set of worlds
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associated with a given experience is specified by reference to the things represented by
that experience. As I veridically see a red and bulgy tomato, for example, my experience
has representational parts that include the tomato and the property-complex <being red &
bulgy>. Plausibly, the representational parts of my experience account for the thoughts
that my experience can make available. Now, if I hallucinate a red and bulgy tomato, my
experience only represents the property-complex. However, my hallucination seems to
make available singular thoughts about what seems to be a particular tomato. For
example, after hallucinating a tomato, I may think of that (putative) tomato that it looks
delicious. As I think about the hallucinated tomato, I mean to refer to that thing right in
front of me, and not to some tomato-like sensible profile. It seems that on top of a
property-complex, a hallucinatory experience also has something else that leads the
subject to form singular thoughts. The gappy theory had gaps doing this job. However, as
argued before, it is hard to make sense of gaps. Yet, simply excluding gaps from the
picture will not do. The job they were asked to do is still there to be done.
The singular character of hallucination has, arguably, a phenomenological upshot.
Presumably, a hallucination disposes its subject to act as if there is a particular object
being perceived, and it can make singular thoughts available, because it has a singular
look. As I hallucinate a red tomato, the very phenomenology of my experience has a
singular character. My experience is such that it looks to me as if there is a particular
object out there, and not merely a bunch of floating properties. It is not clear that a mere
property-complex, no matter how detailed and structured, can capture that difference.
My concern here has to do with the claim that "the phenomenal character of an
experience is one and the same as the complex of properties represented by the
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experience" (Tye, 2014a).112 Johnston (2004) has also defended a view of this sort. In
Johnston's terms, when we have the visual experience of a scene before the eyes, the way
it looks is fixed by its "sensible profile", which is some sort of scene-type stripped away
from any particular object. Since the sensible profile of a hallucination can keep all the
properties and relations that compose an actual scene, the result will look exactly alike.
He argues that there is no reason to believe that a hallucination will look like a bunch of
floating properties just because it lacks particular objects in its sensible profile. Particular
objects make no difference to the way a scene looks. According to Johnston (2004:140),
"hallucinated sensible profiles can mimic particularity". This “mimicking capacity” is
explained by the spatio-temporal layout generating the illusion of a certain particular
object moving in certain directions. The perceiver is thus led to believe that there is a
particular object being perceived, but this (putative) object is in fact a secondary object of
hallucination, an object that appears only in her thoughts or beliefs. According to
Johnston (2004:142), “thanks to containing certain properties in certain relations to
continuous places and times, a primary object can immediately strike the subject as a
moving particular”. Consequently, the singular character of hallucination is like a Vegas
billboard illusion: it looks as if an object is moving around the board, when in fact there
are only successive lights going on.
The Vegas billboard picture arguably accounts for the power of hallucination to
mimic particularity. STV seems to endorse this view. In a certain sense, sensible profiles
(or property-complexes) look particular; they look as if there are particular objects here
112 Schellenberg (2011b) stresses the fact that this view is committed to the existence of uninstantiated
universals. On this view, a hallucinator would be somehow connected to properties not instantiated in her
environment. Schellenberg's case against the property-cluster account of sensory phenomenology is based
on the rejection of the claim that perception involves some sort of awareness of uninstantiated universals. I
prefer here, however, to stress a different point and avoid the highly controversial issue concerning the
metaphysical nature of perceptual properties.
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and there. As the subject attends to an object-looking property-complex, she may come to
have singular thoughts.
This view, however, fails to come to grips with the phenomenology of
particularity.113 Independently of the look of a sensible profile, a subject may or may not
have the experience as of a particular object. The very same property-complex can look
to one subject like a bunch of sensible qualities floating around, and to another like a
particular object. For example, a physician may look at an X-ray image and see objects
there that I can't see as particular objects.114 The fact that we have experiences as of
particular objects does not seem reducible to sensible properties. Moreover, the
phenomenology of particularity does not seem to be derivative or secondary. It is not
simply a cognitive phenomenon concerning our thoughts or beliefs. Whether or not a
bunch of properties is experienced as being a particular entity seems to change the
perceptual phenomenology itself, as well as the cognitive powers of the experience.115
Admittedly, the very existence of a phenomenology of particularity is
questionable. It does seem clear, however, that a particular object does not alter
113 Montague (2011) also argues that general properties cannot account for the phenomenology of
particularity. Her account will be discussed in Chapter 3.
114 Saying that we attend to different things will not do. Even supposing that our saccades are all the same
and we both consciously attend to the very same things, I still fail to see objects as the physician does. And,
more importantly, this seems to be a phenomenological difference in the perceptual level: my experience
does not make certain thoughts available, whereas the doctor's experience does.
115 Phenomenological studies also suggest that the Vegas billboard view is inaccurate. Dorsch (2010), for
instance, analyzes the phenomenal elements that determine the "sense of reality" of perceptual experience,
and claims that some elements may hold in the absence of others. Among the "reality characteristics"
distinctive of perceptual experience (in opposition to, say, imagining or dreaming), there are two of major
interest here: particularity (i.e. objects are experienced as being numerically distinct) and locatedness (i.e.
perceived objects appear to be spatio-temporally situated). But, interestingly, those two features do not go
necessarily together. Some visual experiences are vague about the precise location of objects. A limiting
case is recounted by Sims (1995:110), in which a patient with histrionic personality disorder vividly
hallucinates a person at her bed, but she is unable to locate the person spatially, in relation to her
surrounding environment. When asked to do so, she said she couldn't, since the hallucinated person had no
definite location in relation to the other objects in the room (e.g. walls, curtains, door). Cases like that cast
doubt on Johnston's attempt to explain the feeling of particularity as derived from the feeling of
locatedness.
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perceptual phenomenology qua the particular object it is. Numerically distinct but
identical-looking objects make no phenomenological difference. What is not clear is (1)
whether or not perceiving something as a particular object affects perceptual
phenomenology, and (2) whether this can be accounted for in terms of property-
complexes. For the reasons discussed above, I am inclined to think that the answer to (1)
is yes (i.e. perceiving something as a particular object does affect perceptual
phenomenology), and to (2) is no (i.e. property-complexes cannot explain the
phenomenology of particularity). If I am right in my inclinations, STV is also in trouble
when it comes to explaining the phenomenal character of perceptual experience.116
2.6. DIVIDING THE EXPLANATORY LABOR
As classically understood by representationalists, the notion of content tries to
capture dimensions of perceptual experience that vary independently of one another. This
notion has been deployed to play multiple and relatively independent explanatory roles.
This, I claim, led to a theoretical overburden on that notion. Not surprisingly, the notion
of content has been criticized by naïve realists, and representationalists have
systematically failed to deliver the desired explanations. Any attempt to provide a
harmonious explanation of the various aspects of perceptual experience in terms of a
single notion seems hopeless. I propose that the different dimensions should be accounted
116 Tye (2014b) claims that part of his reasons for defending STV has to do with "considerations of
systematic unity and fit with belief content". He has in mind here the originalist theory of concepts,
defended in Sainsbury & Tye (2012). As I see it, the originalist theory brings a whole set of issues that are
fairly independent from the questions being investigated here. Even if originalism is true, it seems not to
require the truth of STV. Instead of taking any stance on the truth or not of originalism, I prefer, more
modestly, to claim that STV, as an account of hallucinatory experience, does not offer a fully satisfactory
explanation of the relevant desiderata.
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for separately, by relatively autonomous notions. The explanatory labor should be
divided into different elements of perceptual experience.
A philosophical theory of perceptual experience should satisfy these two
desiderata: it should account for the objects an experience is about making a difference to
individuating the experience and giving its veridicality conditions; and it should explain
the possibility of phenomenal sameness across experiences of different objects or of no
objects at all.117
In order to explain the first desideratum, representationalists have typically
defended some sort of object-involving perceptual content. Content, it was argued, should
be singular, or it should include the perceived objects as constituents. As discussed in this
Chapter, the main reason why this view seems mandatory is because an object-free
content cannot capture the accuracy conditions of experiences. Since contents are
understood as capturing the conditions under which an experience is accurate, and given
the fact that those conditions are relative to which objects are being perceived, then the
particular objects perceived by the subject make a constitutive difference to the content.
As stated by Schellenberg (2013:293), "if the accuracy conditions change depending on
what particular object one is related to, and if the content determines accuracy conditions,
then the content of experience must change depending on what particular object one is
related to".
The need for singular content is also related with the epistemological and
cognitive roles of perception. By virtue of perceiving objects in the environment, a
subject can thereby gain knowledge of those objects and can have de re thoughts about
them. If my perception is of this particular tomato, I can thereby know something about
117 This characterization of the main desiderata of a theory of perceptual experience is from Schellenberg
(2010:19). I also follow her steps in arguing for a more layered theory of content.
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this tomato, and not about any other particular tomato. Another experience of a
numerically distinct tomato, no matter how similar to the first one, can make de re
thoughts about this other tomato available as well as ground knowledge about it, but my
second experience cannot ground the same thoughts and knowledge that I had by means
of having the first experience. An account of perceptual experience should explain why
experiences of different objects have different epistemological and cognitive powers.
Unless perceptual experience is individuated in a way that makes reference to the
particular objects being perceived, its grounding capacity cannot be satisfactorily
explained.
The need for making perceptual content object-involving came with a cost that is
not always properly appreciated. Representationalists are fond of unified accounts of
veridical and nonveridical experiences. Giving an account of experience in terms of
intentional content was primarily intended, among other things, as a way of explaining
how both veridical and nonveridical experiences could share a common core. Just like
any other intentional state, perceptions have contents that can be possibly falsidical.
Falsidical and veridical perceptions, however, can share the same intentional content.
This common element was then used to fix the phenomenology of experience. That
maneuver gave representationalists an easy explanation of the second explanandum,
concerning the possibility of phenomenal sameness across veridical and nonveridical
experiences, as well as across experiences of different but identical-looking objects. The
simple answer was that the phenomenal character of experience is fixed by its content,
and all these experiences can share the same content.
However, this account of perceptual phenomenology is no longer available if
content is object-involving. A hallucinatory experience cannot be plausibly individuated
in terms of its objects, for it has none. Whatever content a hallucination has, it cannot be
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a singular content that is partly constituted by the perceived object. But now the unified
account of perceptual experience, so much desired by representationalists, is obviously at
risk. If the content of veridical perception must be singular and the content of
hallucination cannot be singular, they cannot share the same content.
This led representationalists to develop various content-disjunctivist views. I have
argued against some of them here. A bifurcated account of content implies that the
common element across veridical and nonveridical experiences cannot be simply equated
with the content. Veridical and hallucinatory experiences are no longer allowed to share
the same content-type. The typical strategy, then, was to look for some part of the content
that could be shared by both good and bad cases and use this common element to fix the
phenomenal character. Even though hallucination and veridical perception cannot have
the same content, their contents may have something in common. Since hallucination
lacks objects in its content, the natural move was to isolate the object-involving part of
the content of veridical experience and say that hallucination and veridical perception can
share all the other elements, usually associated with properties and relations. According
to this view, perceptual experience, veridical or not, has a content that represents at least
a certain layout of the portrayed scene, and this layout includes properties arranged in a
certain way, or property-clusters. This, it was claimed, is the part of the content that
accounts for the phenomenal character of experience.
I have offered some reasons to resist to this picture. No matter how the content of
hallucination is conceived (e.g. existential, gappy, the empty set), the views discussed
here have failed, for various reasons, to give a satisfactory account of the nature of
hallucinatory experience. Among these various reasons, I believe that the incapacity to
account for the phenomenal particularity of hallucination is the most important one. This
deficiency has consequences that are rarely appreciated. The lack of a satisfactory
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account of this feature of hallucination leads to an unsatisfactory account of both the
phenomenology and the cognitive capacity of hallucinatory experience.
We not only perceive particular objects, but we also seem to perceive them as
particular objects, or as discrete and numerically distinct individuals. This seems to be a
distinctively phenomenological feature of most of our perceptual experiences, including
hallucinatory experiences.118 As argued by Montague (2011:121), "it is part of the
experiential qualitative character of many of our experiences (...) that they are
experiences of individual particular objects".
The phenomenology of particularity is a legitimate explanandum, or so I claim,
and the representationalist views discussed here lack resources to deal with that. Any
view that allows only general properties to account for phenomenology will fail to satisfy
this explanandum. What is needed is a way of telling apart experiences that look
particular from those that don't. If the phenomenal character of experience is simply a
matter of properties (or property-clusters) being used to isolate (seeming) particular
objects, the phenomenological difference between general and particular experiences is
missed out. Saving this account only for the phenomenology of hallucination (in some
sort of disjunctivist view) will not do as well, for hallucination can mimic every
phenomenal aspect of veridical experience, and the phenomenology of perceptual
experience was supposed to be accounted for in a unified way by some sort of common
element shared by good and bad cases.
118 Whether or not all perceptual experiences are phenomenological depictions of individual objects is not
so clear. Some experiences seem not to have an attributional structure of the form <object o is F>.
Olfactory, gustatory, and tactile experiences arguably do not have (at least not typically) this structure.
There are also some special cases of visual experiences that seem to lack that structure (e.g. the visual
experience of a flash of light, or of a color covering the whole visual field, or of complete darkness). For
discussion of whether or not non-visual experiences have attributional structure, see Nudds (2001), Smith
(2007), O'Callaghan (2010), Matthen (2010), Batty (2010, 2011), Fulkerson (2011), Phillips (2013), and
Carvalho (2014).
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As a matter of fact, the mere introduction of objects as constituents of veridical
perceptions is also insufficient to explain their phenomenal particularity. A link between
content singularity and phenomenal particularity must also be explicitly formulated.
When representationalists made the content of veridical experience singular, they were
led to some sort of content-disjunctivist account in which the common element shared by
both veridical and hallucinatory experiences was deprived of any singularity that could
account for the possibly particular character of experiences.119
The phenomenology of particularity is also associated with the cognitive role of
perception. By perceiving a particular object as a particular object, a subject can thereby
form thoughts about that particular object. The phenomenal presentation of a particular
object seems essential to explain this cognitive capacity of perception. If the object
perceptually related to the subject is not phenomenally presented as a particular object,
the experience could hardly be used to ground conscious de re states. In order to be able
to think or talk about a perceived particular object, one must be able to perceptually
single out the relevant object one is thinking or talking about. Perceptual singling out
seems required to secure reference to particular objects. The very fact that experiences
can ground demonstrative reference to particulars seems to depend on the fact that we
perceive things as particulars. This grounding relation needs a phenomenological ground.
Montague (2011:138) claims that "if there is nothing in the character of experience
which is a this thing-ness, we cannot be said to perceive a particular object, rather than
merely be causally affected by a particular object".
Susanna Schellenberg distinguishes two notions of particularity: relational
particularity and phenomenological particularity. In her (2010:22) own terms, "a mental
119 Montague's (2011) account of phenomenal particularity in terms of 'cognitive phenomenology' will be
discussed in Chapter 3. At this moment I am happy with the claim that none of the views discussed so far
give a good explanation of that.
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state instantiates relational particularity if and only if the experiencing subject is
perceptually related to the particular object perceived", and "a mental state instantiates
phenomenological particularity if and only if the particularity is in the scope of how
things seem to the subject, such that it seems to the subject that there is a particular object
(...) present". Phenomenological particularity is instantiated if it seems (perceptually) to
the subject as if there is a particular object in the environment. These notion are easily
confused, and part of the problem of accounting for the relevant desiderata here springs
from this confusion.
The fact that the perceived objects make a difference to individuating the
experience seems to require a relational notion of particularity. The relational account of
experience defended by naïve realists, as well as the object-involving notion of content
defended by some representationalists, are sensitive to this need. The idea is to satisfy
this desideratum by individuating veridical experiences in such a way that objects make
an ineliminable contribution. This seems to be the only way to accommodate the
metaphysical thesis that the object of perception is a constituent of the perceptual state.
However, the metaphysical notion of particularity has been easily confused with
the phenomenological one. The naïve intuition, discussed in Chapter 1, is an emblematic
example of this confusion. When a naïve realist claims that the object itself, qua the
particular object it is, "shapes the contours" of experience, she is claiming that the
relational notion of particularity encompasses the phenomenological one. This move
renders perception in a way that hallucination cannot possibly fit. The phenomenology of
perceptual experiences with no perceived objects becomes obviously problematic, and no
bifurcated account of perceptual phenomenology seems to be satisfactory. In Chapter 1 I
have already argued that naïve realists do not offer a satisfactory way out of this problem.
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Representationalists do not fare much better. They have accounted for the
metaphysical notion of particularity in such a way that the phenomenology of experience
became problematic. They have particularly failed to account for the phenomenological
sense of particularity. They have explained how objects can constitute perceptual states,
but they have failed to explain why some experiences look (from the subject's
perspective) particular.
We have reached a point in the dialect in which simply returning to the naïve
realist view will not do. I want to propose an alternative way out of this conundrum. The
phenomenological sense in which perceptual experience is of a particular and the
metaphysical sense in which experience is about a particular need not be in conflict. We
can distinguish different components of experience, each one serving different
explanatory purposes. Whatever grounds phenomenology should be kept relatively
autonomous from what grounds metaphysical particularity, and whatever accounts for
relational particularity should not affect phenomenology. Schellenberg (2010:45) claims
that "if a distinction can be drawn between what an experience is of and what one takes
one's experience to be of, then we can drive a wedge between the content and the
phenomenology of an experience, without thinking of them as entirely independent". In




I propose now a new account of hallucinatory experience. I argue that it does a
better job than its competitors satisfying the relevant desiderata. Admittedly, I do not
develop my proposal in much detail. What I present here can modestly be seen as a
template view, or as general guidelines for a complete account. Hopefully, this will be
enough to show a certain general picture. And I hope this picture is at least promising.
The schematic nature of the proposal will certainly leave many questions
unanswered. But that is not necessarily problematic. It also means that the proposal can
be developed in different ways in different directions. Though schematic, the view
presented here intends to show how the crucial components of perceptual experience can
be combined in such a way as to offer some of the desired explanations. I do not claim to
answer all the questions, but I do claim to offer a more promising way of delivering the
desired answers.
This Chapter is divided into three sections. First (3.1) I present a way in which the
Kaplanian theory of indexicals can be adapted to account for perceptual experience and
claim that the resulting view has the required resources to provide a harmonious account
of some of the crucial desiderata. Then (3.2) I compare my proposal with Schellenberg's
(2010, 2013) Fregean account and argue that I can offer a less theoretically committed
counterpart that is equally explanatory of the relevant desiderata. Finally (3.3), I argue
that my proposal can also offer a satisfying account of the epistemological role of
hallucination.
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3.1. THE KAPLANIAN MODEL OF PERCEPTION
Michael Tye (2014b) has briefly adumbrated an account of perceptual content as
Kaplanian contents of a special sort.120 My proposal consists in developing this view in a
certain direction.
Kaplan (1989) has famously defended that linguistic indexical terms (e.g. 'I', 'she',
'here', 'there', 'this', 'that', 'today', 'yesterday') have contents with respect to contexts. On
his view, for example, the content of the indexical term 'here' with respect to a given
context is the location of the locution. The content of the term 'I' with respect to a given
context is the speaker of the utterance. Kaplan claimed that a sentence containing an
indexical has as its content a structured proposition that includes the content of the
indexical term (e.g. the location, the speaker) and the content of the other terms. The
sentence 'I am in Austin', for example, as uttered by me, has as its content a structured
proposition containing me (the speaker in this context), the city of Austin (the bearer of
the proper name 'Austin'), and the relation of 'being in'.121
On Kaplan's theory, an indexical term is accounted for in terms of a function that
maps context onto contents. Given a context and a certain function, we can give a
determinate proposition, saturated by the object picked out by the indexical term. This
function is called character. The indexical term 'I', for example, has as its character a
function whose value at each context is the speaker of the utterance. In my utterance of
the sentence 'I am in Austin', for instance, the indexical term 'I' gets me as its value. If the
same sentence is uttered by Michael, it gets Michael as its value. Though my utterance
120 Tye (2014b) briefly presents this alternative and leaves it as an open option.
121 I leave aside, for the sake of simplicity, complications concerning the tense of the verb in this sentence.
Arguably, this sentence also includes a hidden indexical that stands for the time of the locution: 'I am in
Austin [right now]'.
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and Michael's utterance have different contents (mine is about me being in Austin, his is
about him being in Austin), they share a common element: they both have the same
character, which is the function used to determine the specific content of each utterance
of that sentence.
As suggested by Tye (2014b), Kaplanian characters can plausibly be thought as
components of schematic contents, or 'contents of a special sort'. The sentence 'I am in
Austin', independently of the context in which it is uttered, seems to partially represent a
certain schematic state of affairs: the sentence is true if and only if the speaker is in
Austin. Though we are not yet in a position to say if a particular utterance of this sentence
is true or false, we already know some of the conditions that must be satisfied. Since
content is supposed to capture the veridicality conditions of sentences, character seems to
qualify as some sort of content: it gives us some of the conditions that must be satisfied.
It is important to note, however, that whatever kind of content character is, it is
importantly different from the usual notion of content. By themselves, characters are not
enough to give the truth-conditions of particular utterances of sentences. We also need a
particular context to specify a fully determined content. Character seems to be, in this
sense, less than content.
Consider now a case in which the character fails to determine a specific content.
The most obvious case is that of failed demonstrations. Suppose, for example, that I
mistakenly believe that Michael is behind me. As I am talking to someone, I point to my
back over my shoulders and say: 'this guy is my supervisor'. Assuming that there is no
one behind me, I failed to demonstrate anything by using the demonstrative expression
'this guy'. Since on Kaplan's theory the content of a demonstrative expression is
determined by the object demonstrated in the context, in this example my utterance of
this sentence fails to determine a specific content. Given the inexistence of a
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demonstrated object, the demonstrative expression lacks a content with respect to the
context. However, a demonstrative expression that fails to refer still has a character.
There is a function mapping the context of the utterance onto its content. In the example,
the function lacks a value because in that context my demonstration fails to pick out any
object. But the function itself does not go out of existence because it lacks a value. The
function is still there, fixing the conditions that must be satisfied in order to determine a
content. The function explains why my demonstration was infelicitous: it failed because
the conditions determined by the character were not satisfied.
Let's move now from linguistic sentences to perceptual experiences. A Kaplanian
model for perceptual experience can be adapted from Kaplan's account of linguistic
indexicals. The parallel between these two cases is striking. According to
representationalists, perceptual states and linguistic sentences alike are fundamentally
intentional. A perceptual state is also associated with a content that captures its
veridicality conditions. Perception also seems to involve some sort of indexicality: its
content is given with respect to a context. Moreover, perceptual experience seems to
single out individual objects in the environment. This capacity of perceptual experience
seems essential to its capacity to ground demonstrative reference to particular objects.
The singling out of individual objects can plausibly be understood as some sort of
function that maps objects in the context into the content of the experience. In this sense,
perceptual singling out is akin to linguistic indexicals: they can both be described as
functions mapping context onto content.
Linguistic indexical functions, or characters, can be thought as components of
schematic contents, or 'contents of a special sort'. By the same token, it seems plausible to
see the analogous perceptual singling out (or perceptual function) as component of some
sort of schematic content. I shall call this 'special sort of content' content-schema. I use
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this label to emphasize the schematic nature of such content. A content-schema, as
understood here, is composed of perceptual functions and perceptual properties.122 It can
be schematically described in the following way: [ f( ), F ], where f( ) stands for a
perceptual function and F stands for a property (or property-complex) attributed to the
(putative) object picked out by the perceptual function.
Similarly to character, content-schema is importantly less than content. A content-
schema by itself is not enough to determine the veridicality conditions of a token
perceptual experience. A particular perceptual context must also be given. Also similarly
to character, a content-schema can be determined independently of any particular context.
Since it is composed by mere functions and general properties, the content-schema can be
determined without reference to particular objects.
Some examples may be helpful at this point. Take my veridical experience of a
red tomato. The content of my experience is determined by a content-schema that picks
out the particular tomato I am seeing and attribute to it the property of 'being red'. The
content-schema can be schematically described as follows: [f( ), red]. In the relevant
context, the function gets the tomato I am seeing (call it 'tomato1') as its value. The
function then delivers the following output: f(tomato1) = tomato1. The function maps the
relevant object in the context into the content of my experience. The content of my
122 As I present my view here, I focus exclusively on the perceptual relation to particular objects, which
poses a more evident problem for an account of hallucinatory experience. I assume here that perceptual
properties are universals that are not picked out in the same way as particular objects are. I am not,
however, committed to this assumption. The account given to the perceptual representation of particular
objects could be extended to include property-instances, scenes, events, or whatever the subject stands in a
direct perceptual relation to. Though I present my proposal in a way that assumes a metaphysical
conception of properties as universals, I am free to adopt other metaphysical accounts. An extension of my
proposal to illusory cases would have to address these issues. But since I am immediately concerned here
with hallucinatory experience, I prefer to assume a simpler notion of properties. I take it as a virtue of my
proposal that it is flexible enough to accommodate different views on that matter.
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experience can be described as follows: [tomato1, red], where the property red is
attributed to tomato1.
Suppose now that I visually experience a numerically distinct red tomato (call it
tomato2). The content-schema of this experience is also [f( ), red]. But in this new
context, the function picks out tomato2 as its value and delivers tomato2 to the content.
The content of this experience is thus [tomato2, red]. Therefore, the content-schema of
experiences of different objects can be the same. The content-schema is determined in a
way that is not sensitive to contextual changes. Content, however, is context-sensitive.
Experiences of different objects cannot possibly have the same content.
Consider now the case of hallucinatory experience. In an important sense,
hallucinations are similar to failed demonstrations. A failed demonstration fails to pick
out a certain object, and a hallucination fails to be a genuine perception of a particular
object. Both fail to be related in the right way to some (putative) particular object. The
conditions that are not satisfied in the hallucinatory case can plausibly be captured by the
notion of content-schema. The content-schema of a hallucination has a function that maps
a given perceptual context into the content. But perceptual context is such that no object
is given to be mapped into the content. Consequently, hallucinations have content-
schema, but they lack content. The content-schema of a hallucination, given a certain
context, fails to determine a content. The situation is once again analogous to failed
demonstrations: a failed demonstration also has a character that fails to determine a
content. A hallucination, in an important sense, is analogous to a demonstration with no
demonstrated object. We say that a demonstration that fails to demonstrate an object is a
failed demonstration. By the same token, a hallucinatory experience, so to say, is a failed
experience. Tye (2014b) reminds us that "what visual experiences fundamentally aim to
do is to put us in contact with objects around us". Hallucination is a perceptual state that
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fails to fulfill its fundamental purpose: hallucinations don't put us in contact with objects
around us.
Suppose once again that I hallucinate what seems to me to be a red tomato. On
my proposal, my hallucinatory experience has the following content-schema: [f( ), red].
The context of my perceptual episode is such that no particular object is picked out by the
function. The function, therefore, doesn't get any value. A function with no value cannot
deliver any outcome. Since the value of the function is used to determine the content, and
there is no value in this case, no content can be determined. A hallucinatory experience,
therefore, has no content.
I propose that we use the content-schema to fix the phenomenal character of
perceptual experience. This nicely accounts for the possibility of phenomenal sameness
across veridical and nonveridical experiences. Since content-schema is stripped away
from contextual objects, it can be shared by veridical and hallucinatory experiences. This
also accounts for the possibility of phenomenal sameness when numerically distinct
identical-looking objects are perceived. Since particular objects do not enter in the
content-schema, and content-schema fixes sensory phenomenology, then the phenomenal
presentation of numerically distinct objects can look exactly alike. On my account, the
contextual object picked out by a content-schema makes no phenomenological
difference. The object enters in the content of the perceptual state, but not in its content-
schema. Take the three examples discussed before: my experiences of veridically seeing
tomato1 as red, or veridically seeing tomato2 as red, or hallucinating what seems to me to
be a red tomato, all share the same content-schema [f( ), red]. On my proposal, that
accounts for the fact that they are phenomenally identical.
My proposal also has an easy time explaining why two hallucinations can be
phenomenally different. If I first hallucinate what seems to me to be a red tomato, and
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later hallucinate what seems to me to be a green tomato, these two hallucinatory
experiences have different content-schemas. The content-schema of my first hallucination
has a function that acquires no value and the property of 'being red'. This hallucination, so
to say, says that 'this (putative) tomato is red'. In the second case, my hallucination has a
content-schema that specifies the following condition: 'this (putative) tomato is green'.
Schematically, the content-schema of my first hallucination is [f( ), red], whereas the
content-schema of my second hallucination is [f( ), green]. In both cases, no real tomato
is seen. The function, in both cases, fails to pick out any tomato in the context. This
accounts for the fact that both experiences have failed to "put us in contact with objects
around us". Though both experiences failed for the same reason (namely, they failed to
pick out an object in the context), they have satisfying conditions that are importantly
different. The conditions for satisfying the first hallucinatory experience include the
property of being red, whereas the conditions for the second one include the property of
being green. This difference is captured by the content-schema. This, I claim, accounts
for the fact that these hallucinations have different phenomenal characters. And the fact
that both experiences are hallucinatory is accounted for by the condition that both
experiences fail to satisfy.
The claim that hallucinations have no content might strike many as being at odds
with an acceptable representationalist account of hallucination. After all,
representationalism, as I defined here, consists in the claim that perceptual experience is
fundamentally a matter of a subject being in a certain representational state that is defined
in terms of its content, which is supposed to capture the way things are represented to be
according to the experience. But since hallucinations have no content, in a hallucinatory
experience the world is not represented as being any particular way. Since a mere
content-schema cannot give us the veridicality conditions of a token experience, it seems
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that it cannot account for how the world is represented to be according to the experience.
Whatever content-schema is, it seems not the kind of thing that representationalists were
looking for to count as the content of hallucination.
There are, however, different ways of understanding which satisfying conditions
are captured by the notion of perceptual content. We can distinguish at least two different
kinds of conditions: the first condition captures the requirements for being properly
related to the perceived objects (if any) and its properties; the second condition
determines whether or not a particular experiential episode is veridical.
The first condition can be specified without any reference to particular objects. It
simply says that if the experience is to be veridical (or not), it must be about this
(putative) object, and this (putative) object must have property F. This condition can be
captured by the content-schema. The perceptual function in the content-schema accounts
for the requirement that a given experience, in order to be veridical (or not), must be
about this (putative) object, that is perceptually presented to the subject. This condition
may fail to be satisfied. If there is some sort of referential failure, such that the condition
of being about this (putative) object is not satisfied, the experience then fails to be
properly related to the environment. In this case, as I said before, we have a failed
experience. This is a distinctive kind of failure, and the content-schema nicely captures
the conditions that must be met in order to avoid this failure.
Admittedly, content-schema is not the kind of thing that representationalists are
willing to call 'content'. But even though a content-schema does not fully specify the
conditions that must be met for an experiential episode to be veridical, it does give some
conditions that must be satisfied. A content-schema does not represent a specific state of
affairs, but it puts constraints on how the world has to be like in order to make the
experience veridical. It says, for example, that the world must contain some (putative)
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objects here and there, that these objects must be properly related to the subject, and that
these objects must have properties F, G, etc. A content-schema is informative enough to
give us a full content if context is given. Content-schema is not content, granted. But it is
interestingly similar to content in many respects. Moreover, content-schema and content
are interestingly related. Given a context, a content-schema can only determine one
content. And a particular content is not compatible with any content-schema whatsoever.
Given the interesting relations and similarities between content and content-schema, it
seems reasonable to suppose that content-schema can be put to play some of the roles
typically attributed to contents.
My proposal does not simply replace content for content-schema. It adds the
notion of content-schema alongside the classical notion of content. This added element
might seen problematic to some representationalists because it seems not robust enough
to play a crucial metaphysical role. When giving an account of perceptual experience,
philosophers try to accommodate the metaphysical thesis that the objects an experience is
about make a difference to individuating the experience and giving its veridicality
conditions. In order to accomplish this task, content must make reference to the particular
objects the experience is about. An experience cannot be individuated unless its objects
are included in the content. Mere content-schemas cannot play this explanatory role.
All that sounds very right to me. In order to accomplish this specific metaphysical
task, content must make reference to the particular objects the experience is about. When
I distinguished two different senses in which content captures satisfying conditions of
experiences, the second sense referred to the conditions that make particular experiential
episodes veridical or not. I agree that this second condition can only be given by the usual
notion of content. My notion of content captures this condition, since it is object-
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involving. On my account, the ultimate metaphysical basis of veridical experience makes
an ineliminable reference to the objects it is about.
A hallucination, however, cannot have the same kind of metaphysical basis. A
hallucination cannot be individuated in terms of its objects, for it has none. On my view,
a hallucinatory experience also fails to determine a content, so it cannot be individuated
in terms of its content either. Given that a hallucinatory state is not about any particular
object and has no content, the only thing left to individuate this state is a certain
phenomenal type.123
I propose the following account of the nature of hallucinatory experience: a
hallucination consists fundamentally in a subject being in a state that has a content-
schema that fails to determine a perceptual content. The phenomenal type is captured by
the notion of content-schema. When a certain phenomenal type is tokened by the subject,
the subject entertains an experience that (seemingly) portrays the environment as being a
certain way. On my proposal, since veridical and nonveridical experiences can have the
same content-schema, they can also token the very same phenomenal type. This explains
why good and bad perceptual experiences can phenomenally portray identical-looking
scenes.
My proposal, therefore, gives a specific kind of disjunctivist account of the nature
of perceptual experience. Perceptual experience either consists fundamentally in a subject
being in a state defined in terms of its content, or it fundamentally consists in a subject
being in a state with a content-schema that fails to determine a content. Metaphysical
disjunctivism, I claim, is not problematic per se. If each disjunct is used to accomplish an
explanatory task to which it is well suited for, no problem arises from disjunctivism.
123 I borrow this idea from Montague (2011).
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When I criticized the disjunctivist accounts defended by naïve realists in Chapter 1, I
mainly criticized the fact that the disjunct accounting for hallucination could not come to
grips with the intrinsic properties of hallucinatory experience. The problem, as I argued,
was the fact that naïve realists offer a disjunctivist account of sensory phenomenology.
According to them, the very metaphysical basis of phenomenology is what is being
accounted for disjunctively. My view, in contrast, does not give a bifurcated account of
phenomenology. Naïve realists had to do that because they hold the naïve thesis that
particular objects as such make a constitutive difference to phenomenology. Since I reject
the naïve thesis, I am free to offer a unified account of phenomenology and, at the same
time, a disjunctivist account of the ultimate metaphysical structure of perceptual
experience. I only need a common metaphysical element possibly shared by good and
bad cases to ground phenomenology. This element, I claim, is captured by the notion of
content-schema.
The difference in the metaphysical constitution of veridical and hallucinatory
experience reflects an important asymmetry between these cases. A veridical experience
has some cognitive and epistemological capacities that can only be accounted for if the
objects it is about are used to individuate that state. If, for example, a subject veridically
sees tomato1, she can thereby have de re beliefs about that particular tomato. She can also
know something about that particular tomato. But another subject who veridically sees
tomato2, no matter how phenomenally similar their experiences are, cannot, by means of
that experience, come to know anything about tomato1, or form de re beliefs about
tomato1. The experience of the second subject can only make available de re thoughts
and knowledge about tomato2.
Hallucinations, in contrast, do not have the same cognitive and epistemological
capacities. Numerically distinct token hallucinations with the same phenomenal character
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have exactly the same cognitive powers. Hallucinations cannot make knowledge or de re
thoughts about particulars available. This asymmetry explains why they can have
different metaphysical constitutions: their ultimate constitutions are used to ground
different abilities.
A consequence of my view is that a token hallucination is neither veridical nor
falsidical. Since it lacks a content, it cannot be assessed as to its accuracy. A comparison
with failed demonstrations may be illuminating. Take again the example of me pointing
to my back and saying 'this guy is my supervisor'. I mistakenly believe that Michael is
behind me, when in fact there is no one there. In this case, by failing to demonstrate any
object, I also fail to make a statement. I intended to affirm something about Michael, but
I failed to do so. My speech act, so to say, is infelicitous. It is not a false statement about
something, but an act that failed to be a statement. My utterance of that sentence is
neither true nor false.
Analogously, hallucinations are not falsidical experiences, but failed experiences.
They purport to represent a particular state of the world, but they fail to do so. Whatever
a failed statement amounts to, it cannot be individuated in terms of its content, for it has
none. The act of trying to demonstrate an object and making a claim about it, if the
demonstration fails, can plausibly be individuated as some sort of act that failed to be
something it purported to be. By the same token, a hallucination seems to be some sort of
mental state that purports to be a perceptual representation of the world but that fails to be
so. This nicely accounts for the kind of error that hallucinations are. A hallucination fails
to be related to the world in the right way. Because of that, it fails to perceptually refer to
any object. This failure renders hallucinations incapable of representing any particular
state-of-the-world. This representational deficit renders hallucination incapable of being
either a veridical or falsidical depiction of a particular state of affairs. In an important
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sense, there is no way of changing the world and making a hallucination veridical, just as
there is no way of changing the world and making a failed statement true. Since a
hallucinatory state, and a failed statement, fail to determine any specific content, no thing
can make them true.
The claim that hallucinations are neither veridical nor falsidical also fits nicely
with my disjunctivist account of the metaphysical ground of experience. It points to
another asymmetry between good and bad cases. Particular objects make an ineliminable
contribution to the veridicality conditions of veridical experiences (and maybe illusions).
But token hallucinations have no veridicality conditions, so there is no need to include
particular objects in their ultimate nature.
The difficulty of delivering the veridicality conditions of hallucination, which
occupied so many representationalists, is simply bypassed in my view. We don't need
conditions that give the verdict that hallucinations are falsidical, or that show that the so-
called 'veridical' hallucinations are veridical. On my account, hallucination cannot be
either. 'Veridical' hallucinations are simply cases in which the phenomenal type tokened
by the hallucinator matches the phenomenal type of some veridical experience the subject
could have entertained in the same circumstances were she actually having a veridical
experience. If a hallucination occurs in a situation in which, were it properly related to
the world, the resulting experience would be an accurate depiction of the scene, then the
hallucination is 'veridical' in this loose sense. But this is rather loose talk.124 It is
interesting to note that, on my account, a hallucination does not become more or less
'veridical' if the object in the world is substituted by an identical-looking replica. This
shows that the hallucination is simply not about that particular object. The 'veridicality'
124 Siegel's (2010:36) distinction between "weak veridicality conditions" from "strong veridicality
conditions" is interestingly related to what I am saying here, though our views are different in many other
respects.
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conditions for saying whether a hallucination is 'veridical' or not cannot make reference
to particular objects in the environment.125
The view I have sketched here has the necessary resources to accommodate the
relevant desiderata in a harmonious way. By distinguishing content from content-
schema, I have added a new layer to the conventional notion of perceptual content. The
new (layered) notion of perceptual experience can give us the elements we need to
accomplish, in a relatively autonomous way, the various explanatory tasks.
3.2. A FREGEAN COUNTERPART
Susanna Schellenberg (2010) defends a view that can be interestingly compared
with the one I am proposing here. She phrases her theory in explicitly Fregean terms, but
I believe that we can strip the Fregean garment off her theory and retain its bare structure.
I am particularly interested in the explanatory role played by each theoretical element and
in how the different elements of the theory interact with one another. The questions
addressed here, or so I argue, are orthogonal to the Russellianism/Fregeanism debate.
Theories with similar structural organization, or that capture the same relevant
distinctions, can arguably have the same explanatory powers. My proposal, I claim, has
the advantage of not being committed to any specific account of the nature of content.126
125 I have already discussed in Chapter 2 the so-called 'de re hallucinations'. I follow Jonhston's (2004)
view that hallucinatory states, as such, cannot be genuinely de re. A hallucination may strike the subject as
being about a particular object, but the relevant res can only be in the content of thoughts based on the
experience, and it must come from the subject's 'repertoire of singular reference'.
126 My (schematic) proposal takes no stance on whether or not perceptual contents are Fregean-style
propositions (see Burge, 1991), or Russellian-style propositions (see Tye, 2000), or coarse-grained set of
possible worlds (see Stalnaker, 1984), or some sort of pluralistic content (see Chalmers, 2006), or what
have you.
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The first obvious similarity between us concerns the desiderata we want to
satisfy. Schellenberg (2010:22) distinguishes two different senses of particularity. A
mental state instantiates what she calls relational particularity "if and only if the
experiencing subject is perceptually related to the particular object perceived". And a
mental state instantiates phenomenological particularity "if it seems (perceptually) to the
subject as if there is a particular object in the environment". Patently, if
phenomenological particularity can be instantiated without there being any particular
object perceived by the subject, as it seems to happen in hallucinatory experience, then
these two senses of particularity must be accounted for separately. Whatever grounds
phenomenological particularity should be kept relatively autonomous from what grounds
relational particularity. Schellenberg (2010:31) proposes, just as I do, that "perceptual
experience has both a component that grounds phenomenology and a component that
accounts for relational particularity without affecting phenomenology".
From this point on, the similarities between us become less obvious. Schellenberg
proposes an account of perceptual experience in terms of Fregean de re contents.
Perceptual contents, she claims, are composed of "modes of presentation" that specify the
way in which a subject conceives of an object when she perceptually refers to it.127
Schellenberg adapts the Fregean notion of mode of presentation to perceptual experience
in such a way that it is now supposed to capture the way in which an object is perceived
by the subject. A Fregean account, she claims, adds a layer to the notion of content that is
not available for Russellians. In a Fregean account, a perceptual state can not only
represent an object, but it can also represent it in a certain way.
127 Schellenberg includes an account of the perception of properties in her theory. According to her,
property-instances are also perceptually referred to in a certain way, which is also captured by a mode of
presentation. But since I give no account of the perception of properties, I will set aside this part of her
view. As I said before, the perception of objects poses a more immediate problem for an account of
hallucination, and I prefer to focus my attention exclusively on that issue.
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A Fregean account of sensory perception seems appealing because the notion of
mode of presentation has a layered structure that allows for an explanation of
phenomenology in the absence of the perceived object. The extension of the Fregean
account of language to perception seems very natural. If the proposition (Gedanke)
expressed by a linguistic sentence can be accounted for in terms of senses (Sinn) that may
lack a referent (Bedeutung), then it seems plausible to suppose that the perceptual content
of an experience can also be accounted for in terms of modes of presentation that may fail
to refer to any object.
The notion of mode of presentation, as applied to perception, has to be understood
in a specific way. More precisely, it cannot arguably be understood as a de dicto mode of
presentation. As Schellenberg (2010:36) characterizes it, a de dicto mode of presentation
"lays down a condition that something must satisfy to be the object determined by the
content".128 According to this notion, the relation between content and object is that of
semantic satisfaction: content lays down a description, and whatever satisfies the
description is the object determined by the content. This view, she argues, cannot account
for relational particularity, for this notion of content is radically object-independent. If
perceptual content is composed of modes of presentation that are characterized in a way
that makes no reference to particular objects, then the fact that an experience is of a
particular object as opposed to any other object becomes mysterious. More importantly,
this notion of content gets the veridicality conditions of perceptual states wrong. An
experience of a certain object can only be made veridical by the very object that is
perceived. This veridicality condition cannot be captured without reference to the
particular object being perceived.
128 This is, for example, the way in which Chalmers (2066:99) characterizes Fregean modes of
presentation.
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According to Schellenberg (2010:36), "what is needed is a way of thinking about
content such that content grounds relational particularity in the case of accurate
perceptions and grounds phenomenological particularity in both [accurate] perceptions
and hallucinations". The notion of content that we need, she claims, can be understood in
terms of de re modes of presentation.
The first precise characterization of a de re mode of presentation came with Evans
(1982) and McDowell (1984). They characterized this notion in a way that is radically
object-involving. According to their view, in the absence of the relevant res, no content
can be determined. A de re sense with no Bedeutung, in this view, is an aberration. There
is no such thing. Contents that have de re senses in it must necessarily refer to some
specific res.
However, if perceptual content is constituted of radically object-involving de re
modes of presentation, this notion of content cannot explain phenomenological
particularity. Assuming that hallucinatory states can instantiate phenomenological
particularity, and that a hallucination does not refer to any particular res, then its content
cannot be composed of radically object-involving de re modes of presentation. This led
many to content-disjunctivism. But a disjunctivist account of phenomenology, as I
already argued in Chapter 1, is unpromising. If content is used to fix phenomenology, as
it is supposed to do here, this notion of content does not give us what we want.
Instead of a radically object-involving notion of de re mode of presentation,
Schellenberg (2010:37) proposes that de re modes of presentation are only "partly object-
dependent". As she puts it, perceptual content is constituted by object-related contents.
On this view, a perceptual state with a de re mode of presentation can still have a content
even in the absence of the relevant res. She (2010:38) claims that a de re mode of
presentation can be understood as an object-related concept, where this notion of concept
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is analyzed in terms of possession conditions.129 Roughly speaking, the possession
condition of a concept consists in the ability to refer to whatever the concept is of, which
supposedly involves the ability to discriminate between the things that fall under the
concept and those that do not.
Schellenberg (2010:37) spells out her theory in the following way. Perceptual
contents are composed of (object-related) de re modes of presentation that have
possession conditions determined by concepts. Concepts, that are schematically
represented as MOPr( ), take objects as inputs and give contents as outputs. Two
phenomenally identical but numerically distinct token experiences e1 and e2 in which the
subject is perceptually related to the same object o1 will have the same concept MOPr( )
and the same content MOPr(o1), where the content is the output of concept MOPr( ) when
it takes o1 as input.130 Two phenomenally identical experiences e1 and e2, each one related
to numerically distinct objects o1 and o2 respectively, will have the same concept MOPr( )
but different contents, namely MOPr(o1) and MOPr(o2) respectively. Finally, a
hallucination that is phenomenally identical to e1 will also have concept MOPr( ), but
since the concept takes no object as input, its output will be the gappy content MOPr(_).
Hence, on her view, hallucinations have gappy de re content. She argues that
Fregeans don't need to be afraid of gappy contents. A gappy account is problematic for
Russellians because the gap occupies the object-place in the content. On a Russellian
account, gaps look awkwardly like objects of a special sort. A Fregean, in contrast, can
129 Schellenberg (2010) claims that her notion of concept is perfectly compatible with the claim that
perceptual content is nonconceptual. Unsophisticated animals that are not concept-users as we adult
human-beings are can still make perceptual discriminations and count as possessing the relevant concepts.
If an animal can have experiences as of something 'being an object', or 'being over there', this animal counts
as possessing the relevant kind of concepts. Her proposal, she claims, is compatible with any account of the
ability to perceptually refer to (seeming) objects.
130 For the sake of simplicity, I assume here that the experience is constituted of a single de re mode of
presentation that refers to a single object. This is surely an oversimplification, but this simple model can
capture the relevant point being made here.
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hold that a certain mode of presentation fills the content, and this mode of presentation is
gappy. On Schellenberg's account, the gappy mode of presentation accounts for the
phenomenal presentation of what seems to be a particular object. This, she argues,
accounts for phenomenological particularity in a way that does not depend on the
existence of any perceived object. And since veridical experiences have modes of
presentation that make an ineliminable reference to particular objects, her view can also
account for relational particularity: when veridical, an experience is necessarily related to
a specific particular object.
We have enough elements now to compare Schellenberg's theory with the one I
have sketched in the last section. It seems to me that we have arrived somewhat
independently at theories that are structurally alike. What she says in her Fregean dialect
can be translated into my (less theoretically-loaded) dialect without loss.
Her Fregean notion of content plays a dual explanatory role: it explains both
relational particularity and phenomenological particularity. In order to accomplish this
double task, she distinguishes the concept associated with a perceptual mode of
presentation and the outcome of that concept, which is some sort of saturated mode of
presentation. Modes of presentation are saturated either by a particular or by a gap.
Contents are, on her view, composed of saturated modes of presentation. For brevity, I
will say that a saturated mode of presentation is a content.
The similarities between our views are striking. In order to explain the same
desiderata, I distinguish content from content-schema. The content is the output of a
content-schema, which has a function that maps objects into content. Her 'concept' is a
counterpart of my 'content-schema'. 'Concepts', in her dialect, also maps objects into
content, and they are used to ground phenomenology, just as my content-schemas are.
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Concepts and content-schemas alike are specified without reference to any specific
particular object, and that is precisely why they serve to fix phenomenology.
If we take her dialect as object-language and my dialect as meta-language, the
following T-sentences seem quite accurate:
'Two phenomenally identical but numerically distinct token experiences e1 and e2
in which the subject is perceptually related to the same object o1 will have the
same concept MOPr( ) and the same content MOPr(o1), where the content is the
output of concept MOPr( ) when it takes o1 as input'
is true iff
Two phenomenally identical but numerically distinct token experiences e1 and e2
in which the subject is perceptually related to the same object o1 will have the
same content-schema [ f( ) ] and the same content [o1], where the content is the
output of content-schema [ f( ) ] when it takes o1 as input.
'Two phenomenally identical experiences e1 and e2, each one related to
numerically distinct objects o1 and o2 respectively, will have the same concept
MOPr( ) but different contents, namely MOPr(o1) and MOPr(o2) respectively'
is true iff
Two phenomenally identical experiences e1 and e1, each one related to
numerically distinct objects o1 and o2 respectively, will have the same content-
schema [ f( ) ] but different contents, namely [o1] and [o2] respectively.
The hallucinatory case, however, cannot be translated so easily. On her account,
hallucinations have gappy de re content. On my account, hallucinations have no content.
But given the two main desiderata at stake, this difference is functionally irrelevant. For
both of us, hallucinations have the element needed to fix phenomenology (content-
schema for me, 'concept' for her), and for both of us hallucinations lack the element
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necessary to ground relational particularity (content for me, object-involving 'content' for
her).
There is, however, another relevant desideratum. Schellenberg (2010:40)
distinguishes two ways in which a content can be inaccurate: "one way is for the content
to make a claim about the situation that is not accurate. A second way is for it to fail to
make an accurate claim about the situation". On her view, since hallucinations have
content, they have veridicality conditions just like any other perceptual state. But since
the content is gappy, it always delivers the unequivocal verdict of being inaccurate.
This strikes me as the wrong verdict. Failing to make an accurate claim cannot be
simply equated with necessarily making an inaccurate claim. If I fail to make a claim,
whatever I am doing is not the kind of thing that can be either true or false. A
hallucinatory episode can be phenomenally identical to a genuine perceptual encounter
with the world, but by failing to refer to the world, it cannot be about it in the relevant
sense. A false statement about nothing is not the same as a failed statement that is not
about anything. The specific kind of error of hallucination is sui generis: it is not a false
claim about some referred item, but a failure to refer to any item and therefore to make a
claim about anything. On my proposal, hallucinations are neither veridical nor falsidical.
They are, so to say, failed statements, not false statements. It seems to me that my
account does a better job capturing this difference.
My proposal is also structurally similar to the multiple contents view.131
According to this view, perceptual experience has multiple layers of content, each one
satisfying different explanatory demands. One layer, for example, grounds
phenomenology, while another layer accounts for relational particularity. Each layer, on
131 See Horgan & Tienson (2002) and Chalmers (2006) for different versions of this theory.
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this view, is associated with a different set of accuracy conditions. Schellenberg
(2010:42) claims that this view has problems holding the different contents together. The
relation between phenomenal contents, required to account for phenomenological
particularity, and relational contents, required to account for relational particularity, is not
properly explained.
My view, in contrast, avoids this problem because content-schema and content are
not defined in completely independent terms, and the content-schema is not saturated in a
way that is non-object-related. Whatever relation 'concepts' can have with 'contents', on
Schellenberg's view, content-schemas can also have with contents, on my view. Her
notion of an object-related de re mode of presentation seems to match perfectly well the
way in which I conceive content-schemas determining contents. A content-schema has a
function that takes objects as input. The function itself, it seems to me, is perfectly object-
related. It purports to be related to some res, but it may fail to do so.
The way in which a perceptual function picks out its value can also be accounted
for in terms of concepts with possession abilities. The fact that a perceptual state
instantiates a certain perceptual function can be accounted for in terms of discriminatory
abilities or whatever else accounts for our ability to perceptually refer to particulars in the
environment.
In the last section, I compared my perceptual function with the Kaplanian
character. When Kaplan (1989) presented his theory of linguistic indexicals, he gave a
certain explanation of how each character maps context into content. The indexical term
'now', for example, picks out the time of the utterance and maps it into the content. The
term 'here' gets as input the location of the utterance and maps this place into the content.
Each indexical term is accounted for by some sort of procedure that explains which
contextual element will serve as input for delivering the content as output. But Kaplan
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does not explain how a character takes its input. If a speaker says 'it is raining now', how
does she pick out the relevant time-slice in the context? Well, I don't know, neither does
Kaplan. An answer to this question supposedly involves complicated empirical and
metaphysical issues. What is after all a 'time-slice'? How can we be properly related to
those things? Which sensory mechanisms are attuned to the relevant object? How this
ability evolved and was selected by creatures like us? And so on. Those questions are not
answered by Kaplan. They are left completely open. The Kaplanian theory is compatible
with any answer to these questions. By the same token, a Kaplanian theory of perceptual
experience is not committed to any specific explanation of how we come to select the
relevant input of perceptual functions.
When Schellenberg talks of possession conditions of concepts, she is talking
about the conditions that determine whether or not a certain perceptual referring is
successful. The relevant conditions include at least two basic requirements: first, there
must be a particular object in the context; second, this object must be related to the
perceiver in the right way. Moreover, the condition must be spelled out in a way that
makes no reference to particular objects. They are object-related, but not radically object-
involving. The satisfying conditions of Kaplanian characters, or of my perceptual
functions, are exactly like that. Kaplanian characters have satisfying conditions that are
spelled out in context-independent terms, just as my perceptual functions are specified in
a non-object-involving way. Whether or not the condition is satisfied can obviously
depend on the existence of some object, but the condition itself cannot include any
particular object.
In a somewhat loose way, we can understand perceptual referring as some sort of
perceptual singling out of (seeming) individual objects in the environment. The etiology
of this capacity in creatures like us is a massively empirical question that falls out of the
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scope of this dissertation. Whatever accounts for this capacity, it seems to be a natural
capacity that perceivers like us have. For perceivers like us, perception gives more than
properties floating around. We seem to perceive individual objects instantiating various
properties. When I visually experience a red tomato, for example, I have the experience
of a (putative) individual tomato that looks red. The crucial point here is that in my
experience I single out the (putative) tomato and see it as a particular tomato. My
experience purports to put me in contact with this (putative) individual object. This is
something that a philosophical theory of perception is supposed to explain. The details
concerning the empirical basis of this ability, however, fall out of the scope of the
investigation of armchair philosophers like me.
I have argued in this section that my proposal is at least as explanatory of the
relevant desiderata as Schellenberg's account. But my view has the advantage of not
being committed to any specific account of the nature of content.
3.3. THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL ROLE OF HALLUCINATION
Arguably, the role of experience in yielding phenomenal states is not independent
of its role in justifying our perceptual beliefs. Sensory phenomenology yields us some
sort of internal (first-person) evidence for beliefs concerning our surroundings. An
account of perceptual phenomenology should capture the relevant elements needed to
ground this capacity. Schellenberg (2014a) claims that the phenomenological and
epistemological aspects of perception should be accounted for in an integrated manner. In
what follows, I argue that my proposal can capture the interesting epistemological
capacities of hallucinatory phenomenology.
147
The phenomenology of particularity seems to have an epistemological upshot.
Plausibly, a perceptual experience as of a particular object yields some sort of first-
person (possibly defeated) evidence for beliefs concerning the existence of a certain
(putative) object in the environment. By visually experiencing what seems to me to be a
particular object, I thereby have some (possibly defeated) evidence that there is a
(putative) particular object out there.
Hallucinations and veridical perceptions alike can give us this kind of evidence.
As a matter of fact, given that hallucination and veridical experience can be subjectively
indistinguishable, it follows from that the their phenomenology should be able to yield us
the same kind of internal (first-person) evidence for beliefs.
On my proposal, the phenomenology of experience is fixed by a content-schema,
schematically represented as [ f( ), F ]. The perceptual function f( ) stands for a distinctive
kind of perceptual referring that purports to pick out particular objects in the environment
and map them into content. The relevant kind of referring has a phenomenological
upshot: the subject entertains an experience that phenomenally refers to a (putative)
particular object. The distinctive referential sense of this phenomenal presentation, it
seems to me, explains why it looks to the subject as if there is a specific particular out
there. When we have a perceptual experience, the world, so to say, looks as if it is
inhabited by particulars because, in the relevant sense, experience purports to
phenomenally refer to particulars. According to my proposal, the perceptual function f( )
fixes the distinctive particular look of our (veridical and nonveridical) experiences.
Therefore, whatever epistemological role the phenomenology of particularity is supposed
to play, my account can give a unified account for both good and bad cases.
Michelle Montague (2011) proposes an account of the phenomenology of
particularity in terms of non-sensory phenomenology, or as she puts it, in terms of
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cognitive phenomenology. In short, she claims that the fact that a subject applies certain
concepts when having an experience alters the overall phenomenology of that state, and a
process of this kind can explain why we perceive (putative) objects as particular
objects.132
According to Montague (2011:135), most of our perceptual experiences involve a
basic 'thought-form' containing a bare demonstrative, which can be represented as
follows: [that (thing),  ], where the blank () is filled by some property attributed to
the object demonstrated. If, for example, I veridically see a red tomato, my experience
can be represented as: [that tomato, red]. On Montague's view, my experience "entails"
the basic thought-form described above. My experience is, so to say, an instantiation of
the basic form [that (thing),  ]. The same is true for my hallucination as of a red
tomato. In this case, my hallucination is represented as [that (tomato), red], and this also
entails the basic thought-form [that (thing),  ]. In the hallucinatory case, the
demonstrative element fails to refer, but the bare (failed) demonstrative is still there in the
thought-form.
Montague claims that this basic thought-form, i.e. [that (thing), ], accompanies
(or is entailed by) our ordinary perceptions. Every experience as of a particular object
implies the application of the bare demonstrative concept [that (thing)], which captures a
fundamental category of thinking and perception (namely, the category object).133
132 I don't find the typical examples used in support of cognitive phenomenology (e.g. seeing a pine tree as
a pine tree) particularly convincing. Siegel (2006, 2010) has famously presented examples of this kind as
phenomenological evidence of cognitive phenomenology. I find the putative phenomenological evidence
very unclear. But even if the evidence is legitimate and the cognitive account is the right one for that, it is
still not clear to me whether or not the cognitive account can be extended to explain phenomenal
particularity. Natural-kind phenomenology (if there is such a thing) seems to be significantly different from
the phenomenology of particularity. The kind of concepts deployed in the recognition of natural kinds seem
to be much more sophisticated than the very simple abilities necessary for perceptually discriminating
(putative) particulars.
133 Montague (2011:136) refers to studies from Spelke (1990) and Carey & Xu (2001) that show the
fundamentality of the category object, or objecthood, for thought and perception.
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Perceptual thoughts, she (2011:136) claims, are almost always "object-positing", or
"taking-as-object". When having an experience, the subject entertains a thought-form that
applies the concept OBJECT, and such concept-application has a phenomenological
impact. The phenomenology of seeing things as objects, hence, is a cognitive fact
concerning the application of this very special concept.
Montague's account is similar to my own proposal in many respects. But I focus
here on where we diverge. Montague claims that phenomenological particularity is some
sort of cognitive phenomenology, whereas I believe that it is some sort of sensory
phenomenology. The cognitive approach, or so I argue, cannot satisfactorily explain the
epistemological role of the phenomenology of particularity. My proposal, in contrast, can
offer an account of phenomenal particularity as some sort of sensory capacity, which
qualifies it to play its distinctive epistemological role.
Montague (2011:137) compares her notion of an object-positing thought-form to
the Kantian notion of object as a transcendental category. In this sense, the deployment of
the concept OBJECT is seen as a condition of possibility of perceptual experience as of
particular objects.
This Kantian picture, however, is highly problematic when it comes to grounding
epistemological capacities. As argued by McDowell (1994), unless the world is itself
made manifest to us in perception, we are not entitled to hold the perceptual beliefs that
we do. The Kantian transcendental picture seems to imply a notion of perception that can
only entitle us to have beliefs about phenomena, as opposed to noumena. This is,
arguably, a disquieting shortcoming of perceptual evidence. Perception should
supposedly be allowed to reveal us features of the world, not simply features of our way
of seeing the world. If the phenomenology of particularity is supposed to explain how, by
means of perception, we can be entitled to hold beliefs to the effect that there are certain
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(putative) objects in the world, then whatever grounds this capacity should not (arguably)
be understood as some sort of transcendental condition. If perceptual phenomenology is
epistemically related to perceptual beliefs in such a way as to entitle us to have those
beliefs, then we should characterize perceptual phenomenology in a way that makes it
capable to grasp real aspects of the world. In this sense, phenomenological particularity
should be understood as some sort of awareness of external particularity: the world itself,
so to say, is supposedly populated by individuals, and it is being phenomenally revealed
to us as being populated by individuals. If we see things as particulars because we have a
certain concept that is projected onto the phenomenology of perceptual states, then this
phenomenal trait, whatever it is, seems incapable to serve as a legitimate epistemological
ground.
My proposal, in contrast, can give an account of phenomenological particularity
in terms of a specifically sensory ability, so it can arguably satisfy the relevant
epistemological desideratum. The perceptual function f( ), as I conceive of it, is not some
sort of concept of object which is supposedly projected onto sensory phenomenology.
The perceptual function consists in some sort of very basic ability to perceptually refer to
objects in the environment. As I see it, this function is part of a sensory representational
system that evolved in creatures like us. From an evolutionary perspective, the perceptual
function can be understood as a natural function that was selected for singling out
particulars in the environment.134 In principle, a cognitively unsophisticated creature that
can have no conceptual thoughts can still have the capacity to perceptually single out
134 See Millikan (1984) for a full-fledged evolutionary account of perceptual representation, and
Schellenberg (2014a) for an interesting way of using this approach to account for hallucination. My
evolutionary story here is heavily inspired in Schellenberg's. My proposal, however, is not committed to
any specific evolutionary theory of perceptual representation.
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objects. This is an ability that comes with having a certain sensory representational
system, not with having some (innate?) concepts.
Plausibly, the capacity to single out objects is grounded in successful cases.135
Successful cases of perceptual reference to individuals were somehow adaptive and, by
natural selection, the capacity to perceptually refer to individuals was selected for. The
selected capacity purports to put us in contact with elements of the world. In this sense,
we do not impose singularity on the world, as if seeing things as particulars consisted in
conforming our perceptual experience according to some transcendental schemata.
Rather, the world unfolds to us through our conscious experience of particularity.
The moral of this evolutionary tale is that the capacity to perceptually refer to
objects, which in my view explains the phenomenology of particularity, evolved as part
of a natural system that purports to represent aspects of the world. The sensory nature of
this capacity allows it to play its distinctive epistemological role. As I conceive of it, the
capacity to perceptually single out objects, which naturally evolved in sentience creatures
like us, is what grounds both the phenomenology of particularity and the epistemological
powers of this kind of experience. My view, I claim, can deliver the integrated account of
the phenomenological and epistemological aspects of perception that Schellenberg
(2014a) wants in a way that makes the epistemological role of phenomenal particularity
non-problematic.
I have been talking so far about the epistemological role of phenomenal
particularity in grounding beliefs about (putative) particular objects. I claimed that
135 The evolutionary story can also shed some light on the cases in which the perceptual function fails to
fulfill its role. When a subject hallucinates, she purports to refer to a particular, but she fails to do so. The
case is analogous to a bodily organ that fails to fulfill its role. Plausibly, the heart was naturally selected to
pump blood. This is its function. A malfunctioning heart that does not pump blood still has the function of
doing it, even though it fails to do so. A hallucination, by the same token, is a perceptual experience that
fails to fulfill its natural function. Even though a hallucination does not successfully refer to objects, it still
has the function of doing so.
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hallucinations and veridical perceptions can play the same relevant epistemological role.
Hallucinations, I claimed, can make subjects internally justified in believing that there is
a putative object in the environment. However, I haven't explained what a belief about a
putative (non-existing) object can possibly be. Beliefs of this kind, on my view, can be
epistemically grounded in the phenomenology of particularity of hallucinatory
experience. However, given that a hallucination fails to refer to any particular object, then
what kind of belief can possibly be about a putative object that, in fact, does not exist? I
end this section with a brief suggestion as to how my account of hallucination can be
interestingly connected to singular beliefs about non-existing objects.
The singularity of mental states can be understood in different ways. Roughly
speaking, what makes a state singular is the fact that it is necessarily about a particular
individual or collection of individuals. Assuming that mental states are intentional states
of some sort individuated in terms of their content, an obvious problem arises when we
try to give the content of empty singular thoughts, or thoughts containing empty singular
terms (e.g. failed demonstratives, empty names, fictional characters). In this case, the
thought is necessarily about an individual, but there is no existing individual for this
thought to be possibly about.
One way of cashing out the notion of singularity is saying that a singular content
is radically object-involving.136 On this view, every singular term must necessarily pick
out a referent if it is to have any content at all. McDowell (1984), for example, have
famously claimed that a singular thought with no referent is an aberration that simply
cannot exist. On this account, for example, if little Cora believes that Santa is coming at
Christmas, whatever is going on with her it cannot be a belief state, since no content can
136 Evans (1982) and McDowell (1984) have prominently defended a view of this sort.
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possibly be given to a state containing an empty name (well, sorry to say, there is no
Santa). The surprising outcome of this view is that little Cora simply has no belief
whatsoever. However, we can't simply say that and stop there. Whatever an empty
thought is, it is interestingly connected to other mental states and to the subject's
behavior. Little Cora, for instance, may come to believe that someone is coming at
Christmas because she believes that Santa is coming. She may also wake up earlier on
Christmas day because she believes that Santa is coming. The logical relations between
empty singular thoughts and other thoughts or attitudes must be explained, and this can
hardly be done without attributing some sort of content to these thoughts.
Russell, on its turn, has famously defended that empty names consist in disguised
descriptions. On this view, the content of an empty singular thought is not actually
singular, but composed of existentially quantified descriptions. It is, however, almost
unanimous today that this strategy cannot explain the distinctive referential way in which
singular terms are supposed to pick out their referents.
There are surely many alternative views in the market that fall somewhere in
between a radically object-involving strategy and a radically descriptivist strategy. I
propose here that we follow Sainsbury's (2005) strategy of cashing out singularity in
terms of internal configuration. On this view, a mental state is singular if it has the same
internal configuration as an object-involving state.137 From this perspective, a term is
singular if it plays the same role played by an object-involving term within the internal
configuration of a state. This allows for the possibility of terms that purport to refer to an
individual but that lack a referent to count as singular terms. Insofar as the empty term
plays the relevant role within the internal structure, it qualifies as a singular term.
137 See Grice (1969) for a precursor of this perspective.
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An essential feature of how object-involving terms function concerns the
distinctive referential way in which they pick out their referents. If this feature can be
retained even though the object-involving term is substituted by a term that fails to pick
out a referent, then we have a state that is, in an important sense, internally configured
like an object-involving state but that is, so to say, object-lacking. This kind of state, in
which a term refers (rigidly) to a putative object but fails to pick out a referent, can serve
as a model for empty singularity. This is, in a nutshell, the main idea of Sainsbury's
(2005) theory of "reference without referents", or RWR for short.
My account of hallucinatory experience, or so I claim, sits nicely together with
Sainsbury's account of empty singular thoughts. Hallucinations are interestingly similar
to empty singular thoughts. They also refer in a distinctive way to a putative object, but
they fail to pick out a referent. On my view, a hallucination has a content-schema that
captures the internal configuration of that state. I represent this configuration as [ f( ), F ],
where the function stands for some sort of empty referential term. The components of the
content-schema of a hallucination can be mapped onto the elements of the content of an
empty singular thought. In a certain sense, we can say that empty singular thoughts and
hallucinations have similar internal configurations.
An account of perceptual experience must explain the interesting connections
between perceptual and cognitive states. The relation between perceptual and cognitive
states is not only of epistemic justification. There is also a relation of semantic grounding.
This is a specific form of logical relation, in opposition to a merely causal one. If, for
example, I hallucinate what seems to me to be a red tomato, this experience can be
logically connected to thoughts about that (seeming) tomato. Johnston (2004) claimed
that a hallucination can make de re thoughts about qualities available. I would also add
the following claim: a hallucination can also make empty singular thoughts available.
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The fact that a subject may have certain empty thoughts because of a hallucination can be
explained in a very natural way in my view. A hallucination phenomenally presents itself
as referring to a putative object. The phenomenological particularity of hallucination
makes it, so to say, a phenomenal reference without referent. Not surprisingly, a
hallucination can be interestingly connected with other mental states that are references
without referents.
I shall stop now. I will not develop the relation between hallucination and thought
in any more detail. My account of hallucination is certainly not committed to RWR, or to
any other substantive theory of empty thoughts. I believe, nonetheless, that my proposal
sits nicely together with Sainsbury's view. I leave it here, however, as a mere suggestion
as to how my proposal can be developed in a certain direction. The details concerning the
relation between perception and thought go much beyond the scope of my dissertation.
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Conclusion
The nature of perceptual experience, and of hallucinatory experience in particular,
have been puzzling philosophers for a long time. In this dissertation, I certainly haven't
eliminated all the obscurities that surround this question. I modestly tried to advance our
understanding of the question and hopefully shed some light on a few spots that are still
obscure to many philosophers.
As I set the stage, two major views offer opposing accounts of the nature of
perceptual experience. I call these views naïve realism and representationalism. There
are, no doubt, other players in this game. But I focused my attention here exclusively on
those two prominent candidates. I offered a way of characterizing these views that, at the
same time, does justice to the core claims of their most prominent defenders, and that
highlights the relevant desiderata they address. What exactly they claim and to what
extend these views contradict is not so clear. It is also unclear what exactly they are
theories of. I thus proposed a way of untangling this debate that makes explicit where,
and why, they diverge.
As I defined these theories, they are theories about the nature of perception.
Theories of this sort are committed to explaining some specific desiderata. Unless we
have a good grasp on what exactly is being accounted for, and how it is accounted for,
the whole debate is doomed to obscurity. As I proposed, a theory about the nature of
perceptual experience aims to explain the intrinsic properties of this kind of mental state
in terms of its fundamental metaphysical constitution. The theories in dispute here are,
thus, in the business of telling what perceptual experiences fundamentally are. Plausibly,
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an account of perception should explain why experiences have the specific phenomenal
character that they do. A theory of perception should also explain the interesting
relations between sensory experience, thought, knowledge, and behavior. A theory of the
relevant sort is committed to satisfying multiple explanatory demands.
Perceptual experiences are typically classified by philosophers into three types:
veridical perception, illusion, and hallucination. When giving an account of the nature of
experience, a philosopher is committed to tell some story about all three types. They have
a particularly hard time trying to account for the nature of hallucination, or what
hallucinations fundamentally are. Given various assumptions of their views, hallucination
seems to resist being incorporated into a general theory of the nature of perception. In this
dissertation, I addressed this question: what, after all, is the nature of hallucination?
In Chapter 1, I argued that naïve realists fail to come to grips with the distinctive
nature of hallucination. Given some core assumptions of their view, that I made explicit,
naïve realists are committed to some form of disjunctivist account of perceptual
experience. I argued that none of the three disjunctivist accounts available to them offer a
satisfactory explanation of the nature of hallucination. The deepest reason why they fail
to accomplish this task, I argued, consists in their fundamental allegiance to a naïve
conception of perceptual phenomenology. I then proposed that we should reject this
conception and look for a more promising way of accounting for the nature of
hallucination.
In Chapter 2, I investigated whether or not representationalists offer a better
account of hallucination. Given some core principles of this view, representationalists try
to account for the nature of hallucination in terms of its representational content (plus
other aspects of experience). I evaluated different ways in which the content of
hallucination can be understood. As I argued, the accounts proposed by
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representationalists also fail, for various reasons, to satisfy the relevant desiderata. The
min reason why representationalists have failed to deliver the required explanations, I
argued, is that the notion of content, as it has been typically understood, is overloaded
with irreconcilable explanatory demands. A more (layered) notion of content seems to be
required to account for hallucination.
Finally, in Chapter 3, I sketched my own tentative account of the nature of
hallucination. Though my proposal is still schematic and incomplete in may respects, I
argued that it offers a promising way of understanding the fundamental aspects of
hallucination. My view, I argued, can avoid the various problems detected in the former
alternatives and satisfy the most problematic desiderata. My proposal is economical, but
I argued here that it has the resources needed to capture the complex nature of
hallucination in a novel and more promising way.
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